This work analyzes how the Supreme Court of India and High Courts function using the lens of judicial independence and accountability. Through extensive conceptual analysis, it posits that both concepts - independence and accountability - irrespective of jurisdiction, are not in conflict as is commonly assumed. Instead, both lead to 'an effective judiciary'. It uses this doctrinal understanding of 'an effective judiciary' to assess four key, yet academically overlooked facets of judicial functioning in India where judicial independence and judicial accountability have critical significance - appointment, transfer, impeachment and post-retirement employment of judges. It provides a historical account of each of these facets to explain how the dominant narrative of judicial independence as insulation of the judiciary from government, and accountability as its antithesis, took hold. It specifically discusses the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case, the most recent manifestation of this narrative, and argues why the judgement does not lead to 'an effective judiciary'. It consequently suggests certain reforms which could strike an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability and take India closer to the higher judiciary its Constitution envisages and its citizens deserve. The takeaways that the book aims to presents will be of relevance, not only to academics interested in judicial reform in India, but also to scholars and policy-makers working with other judiciaries in South Asia and the world of law"--