The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out?
The discussions, which pitted Israel's security concerns against the United States' determined goal to stem nuclear proliferation, produced a set of strategic understandings. This book recounts the dialogue and related diplomatic activity, that took place during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the Ben-Gurion and Eshkol premierships.
Operation Protective Edge, launched on July 8, 2014, saw heavy fighting between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas in Gaza. Throughout the war US government media spokespersons confirmed Israels right to self-defense against rockets and tunnels, and condemned Hamas for initiating the conflict and its use of human shields. But there is an important difference between confirmation and pro-active demonstration at the highest political level. The longstanding alliance between the United States and Israel has always been subject to the administration and president of the day. In this case, the Obama administrations support for Israels right to self-defense was qualified, and as a result the Israeli political leadership felt constrained in its ability to defeat Hamas militarily without risking criticism from the United States that would impact negatively on the special relationship. In its role as ally, the United States was careful not to apply direct political pressure on Israel. However, US government public criticisms relating to Gazan civilian loss of life damaged Israel on the international stage via harrowing media coverage surrounding the conflict. The Federal Aviation Administration order to airlines to stop flying to Israel enhanced Hamas claim that it had inflicted a strategic defeat to the Zionist State. For the last 70 years Israel has recognized that the United States is its primary strategic ally a principle initiated by Israels first Prime Minister and Defense Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Political and military policies have to be directed to prevent a rift. But the Protective Edge experience has brought to the fore that in times of crisis Israel cannot rely on a special relationship to secure its safety and must of necessity possess the political will and military ability to defend itself and to take actions that may result in a strained relationship.
The discussions, which pitted Israel's security concerns against the United States' determined goal to stem nuclear proliferation, produced a set of strategic understandings. This book recounts the dialogue and related diplomatic activity, that took place during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the Ben-Gurion and Eshkol premierships.
Operation Protective Edge, launched on July 8, 2014, saw heavy fighting between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas in Gaza. Throughout the war US government media spokespersons confirmed Israels right to self-defense against rockets and tunnels, and condemned Hamas for initiating the conflict and its use of human shields. But there is an important difference between confirmation and pro-active demonstration at the highest political level. The longstanding alliance between the United States and Israel has always been subject to the administration and president of the day. In this case, the Obama administrations support for Israels right to self-defense was qualified, and as a result the Israeli political leadership felt constrained in its ability to defeat Hamas militarily without risking criticism from the United States that would impact negatively on the special relationship. In its role as ally, the United States was careful not to apply direct political pressure on Israel. However, US government public criticisms relating to Gazan civilian loss of life damaged Israel on the international stage via harrowing media coverage surrounding the conflict. The Federal Aviation Administration order to airlines to stop flying to Israel enhanced Hamas claim that it had inflicted a strategic defeat to the Zionist State. For the last 70 years Israel has recognized that the United States is its primary strategic ally a principle initiated by Israels first Prime Minister and Defense Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Political and military policies have to be directed to prevent a rift. But the Protective Edge experience has brought to the fore that in times of crisis Israel cannot rely on a special relationship to secure its safety and must of necessity possess the political will and military ability to defend itself and to take actions that may result in a strained relationship.
Come along with me on the journey of my life starting from my birthplace in Darfur, Sudan until I settled in Boston, Massachusetts. I will show you the details of life and culture in each of these small villages of Sudan where sometimes there was no electricity or clean water but the people were very generous and welcoming. I set out to study and work hard to improve my situation and help the people around me, and I found happiness and enjoyed my life in each place . You will see how God miraculously helped me in every step of this adventure along the journey of my life from Darfur, Sudan to Boston, USA.
The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out?
An essential insight into this central figure in the modern history of Israel and Zionism. This important new study explores the years that built up to the Six Day War and details the crucial issues and events the world is still grappling with today. This book traces Daniel Ben-Gurion's waning years in Israeli politics. After his resignation from the office of prime minister in 1963, the 'Old Man' soon lost faith in his self-chose successor, Levi Eshkol, and ceaselessly tried to undermine the latter's premiership, eventually forming a breakaway party. The events leading up to the Six-Day War in June 1967 caught Ben-Gurion by surprise. During the weeks-long 'waiting period' prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he paid little attention to daily security issues. But when war did erupt, he displayed one of his key leadership skills – the ability to formulate an accurate, independent situation assessment. It will be of interest to scholars working in Israeli politics and history, this is a lucid, thoroughly researched account of the sunset years of the driving force behind the Israeli nation-state.
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