Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) already face higher temperatures than other countries and will be more exposed to extreme heat and weather events going forward. Using innovative approaches, the paper finds that in FCS, climate vulnerability and underlying fragilities—namely conflict, heavy dependence on rainfed agriculture, and weak capacity—exacerbate each other, amplifying the negative impact on people and economies. FCS suffer more severe and persistent GDP losses than other countries due to climate shocks because their underlying fragilities amplify the impact of shocks, in particular in agriculture. At the same time, climate shocks worsen underlying fragilities, namely conflict. Macro-critical adaptation policies are needed to facilitate the immediate response to climate shocks and to build climate resilience over time. Sizeable and sustained international support—especially grants, concessional financing and capacity development—is urgent to avoid worse outcomes, including forced displacement and migration. The IMF is stepping up support to FCS in dealing with climate challenges through carefully tailored policy advice, financing, and capacity development.
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region in the world most vulnerable to climate change despite its cumulatively emitting the least amount of greenhouse gases. Substantial financing is urgently needed across the economy—for governments, businesses, and households—to support climate change adaptation and mitigation, which are critical for advancing resilient and green economic development as well as meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement. Given the immensity of SSA’s other development needs, this financing must be in addition to existing commitments on development finance. There are many potential ways to raise financing to meet adaptation and mitigation needs, spanning from domestic revenue mobilization to various forms of international private financing. Against this backdrop, SSA policymakers and stakeholders are exploring sources of financing for climate action that countries may not have used substantially in the past. This Staff Climate Note presents some basic information on opportunities and challenges associated with these financing instruments.
As livelihoods in Niger still depend to a large extent on agricultural production, shocks related to climate change and insecurity present a threat for the country’s development path and are the main sources of vulnerability for the population in rural areas. This paper uses data from the latest household living standard survey to quantify the effects and interactions of these shocks on household welfare before proposing policy recommendations to enhance the resilience of households and the economy more generally. Our results show that when rainfall decreases by one standard deviation, per capita income falls by 11 percent. Furthermore, the impact of shocks on households depends on their adaptive capacity, which includes sufficient agricultural capital and income diversification. Without concrete adaptation measures, vulnerability to climate change is expected to increase in Niger, and human capital accumulation in poor household is also expected to deteriorate and could lead to a poverty trap.
The paper explores the drivers of political fragility by focusing on coups d’état as symptomatic of such fragility. It uses event studies to identify factors that exhibit significantly different dynamics in the runup to coups, and machine learning to identify these stressors and more structural determinants of fragility—as well as their nonlinear interactions—that create an environment propitious to coups. The paper finds that the destabilization of a country’s economic, political or security environment—such as low growth, high inflation, weak external positions, political instability and conflict—set the stage for a higher likelihood of coups, with overlapping stressors amplifying each other. These stressors are more likely to lead to breakdowns in political systems when demographic pressures and underlying structural weaknesses (especially poverty, exclusion, and weak governance) are present or when policies are weaker, through complex interactions. Conversely, strengthened fundamentals and macropolicies have higher returns in structurally fragile environments in terms of staving off political breakdowns, suggesting that continued engagement by multilateral institutions and donors in fragile situations is likely to yield particularly high dividends. The model performs well in predicting coups out of sample, having predicted a high probability of most 2020-23 coups, including in the Sahel region.
Financial inclusion can increase economic growth and productivity and reduce poverty and inequality by helping people and firms—particularly SMEs—to save and invest, smooth consumption, and better manage financial risks. This paper highlights Niger’s lag compared to other WAEMU countries in terms of access to and use of formal financial services, including for women and youth, and underscores key demand and supply side challenges to financial inclusion as well as structural impediments. It lays out key priorities for Niger to harness the potential of greater financial inclusion to support the country’s development agenda, including efforts to tackle low financial literacy, promote digitization, and address informality.
This paper analyzes the interlinkages between climate shocks, domestic conflicts, and policy resilience in Africa. It builds on a Correlated Random Effect model to asess these interrelationships on a broad sample of 51 African countries over the 1990-2018 period. We find suggestive evidence that climate shocks, as captured through weather shocks, increase the likelihood of domestic conflicts, by as high as up to 38 percent. However, the effect holds only for intercommunal conflicts, not for government-involved conflicts. The effect is maginified in countries with more unequal income distribution and a stronger share of young male demographics. The results are robust to a wide set of sensitivity checks, including using various indicators of weather shocks and domestic conflicts, and alternative estimation techniques. The findings shed light on key policy resilience factors, including steadily improving domestic revenue mobilization, strengthening social protection and access to basic health care services, scaling up public investment in the agriculture sector, and stepping up anti-desertification efforts.
Niger’s exposure to recurrent shocks, including climate shocks, increases its vulnerability to food insecurity. This paper aims to quantify the combined effects of climate shocks and food insecurity on key economic variables and identify the most effective mitigation policy responses using a general equilibrium model. Results indicate that rural households would be the most affected by a climate shock resulting in a decline in domestic agricultural production, which would reduce their consumption, erode their capital, and thus increase urban-rural inequalities. Simulations show that cash transfers and the reduction of internal mobility costs appear to be more effective in mitigating the impact on households of a climate shock on agricultural production.
Financial inclusion can increase economic growth and productivity and reduce poverty and inequality by helping people and firms—particularly SMEs—to save and invest, smooth consumption, and better manage financial risks. This paper highlights Niger’s lag compared to other WAEMU countries in terms of access to and use of formal financial services, including for women and youth, and underscores key demand and supply side challenges to financial inclusion as well as structural impediments. It lays out key priorities for Niger to harness the potential of greater financial inclusion to support the country’s development agenda, including efforts to tackle low financial literacy, promote digitization, and address informality.
The paper explores the drivers of political fragility by focusing on coups d’état as symptomatic of such fragility. It uses event studies to identify factors that exhibit significantly different dynamics in the runup to coups, and machine learning to identify these stressors and more structural determinants of fragility—as well as their nonlinear interactions—that create an environment propitious to coups. The paper finds that the destabilization of a country’s economic, political or security environment—such as low growth, high inflation, weak external positions, political instability and conflict—set the stage for a higher likelihood of coups, with overlapping stressors amplifying each other. These stressors are more likely to lead to breakdowns in political systems when demographic pressures and underlying structural weaknesses (especially poverty, exclusion, and weak governance) are present or when policies are weaker, through complex interactions. Conversely, strengthened fundamentals and macropolicies have higher returns in structurally fragile environments in terms of staving off political breakdowns, suggesting that continued engagement by multilateral institutions and donors in fragile situations is likely to yield particularly high dividends. The model performs well in predicting coups out of sample, having predicted a high probability of most 2020-23 coups, including in the Sahel region.
As livelihoods in Niger still depend to a large extent on agricultural production, shocks related to climate change and insecurity present a threat for the country’s development path and are the main sources of vulnerability for the population in rural areas. This paper uses data from the latest household living standard survey to quantify the effects and interactions of these shocks on household welfare before proposing policy recommendations to enhance the resilience of households and the economy more generally. Our results show that when rainfall decreases by one standard deviation, per capita income falls by 11 percent. Furthermore, the impact of shocks on households depends on their adaptive capacity, which includes sufficient agricultural capital and income diversification. Without concrete adaptation measures, vulnerability to climate change is expected to increase in Niger, and human capital accumulation in poor household is also expected to deteriorate and could lead to a poverty trap.
This paper analyzes the interlinkages between climate shocks, domestic conflicts, and policy resilience in Africa. It builds on a Correlated Random Effect model to asess these interrelationships on a broad sample of 51 African countries over the 1990-2018 period. We find suggestive evidence that climate shocks, as captured through weather shocks, increase the likelihood of domestic conflicts, by as high as up to 38 percent. However, the effect holds only for intercommunal conflicts, not for government-involved conflicts. The effect is maginified in countries with more unequal income distribution and a stronger share of young male demographics. The results are robust to a wide set of sensitivity checks, including using various indicators of weather shocks and domestic conflicts, and alternative estimation techniques. The findings shed light on key policy resilience factors, including steadily improving domestic revenue mobilization, strengthening social protection and access to basic health care services, scaling up public investment in the agriculture sector, and stepping up anti-desertification efforts.
Niger’s exposure to recurrent shocks, including climate shocks, increases its vulnerability to food insecurity. This paper aims to quantify the combined effects of climate shocks and food insecurity on key economic variables and identify the most effective mitigation policy responses using a general equilibrium model. Results indicate that rural households would be the most affected by a climate shock resulting in a decline in domestic agricultural production, which would reduce their consumption, erode their capital, and thus increase urban-rural inequalities. Simulations show that cash transfers and the reduction of internal mobility costs appear to be more effective in mitigating the impact on households of a climate shock on agricultural production.
Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) already face higher temperatures than other countries and will be more exposed to extreme heat and weather events going forward. Using innovative approaches, the paper finds that in FCS, climate vulnerability and underlying fragilities—namely conflict, heavy dependence on rainfed agriculture, and weak capacity—exacerbate each other, amplifying the negative impact on people and economies. FCS suffer more severe and persistent GDP losses than other countries due to climate shocks because their underlying fragilities amplify the impact of shocks, in particular in agriculture. At the same time, climate shocks worsen underlying fragilities, namely conflict. Macro-critical adaptation policies are needed to facilitate the immediate response to climate shocks and to build climate resilience over time. Sizeable and sustained international support—especially grants, concessional financing and capacity development—is urgent to avoid worse outcomes, including forced displacement and migration. The IMF is stepping up support to FCS in dealing with climate challenges through carefully tailored policy advice, financing, and capacity development.
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region in the world most vulnerable to climate change despite its cumulatively emitting the least amount of greenhouse gases. Substantial financing is urgently needed across the economy—for governments, businesses, and households—to support climate change adaptation and mitigation, which are critical for advancing resilient and green economic development as well as meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement. Given the immensity of SSA’s other development needs, this financing must be in addition to existing commitments on development finance. There are many potential ways to raise financing to meet adaptation and mitigation needs, spanning from domestic revenue mobilization to various forms of international private financing. Against this backdrop, SSA policymakers and stakeholders are exploring sources of financing for climate action that countries may not have used substantially in the past. This Staff Climate Note presents some basic information on opportunities and challenges associated with these financing instruments.
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