This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification. The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human factors in the verification process, shedding light on this ‘blind spot’ of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and disarmament.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a new urgency in efforts to deal with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferati on. The potential acquisition and use by terrorist groups of such weaponry was suddenly a much increased threat. The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction subsequently encouraged some twenty-two countries and the European Union to pledge up to $20 billion to address this challenge. The creation of the Global Partnership was the first time so many countries agreed to collaborate on a range of non-proliferation, security and nuclear safety programmes, as well as commit such an amount of resources to them. Based on extensive primary research, this Whitehall Paper assesses the success and shortcomings to date of the Global Partnership, and suggests how the mechanism can be bolstered and taken forward.
This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya‘s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi‘s rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime‘s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.
In this book, the authors explore the controversial Iranian nuclear programme through the conceptual lens of nuclear hedging. In 2002, revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facilities thrust Iran’s nuclear activities under the spotlight and prompted concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran has always denied nuclear weapons aspirations, yet it cannot be disputed that the Islamic Republic has gone well beyond what is required for a civil nuclear programme based on energy production and scientific research. What, then, is the nature and significance of Iran's nuclear behaviour? Does it form part of a coherent strategy? What can Iran's actions in the nuclear field tell us about Tehran's intentions? And what does the Iranian case teach us about proliferation behaviour more generally? This book addresses these questions by exploring the nature of nuclear hedging and how this approach might be identified, before applying this logic to the Iranian case. It provides fresh insights into the inherently opaque area of nuclear proliferation and a more nuanced interpretation of the Iranian nuclear challenge.
This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya‘s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi‘s rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime‘s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.
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