This fourth volume of a five-part policy history of the U.S. government and the Vietnam War covers the core period of U.S. involvement, from July 1965, when the decision was made to send large-scale U.S. forces, to the beginning of 1968, just before the Tet offensive and the decision to seek a negotiated settlement. Using a wide variety of archival sources and interviews, the book examines in detail the decisions of the president, relations between the president and Congress, and the growth of public and congressional opposition to the war. Differences between U.S. military leaders on how the war should be fought are also included, as well as military planning and operations. Among many other important subjects, the financial effects of the war and of raising taxes are considered, as well as the impact of a tax increase on congressional and public support for the war. Another major interest is the effort by Congress to influence the conduct of the war and to place various controls on U.S. goals and operations. The emphasis throughout this richly textured narrative is on providing a better understanding of the choices facing the United States and the way in which U.S. policymakers tried to find an effective politico-military strategy, while also probing for a diplomatic settlement. Originally published in 1995. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
United States Army in Vietnam. CMH Pub. 91-13. Draws upon previously unavailable Army and Defense Department records to interpret the part the press played during the Vietnam War. Discusses the roles of the following in the creation of information policy: Military Assistance Command's Office of Information in Saigon; White House; State Department; Defense Department; and the United States Embassy in Saigon.
This searching analysis of what has been called America's longest war" was commissioned by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to achieve an improved understanding of American participation in the conflict. Part II covers the period from Kennedy's inauguration through Johnson's first year in office. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The Vietnam War coincided with, and in many ways caused, an enormous cultural schism in the United States. Now, as then, scholarship is divided over the efficacy of American Cold War strategy, its ability to halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and the role the United States should have played in the struggle for a unified, socialist Vietnam. This book represents a new historical take on the Vietnam War. After a lengthy description of the war's historical backdrop, the book examines the origins of American involvement under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Kennedy's advancement toward direct conflict between the U.S. and guerrilla and regular North Vietnamese forces, and the dramatic troop buildup under Johnson. The final chapters discuss peace negotiations during Nixon's presidency, the ultimate American failure in Indochina, and the region in the aftermath of war. Throughout, the work argues that the war was necessary and winnable under better circumstances and leadership. The book includes an extensive bibliography.
Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973, the sequel volume to William M. Hammond2s Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, continues the history and analysis of the relationship between the press and the military during the final years of the Vietnam conflict. Relying on official records and histories, news media sources and interviews, and significant secondary works, Hammond has carefully and capably traced the many turns that public affairs policies and campaigns took to protect military secrets without diminishing the independence of news correspondents. Massive amounts of information were forthcoming without endangering U.S. forces, but neither the press nor the government was totally satisfied with the system. Doubts and criticisms loomed large, giving rise to tensions and disagreements. With some exceptions, the military and the news media became enemies. What happened in Vietnam between the military and the news media was symptomatic of what had occurred in the United States as a whole. Hammond2s well-written account raises the issues and problems that can confront an open society at war, documenting events and precedents that will continue to affect military-media relations during future operations. It offers important lessons for Soldiers, newsmen, policymakers, and the public at large.
A surprisingly little-known marque today, Elcar once ranked among the finest vehicles on American roads. Built to exacting standards in Elkhart, Indiana, an Elcar could compete head-to-head on the basis of performance, quality, or price with the products of much larger manufacturers. Ultimately done in by weak distribution and the ravages of the Depression, Elcar today stands as an example of an ambitious company that transformed itself, successfully if temporarily, from a maker of buggies and harnesses into a respected car manufacturer in the early days of the automotive age. This remarkably exhaustive history, researched over several decades from all available sources, including interviews with former Elcar employees, details all Elcar models and the Pratt vehicles that preceded them, as well as the personalities behind the cars. Extensive appendices provide a complete model history, with specifications; a full corporate chronology; an illustrated accounting of all Elcars and Pratts known to survive whole or in part today; a roster of company employees; a descriptive list of all ads and brochures ever produced by the company; and a wealth of other data that can be found nowhere else. Lavishly illustrated and surpassingly thorough, this book is a well of information on a significant but forgotten line of automobiles.
From the end of World War II down to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to prevent the expansion of communism. Indeed, that objective was directly embodied in the so-called strategy of containment, a global approach to the pursuit of U.S. national security interests that was first adumbrated by George F. Kennan in 1947 and later became the guiding force in U.S. foreign policy. At first, the concept of containment was applied primarily to Europe. It was there that the threat to U.S. interests from international communism directed from Moscow was first perceived, in the form of Soviet efforts to dominate the nations of Eastern Europe and extend Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Other areas of the world—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—were considered to be less threatened by forces hostile to the free world or more peripheral to U.S. foreign policy concerns. At least that was the view initially proclaimed by George Kennan himself, who identified five areas in the world as vital to the United States: North America, Great Britain, Central Europe, the USSR, and Japan. Only the latter was located in Asia. By the end of the decade, however, the focus of U.S. containment strategy was extended to include East and Southeast Asia, primarily because of the increasing likelihood of a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, which, in the minds of some U.S. policymakers, would be tantamount to giving the Soviet Union a dominant position on the Asian mainland. Added to the growing threat in China was the increasingly unstable situation in Southeast Asia, where the long arc of colonies that had been established by the imperialist powers during the last half of the nineteenth century was gradually but inexorably being replaced by independent states. The emergence of such colonial territories into independence was generally viewed as a welcome prospect by foreign policy observers in Washington, but when combined with the impending victory of communist forces in China it raised the unsettling possibility that the entire region might be brought within the reach of the Kremlin.
An authoritative historical assessment of american foreign policy in a crucial postwar decade. William Bundy's magisterial book focuses on the controversial record of Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's often overpraised foreign policy of 1969 to 1973, an era that has rightly been described as the hinge on which the last half of the century turned. Bundy's principled, clear-eyed assessment in effect pulls together all the major issues and events of the thirty-year span from the 1940s to the end of the Vietnam War, and makes it clear just how dangerous the consequences of Nixon and Kissinger's deceptive modus operandi were.
This book is a study of the process by which herbicidal military policy was made in Southeast Asia. The author relates the intense controversy over the effects of the Agent Orange spraying program. He connects policy to operations, showing how pressure from scientists and disagreements within the government imposed limits on the program. He explores the technical difficulties in spraying herbicides; and he pays tribute to the Ranch Hand airmen who flew planes "low and slow" over enemy positions (altogether, Ranch Hand aircraft took over 7,000 hits). Since the 1975 renunciation of the use of herbicides, this military episode has remained unique in U.S. history. Includes notes, appendices, bibliography, and photos.
Part III, which begins in January 1965 and ends in January 1967, treats the watershed period of U.S. involvement in the war, from President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam and to send U.S. ground forces into South Vietnam, through the buildup of military forces and political cadres required by the new U.S. role in the war. This volume examines Johnson's policymaking, his interaction with military advisors and with Congressional critics such as Mike Mansfield, and his reactions as protests against the war began to grow. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This is a study of U.S. government policymaking during the 30 years of the Vietnam war, 1945-75, beginning with the 1945-1960 period. Although focusing on the course of events in Washington and between Washington and U.S. officials on the scene, it also depicts major events and trends in Vietnam to which the U.S. was responding, as well as the state of American public opinion and public activity directed at supporting or opposing the war."--Preface.
This searching analysis of what has been called America's longest war" was commissioned by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to achieve an improved understanding of American participation in the conflict. Part I begins with Truman's decision at the end of World War II to accept French reoccupation of Indochina, rather than to seek the international trusteeship favored earlier by Roosevelt. It then discusses U.S. support of the French role and U.S. determination to curtail Communist expansion in Asia. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Thirty years ago, one of the most sensational and frightening episodes in American history -- an episode that traumatized the nation -- reached its climax in the Army-McCarthy hearings. Until now, the full story of the intrigues and maneuverings of demagogues and ideologues, of crusaders and compromisers involved in the McCarthy affair has never been told. Crucial documents -- secret diary entries, personal letters, memoranda of meetings, and, above all, transcripts of monitored phone calls of pivotal figures (many of whom Ewald knew as a member of Eisenhower's White House staff) -- were impounded by the Executive Branch to preserve their secrecy and place them beyond the reach of a subpoena by the McCarthy committee. William Ewald's riveting behind-the-scenes chronicle of the administration's effort to thwart McCarthy -- and the roles of key men in Congress, the Pentagon, and the press corps -- draws on this wealth of previously untapped material and is filled with revelations never before published, such as exactly whose side J. Edgar Hoover was playing on and the answer to the accusation that McCarthy forged documents in response to alleged forgery by the Army. - Jacket flap.
This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage.
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