Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judgecentered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic. Eskridge also considers how different normative theories of jurisprudence--liberal, legal process, and antiliberal--inform debates about statutory interpretation. He explores what theory of statutory interpretation--if any--is required by the rule of law or by democratic theory. Finally, he provides an analytical and jurisprudential history of important debates on statutory interpretation.
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn propose an original theory of constitutional law whereby, while the Constitution provides a vision, our democracy advances by means of statutes that supplement or even supplant the written Constitution.
American democracy is commonly described as "majoritarian," but Robert W. Bennett argues that it is more usefully understood as "an extraordinary engine for producing conversation about public affairs" that involves essentially the entire adult citizenry. In Bennett's view, many central features of American democracy act as spurs to wide-ranging conversational interaction between the government and the governed. These included a separately elected executive, bicameralism, federalism, localism, single-member legislative districts, and heightened constitutional protection for speech and the press. Bennett asserts that the resulting democratic conversation plays an important role in holding the entire nation together and in inducing fidelity on the part of citizens to actions taken in its name.Bennett's groundbreaking conversational account also illuminates facets of American democracy which, he says, have heretofore "been blurry, if visible at all." He focuses on four puzzles of American democracy that can be "solved" through his approach. These are: lack of concern about the apportionment of the United States Senate; inattention to the anomalous political treatment of children; the perceived "counter-majoritarianism" of judicial review in enforcement of the U.S. Constitution; and the much-discussed paradox of voting: why do so many citizens vote when their individual ballots have almost no chance of changing election outcomes? Bennett also treats methodological questions of just what makes theories of complex social phenomena (like American democracy) more or less successful.
Contains an introduction to legislation; descriptive and normative theories of legislation, including procedural theories of legislation, pluralism and interest groups, and institutional theories of legislation; Title VII: interpretive issues and political theories, the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, affirmative action United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County; legislative drafting; representational structures, structures of legislative deliberation; statutes as a source of public policy in the United States; theories of statutory interpretation; doctrines of statutory interpretation; and the implementation of statutes.
A history of the discretion accorded U.S. judges in interpreting legislation (from the Revolution to the present), culminating in the author's own theory of the proper scope of judicial discretion.
“Eminently readable, and anybody who cares about the future of American democracy in these perilous times can only hope that it will be widely read and carefully considered.” —James Pope, Washington Post “Fishkin and Forbath’s accessible work serves as both history lesson and political playbook, offering the Left an underutilized—and perhaps counterintuitive—tool in the present-day fight against social and economic injustice: the Constitution.” —Benjamin Morse, Jacobin “Rousing and authoritative...attempt[s] to recover the Constitution’s pivotal role in shaping claims of justice and equality...Makes even the present court’s capture by the ideological right a compelling platform for a revived social-democratic constitutional politics.” —New Republic Oligarchy is a threat to the American republic. When too much economic and political power is concentrated in too few hands, we risk losing the “republican form of government” the Constitution requires. Today, courts enforce the Constitution as if it had almost nothing to say about this threat. But as this revolutionary retelling of constitutional history shows, a commitment to prevent oligarchy once stood at the center of a robust tradition in American political and constitutional thought. Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath demonstrate that reformers, legislators, and even judges working in this “democracy-of-opportunity” tradition understood that the Constitution imposes a duty on legislatures to thwart oligarchy and promote a broad distribution of wealth and political power. These ideas led Jacksonians to fight special economic privileges for the few, Populists to try to break up monopoly power, and Progressives to fight for the constitutional right to form a union. But today, as we enter a new Gilded Age, this tradition in progressive American economic and political thought lies dormant. The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution begins the work of recovering it and exploring its profound implications for our deeply unequal society and badly damaged democracy.
In a comprehensive analysis of the legal issues concerning gender and sexual nonconformity in the United States, William Eskridge presents a rigorously argued case for the "sexualization" of the First Amendment, showing why, for example, same-sex ceremonies and intimacy should be considered "expressive conduct" deserving the protection of the courts. The book also locates the author's legal arguments within the larger currents of liberal theory and integrates them into a general stance toward freedom, gender equality, and religious pluralism.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.