Contractors provide a broad range of support to U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contractors at times exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. The DoD has acknowledged shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and Afghanistan. This report assesses DoD's development of contract support plans. It examines: (1) what progress DoD has made in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation plans; (2) the extent to which contract requirements are included in other sections of operation plans; and (3) DoD's progress in establishing a long-term capability to include operational contract support requirements in operation plans. Charts and tables.
The U.S. and Iraq have signed a Security Agreement calling for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Multi-National Force-Iraq has issued a plan for the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by Aug. 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011. The drawdown from Iraq includes the withdrawal of 128,700 U.S. troops, over 115,000 contractor personnel, the closure or transfer of 295 bases, and the retrograde of over 3.3 million pieces of equipment. This statement focuses on: (1) the extent to which the DoD has planned for the drawdown in accordance with timelines set by the Agreement and presidential directive; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with established timelines. Illus.
The DoD, the Dept. of State (DoS) and the USAID have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. There have been documented shortcomings in DoD's contract management and oversight, and its training of the non-acquisition workforce. This testimony addresses the extent to which: (1) DoD's Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR) are prepared for their roles and responsibilities and provide adequate contract oversight in Afghanistan; (2) DoD, DoS, and USAID vet non-U.S. firms for links to terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan; and (3) DoD has implemented past recommendations. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
The U.S. government relies extensively on private security contractors (PSC) for a variety of security services. However, incidents involving PSCs have raised concerns about oversight and legal accountability. This review examined the extent to which the Dept. of Defense (DoD) and Dept. of State have strengthened: (1) oversight; and (2) coordination of PSC¿s in Iraq. This report also provides information on the legal framework used to hold private security contractor employees legally accountable for their actions in Iraq. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.
The nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective logistics. As the DoD'¿¿s largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate, from Meals Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. This testimony identifies the challenges DoD faces in ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. It focuses on sound practices that have been identified regarding obtaining value when contracting and how they can also apply to DLA's acquisition of commodities. Charts and tables.
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, DoD established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tech'y., and counterimprovised explosive devices systems. This review determined: (1) what DoD entities exist for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DoD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) has DoD evaluated the potential for consolidations. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
The DoD is the single largest U.S. energy consumer. About 3/4 of its total consumption consists of mobility energy -- the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. This testimony discusses DoD¿s efforts to manage and reduce its mobility energy demand, and addresses: (1) energy issues that are likely to affect DoD in the future; (2) key departmental and military service efforts to reduce demand for mobility energy; and (3) DoD¿s management approach to guide and oversee these efforts. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.
The DoD relies extensively on contractors to support deployed forces for services that range from food and housing services to intelligence analysis. Since 1997, there have been reports on DoD¿s shortcomings in managing and overseeing its use of contractor support. Part of the difficulty attributed to these shortcomings is that no one person or entity made the decision to send 129,000 contractors to Iraq. Rather, numerous DoD activities were involved, thus adding to the complexity of the problems. This testimony focuses on the problems that DoD has faced, & future challenges, in managing & overseeing its contractor support to deployed forces. Charts & tables.
The drawdown from Iraq is a complex operation of significant magnitude. Established drawdown timelines dictate a reduction in forces to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. While the Dept. of Defense (DoD) has made progress toward meeting these goals, a large amount of equipment, personnel, and bases remain to be drawn down. Moreover, escalating U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may increase the pressure on DoD to efficiently execute the drawdown. This report examined: (1) the extent to which DoD has planned for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with set timelines; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown. Includes recomm. Illus.
The DoD relies greatly on contractors to support its current operations and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in support of future operations. As of Dec. 2009, DoD estimated that over 207,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD expects to increase the number of contractors as more troops deploy to Afghanistan. This testimony addresses: (1) the challenges DoD faces when trying to provide management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (2) the extent to which DoD has made progress in institutionalizing a department-wide approach to managing and overseeing operational contract support. Charts and tables.
The DoD, State, and the USAID have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. There are concerns that U.S. funds are being diverted to fund insurgent and criminal activity in Afghanistan. This review was initiated to identify DoD, State, and USAID efforts to vet non-U.S. contractors and assistance recipients in Afghanistan. It examines: (1) the extent to which DoD, State and USAID have established a process to vet non-U.S. vendors to ensure that resources are not used to support insurgents; and (2) the extent to which vetting information is shared among DoD, State, and USAID. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40% of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Org. (JIEDDO) was created to lead and coordinate all DoD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. The auditor is recommending that JIEDDO: (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DoD; (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives; and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. Illustrations.
The DoD relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations -- particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require large amounts of fuel, the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to forward-deployed locations presents a logistics burden and risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. This report addresses DoD's: (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations; and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. Solis visited DoD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these locations. Illus.
The Army and Marine Corps maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and are heavily involved in efforts to reset the force. The Dept. of Defense (DoD) has an interest in ensuring that the depots remain operationally effective, efficient, and capable of meeting future maintenance requirements. In 2008, the Army and the Marine Corps each submitted a depot maintenance strategic plan. The objective of this report was to evaluate the extent to which these plans provide comprehensive strategies for meeting future depot maintenance requirements. The report determined whether the plans were consistent with the criteria for developing a results-oriented management framework. Includes recommend. Illus.
In FY 2009, the DoD spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports. In Dec. 2009, the Pres. announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. This testimony reviews DoD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including: (1) the org. involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equip. into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DoD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DoD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. Illustrations.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has continuing efforts to modernize its airlift and tanker fleets by investing billions of dollars to modify legacy airlift systems, such as the C-5 and C-130, and procure new aircraft, such as a tanker replacement. Acquisition has been on GAO's list as a high risk area since 1990. Past GAO reports, including two recently issued, raise concerns about the quality of analyses underpinning the programmatic decision-making surrounding DOD's airlift requirements. GAO has reported that elements contributing to a sound business case for an acquisition are missing or incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new capabilities. Those elements include firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Acquisition problems that include failure to limit cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity reductions persist, but fiscal realities will not allow budgets to accommodate these problems any longer. This testimony addresses (1) the analyses supporting the Department of Defense's (DOD) mobility capabilities and requirements and (2) actions that are needed to improve the outcomes of weapon system acquisitions.
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