This is a study of U.S. government policymaking during the 30 years of the Vietnam war, 1945-75, beginning with the 1945-1960 period. Although focusing on the course of events in Washington and between Washington and U.S. officials on the scene, it also depicts major events and trends in Vietnam to which the U.S. was responding, as well as the state of American public opinion and public activity directed at supporting or opposing the war."--Preface.
This searching analysis of what has been called America's longest war" was commissioned by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to achieve an improved understanding of American participation in the conflict. Part I begins with Truman's decision at the end of World War II to accept French reoccupation of Indochina, rather than to seek the international trusteeship favored earlier by Roosevelt. It then discusses U.S. support of the French role and U.S. determination to curtail Communist expansion in Asia. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This fourth volume of a five-part policy history of the U.S. government and the Vietnam War covers the core period of U.S. involvement, from July 1965, when the decision was made to send large-scale U.S. forces, to the beginning of 1968, just before the Tet offensive and the decision to seek a negotiated settlement. Using a wide variety of archival sources and interviews, the book examines in detail the decisions of the president, relations between the president and Congress, and the growth of public and congressional opposition to the war. Differences between U.S. military leaders on how the war should be fought are also included, as well as military planning and operations. Among many other important subjects, the financial effects of the war and of raising taxes are considered, as well as the impact of a tax increase on congressional and public support for the war. Another major interest is the effort by Congress to influence the conduct of the war and to place various controls on U.S. goals and operations. The emphasis throughout this richly textured narrative is on providing a better understanding of the choices facing the United States and the way in which U.S. policymakers tried to find an effective politico-military strategy, while also probing for a diplomatic settlement. Originally published in 1995. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This searching analysis of what has been called America's longest war" was commissioned by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to achieve an improved understanding of American participation in the conflict. Part II covers the period from Kennedy's inauguration through Johnson's first year in office. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Now in a thoroughly revised edition, this influential book offers a concise history of the "Vietnam War" as seen by all sides, not just from the American perspective. Retaining its invaluable account of the strategies, perspectives, and internal politics of the Vietnamese Communists based on research in primary documents and interviews in Saigon and Hanoi, this completely updated and expanded edition incorporates the avalanche of documentation and secondary literature in both English and Vietnamese that has appeared over the past two decades. Distinguished scholar William S. Turley traces the conflict from its origins in the colonial period to its aftermath and shows how the local, national, regional, and global layers of conflict blended into a single event of great complexity. He takes a refreshingly objective look at contentious issues and concludes with a penetrating assessment of the claims, justifications, and "lessons" that scholars, statesmen, and strategists have advanced since the war's end. More information is available on the author's website.
A New York Times bestseller, this is the “outstanding” (The Atlantic), insightful, and authoritative account of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency. Drawing on newly declassified documents and thousands of pages of unpublished material, The Age of Eisenhower tells the story of a masterful president guiding the nation through the great crises of the 1950s, from McCarthyism and the Korean War through civil rights turmoil and Cold War conflicts. This is a portrait of a skilled leader who, despite his conservative inclinations, found a middle path through the bitter partisanship of his era. At home, Eisenhower affirmed the central elements of the New Deal, such as Social Security; fought the demagoguery of Senator Joseph McCarthy; and advanced the agenda of civil rights for African-Americans. Abroad, he ended the Korean War and avoided a new quagmire in Vietnam. Yet he also charted a significant expansion of America’s missile technology and deployed a vast array of covert operations around the world to confront the challenge of communism. As he left office, he cautioned Americans to remain alert to the dangers of a powerful military-industrial complex that could threaten their liberties. Today, presidential historians rank Eisenhower fifth on the list of great presidents, and William Hitchcock’s “rich narrative” (The Wall Street Journal) shows us why Ike’s stock has risen so high. He was a gifted leader, a decent man of humble origins who used his powers to advance the welfare of all Americans. Now more than ever, with this “complete and persuasive assessment” (Booklist, starred review), Americans have much to learn from Dwight Eisenhower.
Why does the United States pursue robust military invasions to change some foreign regimes but not others? Conventional accounts focus on geopolitics or elite ideology. C. William Walldorf, Jr., argues that the politics surrounding two broad, public narratives—the liberal narrative and the restraint narrative—often play a vital role in shaping US decisions whether to pursue robust and forceful regime change. Using current sociological work on cultural trauma, Walldorf explains how master narratives strengthen (and weaken), and he develops clear predictions for how and when these narratives will shape policy. To Shape Our World For Good demonstrates the importance and explanatory power of the master-narrative argument, using a sophisticated combination of methods: quantitative analysis and eight cases in the postwar period that include Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador during the Cold War and more recent cases in Iraq and Libya. The case studies provide the environment for a critical assessment of the connections among the politics of master narratives, pluralism, and the common good in contemporary US foreign policy and grand strategy. Walldorf adds new insight to our understanding of US expansionism and cautions against the dangers of misusing popular narratives for short-term political gains—a practice all too common both past and present.
From the end of World War II down to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to prevent the expansion of communism. Indeed, that objective was directly embodied in the so-called strategy of containment, a global approach to the pursuit of U.S. national security interests that was first adumbrated by George F. Kennan in 1947 and later became the guiding force in U.S. foreign policy. At first, the concept of containment was applied primarily to Europe. It was there that the threat to U.S. interests from international communism directed from Moscow was first perceived, in the form of Soviet efforts to dominate the nations of Eastern Europe and extend Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Other areas of the world—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—were considered to be less threatened by forces hostile to the free world or more peripheral to U.S. foreign policy concerns. At least that was the view initially proclaimed by George Kennan himself, who identified five areas in the world as vital to the United States: North America, Great Britain, Central Europe, the USSR, and Japan. Only the latter was located in Asia. By the end of the decade, however, the focus of U.S. containment strategy was extended to include East and Southeast Asia, primarily because of the increasing likelihood of a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, which, in the minds of some U.S. policymakers, would be tantamount to giving the Soviet Union a dominant position on the Asian mainland. Added to the growing threat in China was the increasingly unstable situation in Southeast Asia, where the long arc of colonies that had been established by the imperialist powers during the last half of the nineteenth century was gradually but inexorably being replaced by independent states. The emergence of such colonial territories into independence was generally viewed as a welcome prospect by foreign policy observers in Washington, but when combined with the impending victory of communist forces in China it raised the unsettling possibility that the entire region might be brought within the reach of the Kremlin.
Part III, which begins in January 1965 and ends in January 1967, treats the watershed period of U.S. involvement in the war, from President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam and to send U.S. ground forces into South Vietnam, through the buildup of military forces and political cadres required by the new U.S. role in the war. This volume examines Johnson's policymaking, his interaction with military advisors and with Congressional critics such as Mike Mansfield, and his reactions as protests against the war began to grow. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The Vietnam War coincided with, and in many ways caused, an enormous cultural schism in the United States. Now, as then, scholarship is divided over the efficacy of American Cold War strategy, its ability to halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and the role the United States should have played in the struggle for a unified, socialist Vietnam. This book represents a new historical take on the Vietnam War. After a lengthy description of the war's historical backdrop, the book examines the origins of American involvement under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Kennedy's advancement toward direct conflict between the U.S. and guerrilla and regular North Vietnamese forces, and the dramatic troop buildup under Johnson. The final chapters discuss peace negotiations during Nixon's presidency, the ultimate American failure in Indochina, and the region in the aftermath of war. Throughout, the work argues that the war was necessary and winnable under better circumstances and leadership. The book includes an extensive bibliography.
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