One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.
A Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press publication Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, the latest edition of this classic work analyzes how each U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. There have been remarkable successes—such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—frustrating failures, and dangerous wars along the way. This book helps to situate the current Middle East crisis in historical context and point to some possible ways out of the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. Quandt suggests a clear U.S. commitment to a two-state solution—one that would assure Israel of security and peace within the 1967 treaty-established borders, offer the Palestinians an early end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and most of the West Bank, and establish both a Jewish and Arab Jerusalem. Written especially for classroom use, Peace Process is also an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone interested in this vital region of the world. Praise for previous editions of Peace Process “Clearly written, carefully balanced and comprehensive in scope . . . should prove invaluable to all serious students of American foreign policy.”—New York Times Book Review “A major work, whether judged by the standards of classical diplomatic history or modern political science.”—Foreign Affairs “Provides fresh insights into the complexities of creating the process and defining the substance of American foreign policymaking.”—Survival “While objective to a fault, Quandt writes with an insider's knowledge of policymaking and decisions taken at the highest levels of government.”—Middle East Policy “Both a history and analysis of an evolving relationship between Israel and its Arab opponents.”—Choice “A major contribution to understanding the complexity of U.S. presidents’ handling of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict. It should be compulsory reading for anyone studying the Middle East conflict, peacemaking and conflict resolution.”—Journal of Peace Research
Having observed earlier periods of determined, persistent, creative and wise American diplomacy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are left to ponder whether that kind of American leadership and diplomatic wisdom can be recaptured. We also are left to wonder whether the supportive domestic environment in which previous administrations operated will recur, or whether Congressional and public support for Israel has limited administration options and thus changed the very nature of the American role in the peace process. Our overall conclusions in this volume represent a mix of process, politics, and substantive lessons learned, offered in the hope that a better understanding of the past can inform future policy."-from The Peace Puzzle Each phase of Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been inordinately difficult in its own right, and every critical juncture and decision point in the long process has been shaped by U.S. politics and the U.S. leaders of the moment. The Peace Puzzle tracks the American determination to articulate policy, develop strategy and tactics, and see through negotiations to agreements on an issue that has been of singular importance to U.S. interests for more than forty years. In 2006, the authors of The Peace Puzzle formed the Study Group on Arab-Israeli Peacemaking, a project supported by the United States Institute of Peace, to develop a set of "best practices" for American diplomacy. The Study Group conducted in-depth interviews with more than 120 policymakers, diplomats, academics, and civil society figures and developed performance assessments of the various U.S. administrations of the post-Cold War period. This book, an objective account of the role of the United States in attempting to achieve a lasting Arab-Israeli peace, is informed by the authors' access to key individuals and official archives.
A Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press publication Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, the latest edition of this classic work analyzes how each U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. There have been remarkable successes—such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—frustrating failures, and dangerous wars along the way. This book helps to situate the current Middle East crisis in historical context and point to some possible ways out of the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. Quandt suggests a clear U.S. commitment to a two-state solution—one that would assure Israel of security and peace within the 1967 treaty-established borders, offer the Palestinians an early end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and most of the West Bank, and establish both a Jewish and Arab Jerusalem. Written especially for classroom use, Peace Process is also an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone interested in this vital region of the world. Praise for previous editions of Peace Process “Clearly written, carefully balanced and comprehensive in scope . . . should prove invaluable to all serious students of American foreign policy.”—New York Times Book Review “A major work, whether judged by the standards of classical diplomatic history or modern political science.”—Foreign Affairs “Provides fresh insights into the complexities of creating the process and defining the substance of American foreign policymaking.”—Survival “While objective to a fault, Quandt writes with an insider's knowledge of policymaking and decisions taken at the highest levels of government.”—Middle East Policy “Both a history and analysis of an evolving relationship between Israel and its Arab opponents.”—Choice “A major contribution to understanding the complexity of U.S. presidents’ handling of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict. It should be compulsory reading for anyone studying the Middle East conflict, peacemaking and conflict resolution.”—Journal of Peace Research
In September 1978, William Quandt, a member of the White House National Security Council staff, spent thirteen momentous days at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, where three world leaders were holding secret negotiations. When U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin emerged on September 17, they announced a monumental accomplishment: the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. Praised by some for laying the foundations for peace between Egypt and Israel, the accords have also been criticized for failing to achieve a comprehensive settlement, including a resolution of the Palestinian question. But supporters and critics alike recognize the importance of what happened at Camp David, and both groups acknowledge the vital role played by the United States in reaching an agreement. There are few eyewitness accounts of the Camp David negotiations. Of the three leaders present, only Jimmy Carter wrote specifically of the talks in Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (1982). Neither Sadat nor Begin ever wrote about Camp David. Quandt's book is not only an eyewitness account but a scholar's reconstruction of the event, with insights into the people, politics, and policies. His Camp David has provided a comprehensive and lasting guide to the difficult negotiations surrounding the talks, including the fraught scenario leading up to the meetings at the presidential retreat and the accord that would lead to Sadat and Begin jointly receiving the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Praise for Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics "The most authoritative account of a major historic event, written with scrupulous scholarship by a key behind-the-scenes participant." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs, 1977–81 "An excellent piece of work... will represent a major contribution to the acade
This book is the outgrowth of a collaborative effort by a small group of national security analysts associated with the Institute forNational Strategic Studies of the National Defense University,government officials responsible for pondering defense and foreign policy issues, and academics with long experience in Middle Eastern affairs. In the past several years these scholars, policy analysts, and military planners have been focusing on the impact on U.S. goals and interests in the Middle East of three seminal events-the ending of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwaitby Saddam Husayn and the subsequent Gulf War. The authors'individual studies have been nourished by frequent intellectual exchanges with one another and by their participation in numerous academic meetings designed to explore the future of U.S. relations with the Middle East.
In the Arab world as elsewhere, authoritarian regimes have come under pressure for change. As yet, however, democracy has not taken root as an alternative form of governance. This book on Algeria looks at both the erosion of the authoritarian model and the difficulties of making a transition to democracy. Within the past decade, Algeria experienced one of the most promising experiments of opening up the political system and allowing a remarkable degree of freedom. That initial effort failed, however, when elections were won by an Islamist party that was unacceptable to the military, and it was followed by an explosion of political violence that in recent years has cost at least 75,000 lives. Despite this deep crisis there are reasons to believe that Algeria may emerge from its turmoil with a consensus on the need to respect pluralism and to accept the basic rules of democratic politics. Blending theoretical insights with an analysis of the Algerian case, this book demonstrates that democratization is likely to be a difficult process in the Middle East, but that the prospects for eventual success are not as gloomy as often asserted by those who see an incompatibility between democracy and Islam.
A highly acclaimed narrative account of recent world history, The Twentieth Century World is now substantially expanded and updated in this new edition. New material on major political events, such as the war in Bosnia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the advent of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and European integration since Maastricht, is incorporated seamlessly within the distinctive analytical framework that William Keylor employs to examine the rivalry among the major world nations. This edition includes eighteen new maps and several new tables.
In September 1978, William Quandt, a member of the White House National Security Council staff, spent thirteen momentous days at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, where three world leaders were holding secret negotiations. When U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin emerged on September 17, they announced a monumental accomplishment: the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. Praised by some for laying the foundations for peace between Egypt and Israel, the accords have also been criticized for failing to achieve a comprehensive settlement, including a resolution of the Palestinian question. But supporters and critics alike recognize the importance of what happened at Camp David, and both groups acknowledge the vital role played by the United States in reaching an agreement. There are few eyewitness accounts of the Camp David negotiations. Of the three leaders present, only Jimmy Carter wrote specifically of the talks in Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (1982). Neither Sadat nor Begin ever wrote about Camp David. Quandt's book is not only an eyewitness account but a scholar's reconstruction of the event, with insights into the people, politics, and policies. His Camp David has provided a comprehensive and lasting guide to the difficult negotiations surrounding the talks, including the fraught scenario leading up to the meetings at the presidential retreat and the accord that would lead to Sadat and Begin jointly receiving the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Praise for Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics "The most authoritative account of a major historic event, written with scrupulous scholarship by a key behind-the-scenes participant." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs, 1977–81 "An excellent piece of work... will represent a major contribution to the acade
One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.
Within the Middle East, the Camp David Accords are the subject of great debate. This new work, published to mark the tenth anniversary of the accords, offers the comprehensive assessment necessary to discuss the next steps in the Middle East peace process. The authors provide an analytical basis for understanding the complex links among domestic political forces, regional politics, and superpower policies as elements in the Arab-Israeli peace process.
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