This volume, a collection of eleven original essays by many of the foremost U.S. military historians, focuses on the transition of the Army from parade ground to battleground in each of nine wars the United States has fought. Through careful analysis of organization, training, and tactical doctrine, each essay seeks to explain the strengths and weaknesses evidenced by the outcome of the first significant engagement or campaign of the war. The concluding essay sets out to synthesize the findings and to discover whether or not American first battles manifest a characteristic "rhythm." America's First Battles provides a novel and intellectually challenging view of how America has prepared for war and how operations and tactics have changed over time. The thrust of the book--the emphasis on operational history--is at the forefront of scholarly activity in military history.
At the end of the Great War, the U.S. Army faced the challenge of integrating what it had learned in the failures and ultimate success of its war effort. During the interwar years the army sought to balance readiness and modernization in a period of limited resources and technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. In After the Trenches, William O. Odom traces the development of combat doctrine between the world wars through an examination of the army's primary doctrine manuals, the Field Service Regulations. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 successfully assimilated the experiences of the First World War and translated them into viable tactical practice, Odom argues in this unique study. Rapidly developing technologies generated more efficient tools of war and greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. Personnel and material shortages led to a decline in the quality of army doctrine evidenced in the 1939 regulations. Examining the development of doctrine and the roles of key personalities such as John Pershing, Hugh Drum, George Lynch, Frank Parker, and Lesley McNair, Odom concludes that the successive revisions of the manual left the army scurrying to modernize its woefully outdated doctrine on the eve of the new war. This impressively researched study of the doctrine of the interwar army fills a significant gap in our understanding of the development of the U.S. Army during the first half of the twentieth century. It will serve scholars and others interested in military history as the standard reference on the subject. Moreover, many of the challenges and conditions that existed seventy years ago resemble those faced bytoday's army. This study of the army's historical responses to a declining military budget and an ever-changing technology will broaden the perspectives of those who must deal with these important contemporary issues.
Discusses how to plan a staff ride of a battlefield, such as a Civil War battlefield, as part of military training. This brochure demonstrates how a staff ride can be made available to military leaders throughout the Army, not just those in the formal education system.
United States Army in Vietnam. CMH Pub. 91-13. Draws upon previously unavailable Army and Defense Department records to interpret the part the press played during the Vietnam War. Discusses the roles of the following in the creation of information policy: Military Assistance Command's Office of Information in Saigon; White House; State Department; Defense Department; and the United States Embassy in Saigon.
The true story of the US Army’s Comanche Code Talkers, from their recruitment and training to active duty in World War II and postwar life. Among the allied troops that came ashore in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944, were thirteen Comanches in the 4th Infantry Division, 4th Signal Company. Under German fire they laid communications lines and began sending messages in a form never before heard in Europe?coded Comanche. For the rest of World War II, the Comanche Code Talkers played a vital role in transmitting orders and messages in a code that was never broken by the Germans. This book tells the full story of the Comanche Code Talkers for the first time. Drawing on interviews with all surviving members of the unit, their original training officer, and fellow soldiers, as well as military records and news accounts, William C. Meadows follows the group from their recruitment and training to their active duty in World War II and on through their postwar lives up to the present. He also provides the first comparison of Native American code talking programs, comparing the Comanche Code Talkers with their better-known Navajo counterparts in the Pacific and with other Native Americans who used their languages, coded or not, for secret communication. Meadows sets this history in a larger discussion of the development of Native American code talking in World Wars I and II, identifying two distinct forms of Native American code talking, examining the attitudes of the American military toward Native American code talkers, and assessing the complex cultural factors that led Comanche and other Native Americans to serve their country in this way. “Of all the books on Native American service in the U.S. armed forces, this is the best. . . . Readers will find the story of the Comanche Code Talkers compelling, humorous, thought-provoking, and inspiring.” —Tom Holm, author of Strong Hearts, Wounded Souls: Native American Veterans of the Vietnam War
This monograph examines the relationship between physical forces prevalent on the modern battlefield and the causes inherent to US armored battalion failure since World War II. Given the complexity of today’s battlefield in terms of technology, command and control, and lethality, examining the physical aspects of failure can offer the clearest understanding of unit failure as a whole; after all, physical actions and reactions in battle are more easily analyzed. To determine the relationship between armored failure and physical forces on the battlefield, I first provide some theoretical and contemporary perspectives on the physical aspects of unit failure. Next, the causes and conditions of battlefield failure are identified and examined, followed by a discussion of the processes of failure. After laying a foundation of theory and the processes of failure, historical examples as well as recent armored NTC experiences are examined to determine the decisive causes of failure for US armor units since World War II. My conclusion is that effective enemy maneuver, when complimented with overwhelming fires is the decisive cause of failure for US armored units since World War II. Maneuver sets the conditions for both physical and moral destruction. However, failure is difficult to isolate; it is complex and occurs most often because of a combination of actions rarely just one. Clearly, technology has a great deal to do with physical failure. Maneuver, firepower, and protection have increased the power and importance of physical forces in relation to moral and cybernetic forces. Ultimately, overwhelming enemy maneuver and fires rapidly destroy unit cohesion as well as the physical capabilities of the defeated unit.
This futures book reflects the global trends and events of the recent past of today that are bringing about change to the world's political, economic, social, technological, and military environments. Provides a set of plausible scenarios against which users can build policies and decisions while anticipating and judging their consequences before implementation. Useful for strategic planning through active and reserve components of the U.S. military. Also useful for long-range planning by business, industry, academia, and other private and governmental organizations. Charts, tables and drawings. Also includes a 21-page study, "Creating Strategic Visions.
This is a study of U.S. government policymaking during the 30 years of the Vietnam war, 1945-75, beginning with the 1945-1960 period. Although focusing on the course of events in Washington and between Washington and U.S. officials on the scene, it also depicts major events and trends in Vietnam to which the U.S. was responding, as well as the state of American public opinion and public activity directed at supporting or opposing the war."--Preface.
This fourth volume of a five-part policy history of the U.S. government and the Vietnam War covers the core period of U.S. involvement, from July 1965, when the decision was made to send large-scale U.S. forces, to the beginning of 1968, just before the Tet offensive and the decision to seek a negotiated settlement. Using a wide variety of archival sources and interviews, the book examines in detail the decisions of the president, relations between the president and Congress, and the growth of public and congressional opposition to the war. Differences between U.S. military leaders on how the war should be fought are also included, as well as military planning and operations. Among many other important subjects, the financial effects of the war and of raising taxes are considered, as well as the impact of a tax increase on congressional and public support for the war. Another major interest is the effort by Congress to influence the conduct of the war and to place various controls on U.S. goals and operations. The emphasis throughout this richly textured narrative is on providing a better understanding of the choices facing the United States and the way in which U.S. policymakers tried to find an effective politico-military strategy, while also probing for a diplomatic settlement. Originally published in 1995. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
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