Consciousness lies at the core of being human. Therefore, to understand ourselves, we need a theory of consciousness. In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that prevents it from ever being explained. Consequently, philosophical debates over materialism and dualism are a waste of time. Scientific explanations of consciousness fare no better. Scientists do study consciousness, and such investigations will continue to grow and advance. However, none of them will ever reveal what consciousness is. In addition, given the centrality of consciousness in philosophy, Dietrich and Hardcastle claim that philosophy itself needs to change. That the central problems of philosophy persist is actually a profound epistemic fact about humans. Philosophy, then, is a limit to what humans can understand. (Series A)
Articulates a method for integrating the individual disciplines that compose the cognitive sciences so that unified interdisciplinary theories are possible.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle argues that both professional and lay definitions of pain are wrongheaded -- with consequences for how pain and pain patients are treated, how psychological disorders are understood, and how clinicians define the mind/body relationship. Pain, although very common, is little understood. Worse still, according to Valerie Gray Hardcastle, both professional and lay definitions of pain are wrongheaded -- with consequences for how pain and pain patients are treated, how psychological disorders are understood, and how clinicians define the mind/body relationship. Hardcastle offers a biologically based complex theory of pain processing, inhibition, and sensation and then uses this theory to make several arguments: (1) psychogenic pains do not exist; (2) a general lack of knowledge about fundamental brain function prevents us from distinguishing between mental and physical causes, although the distinction remains useful; (3) most pain talk should be eliminated from both the folk and academic communities; and (4) such a biological approach is useful generally for explaining disorders in pain processing. She shows how her analysis of pain can serve as a model for the analysis of other psychological disorders and suggests that her project be taken as a model for the philosophical analysis of disorders in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.
Locating Consciousness" argues that our qualitative experiences should be aligned with the activity of a single and distinct memory system in our mind/brain. Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision-making system. Instead, consciousness is viewed as a lower level dynamical structure underpinning our information processing. This new perspective affords novel solutions to a wide range of problems: the absent qualia, the binding problem, the inverted spectra, the specter of epiphenomenalism, the explanatory gap, the distinction between objective and subjective, and the general skeptical doubts about the viability of the naturalist project itself. Drawing on recent data in psychology and neuroscience, "Locating Consciousness" also discusses when we become conscious and when we should think other animals are conscious. (Series A)
How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science specifies the characteristics of fruitful interdisciplinary theories in cognitive science and shows how they differ from the successful theories in the individual disciplines composing the cognitive sciences. It articulates a method for integrating the various disciplines successfully so that unified, truly interdisciplinary theories are possible. This book makes three contributions of utmost importance. First, it provides a long overdue, systematic examination of the field of cognitive science itself. Second, it provides a template for linking domains without loss of autonomy. This philosophical treatment of integration serves as a blueprint for future endeavors. Third, the book provides a solid theoretical foundation that will prevent future missteps and enhance collaboration.
Constructing the Self analyzes the narrative conception of self, filling a serious gap in philosophy and grounding discussion in other disciplines. It answers the questions: What are the connections between our interpretations, selfhood, and conscious phenomenal experience? Why do we believe that our interpretations of our life-defining events are narrative in nature? From the myriad of thoughts, actions, and emotions which constitute our experiences, how do we choose what is interpretively important, the tiny subset that composes the self? By synthesizing the different approaches to understanding the self from philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, psychopathology, and cognitive science, this monograph gives us deeper insight into what being minded, being a person, and having a self are, as well as clarifies the difference and relation between conscious and unconscious mental states and normal and abnormal minds. The explication also affords new perspectives on human development and human emotion. (Series A)
Valerie Gray Hardcastle argues that both professional and lay definitions of pain are wrongheaded -- with consequences for how pain and pain patients are treated, how psychological disorders are understood, and how clinicians define the mind/body relationship. Pain, although very common, is little understood. Worse still, according to Valerie Gray Hardcastle, both professional and lay definitions of pain are wrongheaded -- with consequences for how pain and pain patients are treated, how psychological disorders are understood, and how clinicians define the mind/body relationship. Hardcastle offers a biologically based complex theory of pain processing, inhibition, and sensation and then uses this theory to make several arguments: (1) psychogenic pains do not exist; (2) a general lack of knowledge about fundamental brain function prevents us from distinguishing between mental and physical causes, although the distinction remains useful; (3) most pain talk should be eliminated from both the folk and academic communities; and (4) such a biological approach is useful generally for explaining disorders in pain processing. She shows how her analysis of pain can serve as a model for the analysis of other psychological disorders and suggests that her project be taken as a model for the philosophical analysis of disorders in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.
Consciousness lies at the core of being human. Therefore, to understand ourselves, we need a theory of consciousness. In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that prevents it from ever being explained. Consequently, philosophical debates over materialism and dualism are a waste of time. Scientific explanations of consciousness fare no better. Scientists do study consciousness, and such investigations will continue to grow and advance. However, none of them will ever reveal what consciousness is. In addition, given the centrality of consciousness in philosophy, Dietrich and Hardcastle claim that philosophy itself needs to change. That the central problems of philosophy persist is actually a profound epistemic fact about humans. Philosophy, then, is a limit to what humans can understand. (Series A)
Constructing the Self analyzes the narrative conception of self, filling a serious gap in philosophy and grounding discussion in other disciplines. It answers the questions: What are the connections between our interpretations, selfhood, and conscious phenomenal experience? Why do we believe that our interpretations of our life-defining events are narrative in nature? From the myriad of thoughts, actions, and emotions which constitute our experiences, how do we choose what is interpretively important, the tiny subset that composes the self? By synthesizing the different approaches to understanding the self from philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, psychopathology, and cognitive science, this monograph gives us deeper insight into what being minded, being a person, and having a self are, as well as clarifies the difference and relation between conscious and unconscious mental states and normal and abnormal minds. The explication also affords new perspectives on human development and human emotion. (Series A)
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