This is the second volume in a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the Ill Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.
Contains 58 photos and 10 maps and charts. “The return of Allied forces to the Philippines in the fall of 1944 further throttled Japan’s already tenuous pipe line to the rich resources of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, and with it the last vestige of her ability to meet the logistical requirements of a continuing war. The Battle for Leyte Gulf marked the end of Japan as a naval power, forcing her to adopt the desperation kamikaze tactic against the United States Fleets. The Philippine victories were primarily Army and Navy operations. Marines, comprising only a fraction of the total forces engaged, played a secondary but significant role in the overall victory. The campaign was important to the Corps in that the Marine aviators, who had battled two years for air control over the Solomons, moved into a new role, their first opportunity to test on a large scale the fundamental Marine doctrine of close air support for ground troops in conventional land operations. This test they passed with credit, and Marine flyers contributed materially to the Philippine victory. Lessons learned and techniques perfected in those campaigns form an important chapter in our present-day close air support doctrines.”-C. B. CATES, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
The United States (US) has a long history of employing military advisors, from the American military occupation of the Philippines throughout the 19th century, and the Korea War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973, El Salvador 1984 to 1992, to current efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A strong Iraqi military is needed to support the future democratic government of Iraq. This will allow the US to disengage a large portion of its combat units from Iraq. The US must train the present Iraqi military to successfully take over responsibility for Iraq’s security and combat the current insurgency. The US Army and Marine Corps combat advisors will play a key role in ensuring the Iraqi military is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide for a secure Iraq. There are lessons learned from training and advising the Republic of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF) during the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973 that could be applied in the ongoing advisory effort in Iraq. The focus of this thesis is to determine the lessons learned from selecting, training, and the organization of US Army and Marine Corps advisors during the Vietnam War.
Set in the Marianas group of islands is the American possession of Guam, U.S. territory since 1898; it was the captured by the Japanese soon after the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor and served as a symbol of the Japanese expansion. The American Forces sailed into view of Guam in 1944 determined to recapture the island for strategic and political purposes, but knew that the Japanese defenders take a heavy toll of them from their prepared positions. The story of the capture of the island is an epic of courage, bloodshed, fierce resistance by the Japanese and the indomitable will to conquer of the U.S. Marines. Contains 99 photos and 32 maps and charts. “I have always had a feeling of deep satisfaction in having been the commander of one of the assault elements that returned the American flag to Guam. The island once more stands ready to fulfill its destiny as an American fortress in the Pacific. The conquest of Guam was a decisive triumph of combined arms over a formidable Japanese defensive force which took full advantage of the island’s rugged terrain. The heroic action of the veteran Marines who seized Orote Peninsula and Apra Harbor gave the Navy a much-needed advance base for further operations in the Pacific. Once marine and Army units captured northern Guam, engineers moved in and out from the jungle the airfields from which the Twentieth Air Force launched B-29 raids, bringing the full realization of war to the Japanese homeland.”-LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
Includes over 50 photos and 35 maps. THIS IS THE CONCLUDING VOLUME of a five-part series dealing with operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and 27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during 1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF). “MENTION THE KOREAN WAR and almost immediately it evokes the memory of Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the Korean War. In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital. Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations. Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any threat of American security.”-Gen. Chapman
The Boston Marine Barracks is one of the oldest in the United States: it stands within eyeshot of the USS Constitution. Lt. Col. John R. Yates, Jr., the last commanding officer of the Barracks when it closed in 1974, researched the hundreds of letters left behind by previous Barracks commanders, their superiors and many others. They reveal the life and times of the Marines billeted at the Barracks from the early 19th century until World War II. Often, of course, the Marines were deployed to far-off events and places. This book also tells the story of the Barracks Marines' participation in the Seminole Wars, the action in Samoa, the Boer Wars, the Philippine Insurrection, Panama, the Boxer Rebellion, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish American War and World War I. This book reveals a naval prison's existence on the shipyard for which the Marines were responsible for many years.
The concepts of interior and exterior lines gained prominence during the Napoleonic Era with the writings of Jomini. Interior Lines of Operation deal with forces whose operations diverge from a central point. The use of interior lines allows a commander to rapidly shift forces to the decisive point. The Battle of Gettysburg was a great historical example illustrating the impact of interior and exterior lines. At the Battle of Gettysburg, the Confederates uncharacteristically fought along exterior lines. Their lines of communication stretched from Pennsylvania through the Shenandoah Valley south to Richmond. This was an extremely precarious situation for General Lee and weighed heavily on his decisions at Gettysburg. The Army of the Potomac, under command of newly appointed General Meade, found themselves operating from interior lines at Gettysburg. On July 2 and 3, this became a major factor in General Meade’s ability to react to the offensive actions taken by the Army of Northern Virginia. I propose that Lines of Operations, as espoused by Jomini years earlier, was the decisive factor in the Gettysburg Campaign. I believe that the use of interior lines by General Meade, specifically throughout the day and night of Day 2 and again on day 3, allowed the Army of the Potomac to gain victory. The Army of Northern Virginia on several occasions achieved momentary breaks in the Union lines only to be repulsed by Union forces shifted from other positions. General Meade would not have been able to rapidly shift these forces to the decisive point unless he was operating on interior lines. Throughout the three days of battle, General Meade applied Operational Art in positioning his forces at the decisive time and place. One must keep in mind the significance of General Meade’s actions at Gettysburg. He defeated the venerable General Robert E. Lee on the battlefield, a feat elusive to all previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac.
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