The USAir Force human capital management (HCM) system is not easily defined or mapped. It affects virtually every part of the Air Force because workforce policies, procedures, and processes impact all offices and organizations that include Airmen and responsibilities and relationships change regularly. To ensure the readiness of Airmen to fulfill the mission of the Air Force, strategic approaches are developed and issued through guidance and actions of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Strengthening US Air Force Human Capital Management assesses and strengthens the various U.S. Air Force initiatives and programs working to improve person-job match and human capital management in coordinated support of optimal mission capability. This report considers the opportunities and challenges associated with related interests and needs across the USAF HCM system as a whole, and makes recommendations to inform improvements to USAF personnel selection and classification and other critical system components across career trajectories. Strengthening US Air Force Human Capital Management offers the Air Force a strategic approach, across a connected HCM system, to develop 21st century human capital capabilities essential for the success of 21st century Airmen.
The multiple challenges America faces today calls for rapid responsive, global air power. The answer is the United States Air Force's (USAF) Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). An AEF consists of aircraft wings, groups, or squadrons attached to a USAF numbered air force deployed under the command of a U.S. Military Joint Commander-in-Chief (CING) of a geographic region, during a period of increased operations tempo. An increased operations tempo is invariably associated with U.S. diplomatic, political, military or humanitarian actions either underway or in prospect. Also, an AEF unit deploys as a composite force, one made up several different aircraft types within the same unit, rather than in accordance with past USAF practice where a combat unit consists of only one type (and model) of aircraft. By taking advantage of the intrinsic strengths of air power-speed, range, and flexibility-the AEF provides a logistically lean, flexible, tailored, quick-response force to the CINC.
The United States military space program began at the end of World War II when a few people realized that space flight was now achievable and could be employed to military advantage. Science and technology in the form of advanced radar, jet propulsion, ballistic rockets such as the V-2, and nuclear energy had dramatically altered the nature of war. Army Air Forces Commanding General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold wrote in November 1945 that a space ship "is all but practicable today" and could be built "within the foreseeable future." The following month the Air Force Scientific Advisory Group concluded that long-range rockets were technically feasible and that satellites were a "definite possibility." The U.S. Navy also expressed interest in space flight. In November 1945 the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics produced a satellite report, and, on March 7, 1946 proposed an interservice space program. The idea was presented to the joint Army-Navy Aeronautical Board on April 9. Major General Curtis E. LeMay, the Director of Research and Development for the Army Air Forces, however, viewed space operations as an exclusive Air Force domain, and he ordered an independent study.
From the days of biplanes and open cockpits, the air forces of the United States have relied on the mastery of technology. From design to operation, a project can stretch to 20 years and more, with continuous increases in cost. Much of the delay and cost growth afflicting modern United States Air Force (USAF) programs is rooted in the incorporation of advanced technology into major systems acquisition. Leaders in the Air Force responsible for science and technology and acquisition are trying to determine the optimal way to utilize existing policies, processes, and resources to properly document and execute pre-program of record technology development efforts, including opportunities to facilitate the rapid acquisition of revolutionary capabilities and the more deliberate acquisition of evolutionary capabilities. Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Preacquisition Technology Development responds to this need with an examination of the current state of Air Force technology development and the environment in which technology is acquired. The book considers best practices from both government and industry to distill appropriate recommendations that can be implemented within the USAF.
For the past eighty years the US military establishment has worked to integrate air power into its doctrine, strategy, force structure, and tactics in order to maximize the nation's security. This study by Dr. Richard Davis highlights one aspect of this process, that of providing the most potent mix of army and air forces to prosecute ground warfare. It also illustrates the impediments to joint action created by the services' separate organizations and distinctive doctrine. In addition, this monograph suggests that changes to improve interservice cooperation are often either forced by combat or imposed from the top down by the highest levels of the service or defense hierarchies. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam the services developed weapons and systems that brought air power to bear on the battlefield in a relatively quick and overwhelmingly powerful manner. Without the impetus of war, however, the services seem often to fall back on their broader agenda of preparation for future war. In the case of the 1980s, intervention by the Chiefs of the Air Force and Army Staffs forced increased cooperation for battlefield synchronization and integration. In this instance the two Chiefs recognized the need and acted. Generals Gabriel and Wickham, aided by their deputies for plans and operations, Lieutenant Generals John T. Chain, Jr., and Fred K. Mahaffey, set up a small ad hoc group, bypassing their own services' formal staff structure, to fabricate a new method of mutual force development, including cross-service budgeting and programming procedures. The Chiefs adopted the group's recommendations as the foundation of a continuing joint force development process.
The ability of the United States Air Force (USAF) to keep its aircraft operating at an acceptable operational tempo, in wartime and in peacetime, has been important to the Air Force since its inception. This is a much larger issue for the Air Force today, having effectively been at war for 20 years, with its aircraft becoming increasingly more expensive to operate and maintain and with military budgets certain to further decrease. The enormously complex Air Force weapon system sustainment enterprise is currently constrained on many sides by laws, policies, regulations and procedures, relationships, and organizational issues emanating from Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Air Force itself. Against the back-drop of these stark realities, the Air Force requested the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, under the auspices of the Air Force Studies Board to conduct and in-depth assessment of current and future Air Force weapon system sustainment initiatives and recommended future courses of action for consideration by the Air Force. Examination of the U.S. Air Force's Aircraft Sustainment Needs in the Future and Its Strategy to Meet Those Needs addresses the following topics: Assess current sustainment investments, infrastructure, and processes for adequacy in sustaining aging legacy systems and their support equipment. Determine if any modifications in policy are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations for changes in Air Force regulations, policies, and strategies to accomplish the sustainment goals of the Air Force. Determine if any modifications in technology efforts are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations regarding the technology efforts that should be pursued because they could make positive impacts on the sustainment of the current and future systems and equipment of the Air Force. Determine if the Air Logistics Centers have the necessary resources (funding, manpower, skill sets, and technologies) and are equipped and organized to sustain legacy systems and equipment and the Air Force of tomorrow. Identify and make recommendations regarding incorporating sustainability into future aircraft designs.
In December 1918 Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), directed his newly appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, to prepare a history and final report on U.S. air activities in Europe during World War I. The narratives written and compiled by Gorrell and his staff were submitted by Patrick to Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF. They summarized Air Service activities from the arrival of the first airmen in France in the spring of 1917 until the Armistice on November 11, 1918. The "Final Report" was published by the Air Service in an Information Circular in 1921, and by the Army in a multivolume collection of World War I documents in 1948. Although it has been used and cited by a number of historians over the years, it deserves to be better known. The Office of Air Force History, therefore, is republishing it so as to reach a wider circle of persons interested in the Great War and the early history of military aviation. Another important document produced under Gorrell's supervision as part of the history of the Air Service, AEF, is a "Tactical History" written by Lt. Col. William C. Sherman and a group of officers working with him in France at the end of the war. Although published in part in an Air Service Information Circular in 1920, Sherman's "Tactical History" has remained virtually unknown, or at least has not had extensive use. Since it provides excellent information about the conduct of combat operations, it should be of value to persons interested in aerial warfare in the First World War. It has been included, therefore, in this volume with the "Final Report." This is one of a series of volumes of World War I documentation that the Office of Air Force History is planning to publish.
One of the major lessons of World War II was the need for the military services, both in the United States and elsewhere, to work together in mutually supporting ways to defeat an enemy. Changing technology and the worldwide character of the war altered the traditional boundaries between land and sea warfare, and the new elements of air power and atomic weapons even further called into question the traditional roles and missions of the armed services. In 1947, the U.S. Air Force became independent of the Army and a National Military Establishment (which became the Department of Defense in 1949) was formed to coordinate and, after 1949, to control the services. Yet, disagreements over roles and missions continued, often exacerbated by the fiscal limitations of the post-war era. But not all roles and missions disagreements were caused by financial struggles. Genuine differences of opinion over doctrinal issues and the best means to accomplish missions often divided the services, and on many occasions the Secretary of Defense had to assign missions and adjudicate roles amid a blizzard of conflicting claims. Dr. Richard Wolf of the Office of Air Force History has collected in this volume the most significant documents which have determined the roles and missions of the Air Force, from its birth in 1947 to the present. The documents themselves only tell part of the story, of course. Dr. Wolf provides an introductory essay to each document so that readers can comprehend the context in which the decisions over roles and missions took place. The result is a convenient and useful reference tool for anyone working with, or studying, the organizational and doctrinal basis of the United States Air Force.
On September 21 and 22, 1995, the Air Force Historical Foundation convened a historical symposium on the United States Air Force's experience in the development of space systems and their military applications. Held at theAndrews Air Force Base Officers' Club, Maryland, the symposium was the culmination of nearly a year-long planning effort headed by a committee chaired by Lt. Gen. Bradley Hosmer, USAF (Ret.). Other committee members included Donald R. Baucom, BMDO historian; George W. Bradley III, Air Force Space Command historian; Col. Louis H. Cummings, USAF (Ret.), the Foundation's executive director; R. Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, senior historians at the Air Force History Support Office; and Maj. John Kreis, USAF (Ret.), a Foundation trustee. The symposium was co-sponsored by the Office of the Air Force Historian, in association with the Air Force Space Command and the Air University.Dozens of individuals affiliated with these organizations pitched in graciously and expertly whenever the committee solicited their assistance. We wish to acknowledge especially Lt. Gen. Patrick P. Caruana, vice commander of Air Force Space Command, who introduced one of the panels, and Major Kreis, who introduced another.Gen. Bryce Poe II, USAF (Ret.), the Foundation president at the time, introduced the symposium. He was followed by the then Air Force Chief ofStaff, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, who gave the keynote address. Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila E. Widnall and the Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, placed the subject in perspective and peeked into the future. Severalother distinguished civilian and military officials related their experiences and perspectives, while scholars provided historical context. A perusal of the table of contents discloses a virtual “Who's Who” in Air Force space history. The symposium was arranged in three chronological sessions beginning with the threshold of space in 1945 to 1961, the year that the Air Force became executive agent for space research and development. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.), the service's leading missiles and space pioneer, provided invaluable recollections and observations. Panel two traced the evolution of space systems from R&D to operational status up to their employment in the Persian Gulf War. Former Air Force Secretary John L. McLucas and Gen. Donald J. Kutyna riveted the audience's attention with their personal assessments. Finally,former Air Force Secretary Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge was among a select panel of senior leaders who looked at space “today and tomorrow.” The consensus among the two hundred men and women who attended was that this was a unique and extremely useful symposium and that its proceedings deserved to be published and disseminated widely.
The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force offers a vivid, candid, and highly personal account of military life by four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. Their recollections, captured in a 1987 interview at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., cover a period of over thirty years-from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (held by only ten individuals since its establishment in 1966) has given all enlisted service members a representative who has direct access to, and the ability to advise, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. It has also imparted to each of the interviewees broad and insightful perspectives on the issues discussed. The careers of the Chief Master Sergeants and the experiences that shaped them reveal that throughout its brief but eventful history the U.S. Air Force has been able to rely completely on the competence, dedication, and absolute professionalism of its enlisted force. Again and again, this force has met the host of challenges that have confronted it at home and around the globe: It tirelessly maintained the aircraft and supported the air crews of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; it integrated its ranks and welcomed women as equals into the workplace; it has obtained a better quality of life for its members and their families; and it has pursued increasingly demanding education and training programs in fast-changing social and technological service milieus. The stories of the Chief Master Sergeants point to an essential fact: The service would be unable to carry out its missions successfully in a dangerous world without the genuine cooperation of a motivated enlisted corps. That the Air Force almost flawlessly achieved its objectives in Operation DESERT STORM is in no small measure the result of that corps' tradition of striving and excellence.
Reflections on Research and Development in the United States Air Force was intended to be part of the now-defunct Warrior Series. While the necessity for that particular series has lapsed, its long-term goal remains valid-to produce books which will appeal to all levels of Air Force people, who may learn from the past and perhaps apply the experiences of past generations to the present. This publication should interest readers who have scant familiarity with research and development, as well as those intimately familiar with the subject. The former will gain an understanding of the outline history of Air Force research and development, while the latter will obtain fresh, personal perspectives. In 1982 General Lew Allen, Jr. called for "the continuing study of military history, combat leadership, the principles of war, and particularly, the applications of air power." All of us in the Air Force community can benefit from such study and reflection. The challenges of today and the future demand no less.
Many of the aircraft that form the backbone of the U.S. Air Force operational fleet are 25 years old or older. A few of these will be replaced with new aircraft, but many are expected to remain in service an additional 25 years or more. This book provides a strategy to address the technical needs and priorities associated with the Air Force's aging airframe structures. It includes a detailed summary of the structural status of the aging force, identification of key technical issues, recommendations for near-term engineering and management actions, and prioritized near-term and long-term research recommendations.
The Air Force requires technical skills and expertise across the entire range of activities and processes associated with the development, fielding, and employment of air, space, and cyber operational capabilities. The growing complexity of both traditional and emerging missions is placing new demands on education, training, career development, system acquisition, platform sustainment, and development of operational systems. While in the past the Air Force's technologically intensive mission has been highly attractive to individuals educated in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, force reductions, ongoing military operations, and budget pressures are creating new challenges for attracting and managing personnel with the needed technical skills. Assessments of recent development and acquisition process failures have identified a loss of technical competence within the Air Force (that is, in house or organic competence, as opposed to contractor support) as an underlying problem. These challenges come at a time of increased competition for technical graduates who are U.S. citizens, an aging industry and government workforce, and consolidations of the industrial base that supports military systems. In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council conducted five fact-finding meetings at which senior Air Force commanders in the science and engineering, acquisition, test, operations, and logistics domains provided assessments of the adequacy of the current workforce in terms of quality and quantity.
In this study of the origins and evolution of the Air National Guard, Dr. Charles. Gross, himself a former guardsman and a professional historian, currently at the Air Force Systems Command History Office, chronicles this transformation. In the 1940s, the active duty Air Force was not particularly sympathetic or supportive of an Air National Guard. Focused on creating an Air Force as a separate service, carving out its role in the air-atomic age, and changing from piston to jet engines in an austere budgetary environment, the regulars saw no real purpose for part-time, state air forces. If anything, an Air Guard threatened the funding of an adequate regular force. Given the Guard's record of poor readiness and its successful resistance to direction from Washington, the Air Force leadership would have been just as happy to see the Guard eliminated. In 1950, the difficult and in many respects unsuccessful mobilization of the Air National Guard for the Korean War, forced the Air Force into reforms, and the Guard itself to accept greater peacetime control by the active force. Through the 1950s, by means of expansion, more modern aircraft, and more closely coordinated planning and policy-making, the Guard began to increase both in effectiveness and in the respect it engendered from the Air Force leadership. Late in the decade, increased budgetary pressure on the Air Force, combined with the Eisenhower administration's emphasis on reserves and the Congress' support for the Guard, led to a more favorable view of the Guard by the Air Force. Also, Air Guard leaders themselves realized that they had to institute various reforms and better integrate the Guard with the regular force. Most importantly, the Guard in the 1950s won for itself, in continental air defense, in tactical aviation, and in airlift, meaningful missions that it could perform effectively on a continuing basis in peacetime. In mobilizations during the Berlin crisis in 1961-1962, in the Pueblo crisis and the Southeast Asian War in 1968, the Guard proved its competence and excellence. The expanding role of the Guard and its close cooperation with the Air Force are Dr. Gross' themes, explaining the rise of the Guard to the prominence it plays in today's air operations. He pulls no punches in recounting the conflict between Guard and regular Air Force, or in explaining how each side maneuvered to safeguard its interests. However, the author also shows how common concerns and mutual dedication to the national defense overcame parochialism and led from cooperation to integration. The result was displayed for all the Air Force to see in the professionalism of Guard units in the 1960s mobilizations. Guard and regular Air Force had become vital to each other; in return for modern aircraft, a substantial peacetime mission, and upon mobilization integration into the wartime force, the Guard accepted de facto control by the regular Air Force. As Dr. Gross concludes, the concept of "state militia" was altered far beyond the changes wrought earlier in federal-state military relations. The Air Guard was ready for the 'Total Force" policy of the 1970s. The dilemma of maintaining a reserve fully capable of fighting the air war was solved. By the 1980s, the Air National Guard, at the same time inheritors of a military tradition extending back before 1776, and users of the most advanced technologies of war, could prove that citizen-soldiers need not be second to any airman in the world.
While there are examples of successful weapon systems acquisition programs within the U.S. Air Force (USAF), many of the programs are still incurring cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. The USAF now faces serious challenges in acquiring and maintaining its weapons systems as it strives to maintain its current programs; add new capabilities to counter evolving threats; and reduce its overall program expenditures. Owning the technical baseline is a critical component of the Air Force's ability to regain and maintain acquisition excellence. Owning the technical baseline allows the government acquisition team to manage and respond knowledgeably and effectively to systems development, operations, and execution, thereby avoiding technical and other programmatic barriers to mission success. Additionally, owning the technical baseline ensures that government personnel understand the user requirements, why a particular design and its various features have been selected over competing designs, and what the options are to pursue alternative paths to the final product given unanticipated cost, schedule, and performance challenges. Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force discusses the strategic value to the Air Force of owning the technical baseline and the risk of not owning it and highlights key aspects of how agencies other than the Air Force own the technical baseline for their acquisition programs. This report identifies specific barriers to owning the technical baseline for the Air Force and makes recommendations to help guide the Air Force in overcoming those barriers.
This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for combat support to air and space forces across the full range of military operations. "Combat Support" is the keystone document addressing the full spectrum of agile combat support functions that operate in peace and in war. It stresses the need for tailored combat support packages with the Airmen, facilities, equipment, and supplies required for supporting Air Force forces. Air and space forces respond to global taskings within hours. The support for these forces must be equally responsive. This is the challenging job of combat support, the foundation of air and space power. Air and space expeditionary task forces employment capabilities demand rapid positioning of force packages to achieve combat, peacekeeping, counterdrug, and nation building effects. Air Force agile combat support capabilities are provided by people and organizations responsible for planning, programming, and sustaining the forces; determining who and what are deployed; as well as how they arrive and return home safely. Agile combat support is an Air Force distinctive capability that touches every functional area and is key to meeting the US Air Force's mission to organize, train, equip, and employ air and space power. The dedicated support of our people makes agile combat support a reality. The goal of agile combat support is to provide the most capable air and space forces to combatant commanders.
Overall Air Force weapon system sustainment (WSS) costs are growing at more than 4 percent per year, while budgets have remained essentially flat. The cost growth is due partly to aging of the aircraft fleet, and partly to the cost of supporting higher-performance aircraft and new capabilities provided by more complex and sophisticated systems, such as the latest intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Furthermore, the expectation for the foreseeable future is that sustainment budgets are likely to decrease, so that the gap between budgets and sustainment needs will likely continue to grow wider. Most observers accept that the Air Force will have to adopt new approaches to WSS if it is going to address this problem and remain capable of carrying out its missions. In this context, the original intent of this 3-day workshop was to focus on ways that science and technology (S&T) could help the Air Force reduce sustainment costs. However, as the workshop evolved, the discussions focused more and more on Air Force leadership, management authority, and culture as the more critical factors that need to change in order to solve sustainment problems. Many participants felt that while S&T investments could certainly help-particularly if applied in the early stages ("to the left") of the product life cycle-adopting a transformational management approach that defines the user-driven goals of the enterprise, empowers people to achieve them, and holds them accountable, down to the shop level. Several workshop participants urged Air Force leaders to start the process now, even though it will take years to percolate down through the entire organization. These sustainment concerns are not new and have been studied extensively, including recent reports from the National Research Council's Air Force Studies Board and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
The US Air Force provides unique warfighting capabilities that are essential to joint operations. Foremost among these capabilities is the ability to rapidly focus American combat power and life-saving resources anywhere on the planet. Frequently, and especially in the opening stages of a conflict, air and space power may be the main manifestation of combat power we bring to bear against an adversary. Of these capabilities, the Air Force provides a very singular form of power: the ability to rapidly position and sustain forces at places and times of our choosing. This pivotal capability—air mobility—is the essential ingredient for modern US expeditionary operations and supports joint force commander-desired effects to deter, dissuade, or destroy the enemy. Force projection provides for presence, mass and maneuver, surprise, security and economy. It is the sum of an impressive fleet of transport and aerial refueling aircraft, underpinned by a flexible support system, and operated by a specialized cadre of active duty Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force civilian personnel. While other forms of American military power have some degree of inherent mobility, the scale of flexibility and responsiveness of the Air Force's air mobility forces is singular in the history of world conflict. This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, has been prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This document establishes doctrinal guidance for the application of the air mobility forces and is consistent with, and complementary to, capstone doctrine contained in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, and AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. AFDD 3-17 serves as the keystone doctrine document for employing airlift, air refueling, and air mobility support elements as an integrated system of operations.
The Air Force's humanitarian operations received wide attention during the 1990s, as they will for years to come. They are part of a well-established tradition dating back three-quarters of a century to the early days of military flight. The nation's first airmen recognized early on aviation's potential for alleviating the effects of natural disasters. As early as September 1919, Army Air Service planes from Kelly Field, Texas, dropped food supplies to marooned flood victims along the Rio Grande. On a few occasions during the 1920s, American aviators bombed their own country-for good cause. They delivered ordnance against ice jams in the Delaware, Platte, and Susquehanna rivers to prevent flooding, save bridges, and restore navigation. In March 1929 at least twenty-one airplanes from Maxwell Field, Alabama, delivered twenty-seven tons of food and other supplies to flood victims in the southern part of the state. The Army flew several dramatic relief missions during the 1930s. In 1932 bombers dropped supplies to Navajo Indians who had become snowbound by severe blizzards in Arizona. In December 1935 the 5th Bombardment Group bombed the Mauna Loa volcano, diverting its lava flow away from Hilo, Hawaii. In 1936 Air Corps squadrons flew food and other supplies to flood victims in Pennsylvania and the following year to southern Illinois. During February 1939 the Army air-delivered medical aid in the wake of an earthquake in Chile. World War II proved the most costly conflict in history. It has been estimated that during the six years of warfare, about 85 million people were killed and another 60 million rendered homeless. Around the globe, staggering numbers of unfortunates needed food and medical relief.
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