Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the subject of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) has evoked strong opinions and emotions. For some, the belief in or study of UFOs (known as ufology) has taken on the dimensions of a religious quest. Others remain nonbelievers or at least skeptical of the existence of alien beings and elusive vehicles which never quite seem to manifest themselves. Regardless of one’s conviction, nowhere has the debate about UFOs been more spirited than over the events that unfolded near the small New Mexico city of Roswell in the summer of 1947. Numerous witnesses, including former military personnel and respectable members of the local community, have come forward with tales of humanoid beings, alien technologies, and government cover-ups that have caused even the most skeptical observers to pause and take notice. In July 1994, at the request of the Government Accounting Office, the U.S. Air Force completed a thousand-page report to explain the events that transpired in and near Roswell in the summer of 1947. That report sought to bring all the facts to light, declassify all the documents, and present the definitive truth to the public. The Roswell Report: Case Closed is the follow up to that report and contains additional materials and analysis intended to reach a complete, open, and final explanation of the events that occurred in the Southwest many years ago. While this explanation may not be as titillating as tales of unearthly craft and creatures, it is a fascinating story nonetheless.
On 5 November 2009, a tragic shooting allegedly carried out by a military member at Fort Hood, Texas, left 13 dead and 43 wounded or injured. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates subsequently established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood and appointed former Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., and former Chief of Naval Operations Adm Vern Clark to lead that effort. That review identified possible deficiencies and provided recommendations regarding Department of Defense (DoD) policies, programs, and procedures related to force protection, personnel policies, mass casualty response, and sufficiency of care for the health care providers involved in such events. Key concerns included developing a credible process for identifying individuals who pose a potential threat to themselves or others, providing time-critical information to the right people, employing appropriate force protection measures, and planning for and responding to incidents. The report, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, was delivered to Secretary Gates on 15 January 2010. It concluded force protection measures focused solely on external threats are no longer sufficient. Force protection measures must now also consider internal threats— “disaffected individuals within the force motivated to violence against the force and the nation.”The DoD report recommended that each of the Services conduct in-depth follow-on reviews. In response, Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley issued Terms of Reference on 25 January 2010 and directed Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, Commander of Air Education and Training Command, to chair an in-depth Air Force Follow-on Review (Air Force FOR) to identify and resolve policy, program, and procedural gaps that could create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of Air Force personnel, other supported personnel, and their families. This report is the result of that review.Although the Air Force review emerged as a result of the shootings at Fort Hood in November 2009, this report expands its focus beyond traditional force protection measures by addressing a broader range of violent physical threats and the potential precursors or indicators of violence. This attention to indicators sets the conditions for moving toward preventing violence rather than relying on response in its aftermath. This more expansive approach, contained in this report, emphasizes integrating existing programs not normally identified within the force protection agenda. Our review team conducted simultaneous top-down and bottom-up assessments. Major commands (MAJCOM), direct reporting units (DRU), the Air National Guard (ANG), and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) provided inputs and reviews. Representatives from across the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) staff formed six cross-functional teams—Risk Assessment and Prevention, Sharing Information, Preparing the Force, Developing the Force, Leading the Force, and Responding and Recovering. The HAF also drew upon the DoD findings and recommendations as a baseline from which to assess relevant Air Force policies, programs, procedures, and practices. A full team roster is provided at appendix D.More than 2,000 Total Force commanders and civilian directors provided insight into practices related to information sharing, training, recognition of internal threats, force protection, and mass casualty response and recovery through a survey conducted by the Air Force Manpower Agency (AFMA). Selected survey results are integrated throughout the report and provided at appendix C.Our review developed 118 findings and 151 recommendations focused on preventing violence and enhancing response, which are contained in this report. A summary of our recommendations appears at appendix E. The terms of reference for both the DoD and the Air Force reviews requested notation of best practices to be shared across the DoD. Those identified during our review are provided in appendix B.
Section 587 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 required GAO to address (1) the trends in the number of conscientious objector applications for the active and reserve components during calendar years 2002 through 2006; (2) how each component administers its process for evaluating conscientious objector applications; and (3) whether, upon discharge, conscientious objectors are eligible for the same benefits as other former servicemembers. GAO's review included the Coast Guard components. GAO compiled numbers of applications based on data provided by the Armed Forces. However, these numbers do not include the numbers of applications that are not formally reported to the components' headquarters. Also, the Defense Manpower Data Center does not maintain separate data on numbers of applications for conscientious objector status; it does maintain data on reasons for separation. GAO used these data to help assess the reasonableness of the component-provided data and to compile demographic data.
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