U.S. Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation's Books

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action offers the consensus findings and recommendations of a joint committee established by the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences to identify methods of improving the ongoing cooperation between the two nations in this area. The report finds that the best way to realize the enormous potential of the U.S.-Russian relationship on nuclear nonproliferation is to reinvigorate the relationship between the two governments as a true partnership. It recommends that the U.S. and Russia establish a Joint High-Level Commission of government and non-government experts to assess their cooperation and devise a strategic plan for moving forward. It suggests that the Senior Interagency Group that was recently established by the two presidents be empowered to carry out this strategic plan. The report then examines three issue areas, making specific recommendations in each: law and taxation, program organization and management, and scientific and technical cooperation.

The U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences convened a joint workshop to identify methods of overcoming impediments to cooperation between the United States and Russia on nonproliferation. The workshop emphasized approaches and techniques that have already been shown to work in U.S.-Russian programs and that might be applied in other areas. The workshop was intended to facilitate frank discussion between individuals in the United States and Russia who have some responsibility for cooperative nonproliferation programs in the hope of identifying both the impediments to cooperation and potential methods of addressing them. This report summarizes the discussions at the workshop.

The so-called nuclear renaissance has increased worldwide interest in nuclear power. This potential growth also has increased, in some quarters, concern that nonproliferation considerations are not being given sufficient attention. In particular, since introduction of many new power reactors will lead to requiring increased uranium enrichment services to provide the reactor fuel, the proliferation risk of adding enrichment facilities in countries that do not have them now led to proposals to provide the needed fuel without requiring indigenous enrichment facilities. Similar concerns exist for reprocessing facilities. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle summarizes key issues and analyses of the topic, offers some criteria for evaluating options, and makes findings and recommendations to help the United States, the Russian Federation, and the international community reduce proliferation and other risks, as nuclear power is used more widely. This book is intended for all those who are concerned about the need for assuring fuel for new reactors and at the same time limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This audience includes the United States and Russia, other nations that currently supply nuclear material and technology, many other countries contemplating starting or growing nuclear power programs, and the international organizations that support the safe, secure functioning of the international nuclear fuel cycle, most prominently the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The International Atomic Energy Agency reports numerous incidents of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, including ionizing radiation sources (IRSs) used in medical, agricultural, and industrial applications. This report assesses the threats posed by inadequately protected IRSs in Russia and recommends steps to enhance the effectiveness of DOE's current cooperative program with Russia. These continuing DOE's current program of quick security fixes and developing a comprehensive plan to work with Russian counterparts to reduce overall risk, within the context of a comprehensive Russian program for ensuring adequate life-cycle management of IRSs.

In the fall of 2010, the U.S. National Academies (consisting of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences) initiated a joint study of U.S.-Russian bilateral engagement in the biological sciences and biotechnology (hereinafter collectively referred to as bioengagement). The U.S. Department of State and the Russian Academy of Sciences provided support for the study. The academies established a joint committee of 12 leading scientists from the two countries to assess bioengagement activities since 1996 and to provide recommendations as to collaborative efforts in the near future. The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions summarizes the principal conclusions and recommendations of the study.

The government's first Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs were created in 1991 to eliminate the former Soviet Union's nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and prevent their proliferation. The programs have accomplished a great deal: deactivating thousands of nuclear warheads, neutralizing chemical weapons, converting weapons facilities for peaceful use, and redirecting the work of former weapons scientists and engineers, among other efforts. Originally designed to deal with immediate post-Cold War challenges, the programs must be expanded to other regions and fundamentally redesigned as an active tool of foreign policy that can address contemporary threats from groups that are that are agile, networked, and adaptable. As requested by Congress, Global Security Engagement proposes how this goal can best be achieved. To meet the magnitude of new security challenges, particularly at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, Global Security Engagement recommends a new, more flexible, and responsive model that will draw on a broader range of partners than current programs have. The White House, working across the Executive Branch and with Congress, must lead this effort.

The successor states of the former Soviet Union have enormous stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material and other militarily significant commodities and technologies. Preventing the flow of such items to countries of proliferation concern and to terrorist groups is a major objective of U.S. national security policy. This book reviews the effectiveness of two U.S. programs directed to this objective. These programs have supported the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan in upgrading the physical protection, control, and accountability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and strengthening systems to control the export of many types of militarily sensitive items.

Book's by U.S. Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation

Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism

U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism

The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology

The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology

Global Security Engagement

Global Security Engagement

Proliferation Concerns

Proliferation Concerns

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