What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
How nations can promote peace, prosperity, and stability through cohesive political institutions "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters—places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.
Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1991 ? 1995 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1991) R H COASE ? for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy; (1992) G S BECKER ? for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour; (1993) R W FOGEL & D C NORTH ? for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change; (1994) J C HARSANYI, J F NASH & R SELTEN ? for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games; (1995) R E LUCAS ? for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy.
Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1996 ? 2000 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1996) J A MIRRLEES & W S VICKREY ? for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information; (1997) R C MERTON & M A SCHOLES ? for a new method to determine the value of derivatives; (1998) A K SEN ? for his contributions to welfare economics; (1999) R A MUNDELL ? for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas; (2000) J J HECKMAN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples & D L McFADDEN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice.
LSD has a controversial and extraordinary reputation, due to the special effects it can induce on human consciousness.This book is the first ever comprehensive review of the psychological and pharmacological effects of LSD. It draws on data from more than 3000 experimental and clinical studies.
This is the first book focusing on the chemoecology of insect eggs and egg deposition. It covers a wide range of different issues including herbivorous and carnivorous insects, social insects and those of medical and veterinary importance. The knowledge compiled in this book may promote future studies on evolutionary aspects on insect reproductive behaviour as well as on controlling insect pests by targeting the egg stage.
This is a comprehensive introduction to Landau-Lifshitz equations and Landau-Lifshitz-Maxwell equations, beginning with the work by Yulin Zhou and Boling Guo in the early 1980s and including most of the work done by this Chinese group led by Zhou and Guo since. The book focuses on aspects such as the existence of weak solutions in multi dimensions, existence and uniqueness of smooth solutions in one dimension, relations with harmonic map heat flows, partial regularity and long time behaviors. The book is a valuable reference book for those who are interested in partial differential equations, geometric analysis and mathematical physics. It may also be used as an advanced textbook by graduate students in these fields.
In these memoirs, Torsten Husen, Professor Emeritus of Education at the University of Stockholm, conveys a fascinating picture of the academic world from the l940s onwards and of the extraordinary developments in education and psychology. Professor Husen is an internationally acknowledged expert on school affairs. As the first holder of the Chair of Educational Research at the Stockholm School of Education, he became deeply involved in policy research tied to the school reforms and his research and writing have directly affected the worldwide debate on the structure and content of secondary and upper secondary schooling. He was a founder member of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) and as Chairman of the Board of the International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) in Paris he became increasingly concerned with educational problems in the developing countries. This is an account of a remarkable man whose dedication to research into educational problems worldwide should be an inspiration to others.
What place do the four Gospels give Satan, demons, and Jesus’ human opponents (including Jewish leaders but also Jesus’ disciples) in their accounts of Jesus’ life? This study takes a literary-historical approach to the Gospels, examining them as narratives. It shows how the authors were in the process of developing the devil as a character and determining which roles he filled. New interpretations of individual passages in the Gospels are given as well as new understandings of the theological emphases of each author. This study is also a contribution to redaction criticism and the relative chronology of the Gospels. It employs the theory of Matthean posteriority which revolutionizes our understanding of the literary relations between the Gospels and allows for a new understanding of theological development in early Christianity.
The complex of megaliths near Tustrup is a prime example of the megalithic sites used by early farming communities in Stone Age Europe. Excavated in the 1950s by Moesgaard Museum, the site continues to hold great contemporary and scientific value. Its significance relates primarily to the unusual find of a ritual complex connected to two dolmens and passage grave. The question of why monumental sites played such an important role for early farming communities is currently the focus of several international studies. In Denmark, which boasts one of the world’s largest concentrations of megalithic monuments as well as a strong tradition for research in the area, archaeologists have had a longstanding wish to contribute to this discussion with a comprehensive publication about the unique complex of megaliths near Tustrup. Experts have researched the finds and meticulously analysed the site and its artefacts. These detailed studies have led to surprising and well-documented interpretations of the megalithic tombs, the construction history of the ritual site and their function, along with the inter-relationship between the monuments.
Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.
How nations can promote peace, prosperity, and stability through cohesive political institutions "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters—places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.
This book is a festschrift for Torsten Hagerstrand. "Through your work on migration, innovation diffusion, and time-geography you have helped demonstrate that geography's most profound insights are to be gained from the study of process rather than form.
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