Contains anecdotes from observations and interviews with nearly 50 players and coaches from every generation of the U.S. Women's National Soccer Team. Players mentioned include April Heinrichs, Michelle Akers, Carla Overbeck, Mia Hamm, Julie Foudy, Kristine Lilly, Christie Rampone, Abby Wambach, Alex Morgan, Carli Lloyd.
Four neighborhood boys get together during summer vacation and form a club. Together, the boys go on several adventures, with each one of the adventuresgiving them clues, to the secret of the pirate's cave!
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Nashville is a name synonymous with music. Years before the first radio broadcast of country music from Nashvilles Grand Ole Opry, music and publishing were central to Nashvilles self-identity. Thousands of songs flooded into the Cumberland and Tennessee River valleys from Southern Appalachia, sung by folk performers. These songs became the foundation for the folk-hymn traditions that grew throughout Tennessee. Into this stream flowed a body of African American spirituals, gospel, and minstrel songs. The arrival of trained German musicians brought classical styles to this gathering stream of musical confluences. These musicians found a home in the academies and businesses of Nashville. Nashville Music before Country is the story of how music merged with education, publication, entertainment, and distribution to set the stage for a unique musical metropolis. The images for Nashville Music before Country come from private collections as well as public libraries and archives.
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
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