The countries of Central Europe in the first round for admission to the European Union have all established constitutional, electoral democracies and market economies. However, much remains to be done to achieve fully consolidated democratic states. This study documents the weaknesses of public oversight and participation in policymaking in Hungary and Poland, two of the most advanced countries in the region. It discusses five alternative routes to accountability including European Union oversight, constitutional institutions such as presidents and courts, devolution to lower-level governments, the use of neo-corporatist bodies, and open-ended participation rights. It urges more emphasis on the fifth option, public participation. Case studies of the environmental movement in Hungary and of student groups in Poland illustrate these general points. The book reviews the United States' experience of open-ended public participation and draws some lessons for the transition countries from the strengths and weaknesses of the American system.
Although many people feel that Germany provides a model for environmental policymaking, this book shows that it does not. German administrative law, which focuses on individuals' complaints against the state for violating their rights, does not deal adequately with the broad issues of democratic legitimacy and accountable procedures raised in American courts. Susan Rose-Ackerman compares regulatory law and policy in the United States and Germany and argues that the American system can provide lessons for those seeking to reform environmental policymaking in Germany and the newly democratic states of eastern Europe. Democratic governments, says Rose-Ackerman, face the problem of balancing the desires and expertise of conflicting interest groups, such as those that concern themselves with environmental protection. Under German law, however, environmental associations with policy agendas have no enforceable legal right to participate in federal policymaking, and regulation writing is much less open and accountable than in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court is moving in the direction of the German system - away from review of the rulemaking process and toward a focus on individual rights. Those who support this trend should look critically at the German solution.
With nuanced perspective and detailed case studies, Due Process of Lawmaking explores the law of lawmaking in the United States, South Africa, Germany, and the European Union. This comparative work deals broadly with public policymaking in the legislative and executive branches. It frames the inquiry through three principles of legitimacy: democracy, rights, and competence. Drawing on the insights of positive political economy, the authors explicate the ways in which courts uphold these principles in the different systems. Judicial review in the American presidential system suggests lessons for the parliamentary systems in Germany and South Africa, while the experience of parliamentary government yields potential insights into the reform of the American law of lawmaking. Taken together, the national experiences shed light on the special case of the EU. In dialogue with each other, the case studies demonstrate the interplay between constitutional principles and political imperatives under a range of different conditions.
A defense of regulatory agencies' efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens "This exceptional exploration of how four advanced democracies pursue legitimacy in the bureaucratic implementation of regulatory law makes an invaluable contribution."--Peter M. Shane, author of Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
The countries of Central Europe in the first round for admission to the European Union have all established constitutional, electoral democracies and market economies. However, much remains to be done to achieve fully consolidated democratic states. This study documents the weaknesses of public oversight and participation in policymaking in Hungary and Poland, two of the most advanced countries in the region. It discusses five alternative routes to accountability including European Union oversight, constitutional institutions such as presidents and courts, devolution to lower-level governments, the use of neo-corporatist bodies, and open-ended participation rights. It urges more emphasis on the fifth option, public participation. Case studies of the environmental movement in Hungary and of student groups in Poland illustrate these general points. The book reviews the United States' experience of open-ended public participation and draws some lessons for the transition countries from the strengths and weaknesses of the American system.
Rose-Ackerman sees recent advances in law and economics as an opportunity to tackle some of the failings of the US state. She proposes a progressive and positive agenda of reform rather than simple reduction or expansion of existing functions and services.
Corruption: A Study in Political Economy focuses on the problem of corruptions in political economy and functional bribery. This book is organized into four parts encompassing 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with the fundamental relationship among voters, legislators, and interest groups, as well as the role of the government bureaucracy in shaping legislative choices. Chapters 5 illustrates the basic relationships with an analysis of a monopolistic government official charged with allocating a benefit through a queuing system, while Chapter 6 retains the assumption of a single official with monopoly power but moves beyond the queuing model to consider alternative sanctioning strategies, a wider variety of bureaucratic tasks, and bribers who may be competitively or monopolisticly organized. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of a system where officials are permitted to compete with one another in processing applications for governmental benefits. Under this system, an individual or firm rejected by one official can seek the benefit from other bureaucrats. Chapter 9 introduces a final administrative variable into the analysis, while Chapter 10 discusses the governmental corruption to analogous corrupt activities entirely within the private sector. Lastly, Chapter 11 looks into the relation between corruption and democratic theory, the possibility of reforming corrupt bureaucracies, and the link between economics and morality. This book will be of value to public servants, legislators, economists, sociologists, and researchers.
Rose-Ackerman sees recent advances in law and economics as an opportunity to tackle some of the failings of the US state. She proposes a progressive and positive agenda of reform rather than simple reduction or expansion of existing functions and services.
Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats—undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic—invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? In The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma, Susan D. Hyde explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. Hyde argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government’s purported commitment to democratic elections. Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces.
A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
This comparative study of the law of lawmaking demonstrates the interplay between constitutional principles and political imperatives in four modern polities.
Although many people feel that Germany provides a model for environmental policymaking, this book shows that it does not. German administrative law, which focuses on individuals' complaints against the state for violating their rights, does not deal adequately with the broad issues of democratic legitimacy and accountable procedures raised in American courts. Susan Rose-Ackerman compares regulatory law and policy in the United States and Germany and argues that the American system can provide lessons for those seeking to reform environmental policymaking in Germany and the newly democratic states of eastern Europe. Democratic governments, says Rose-Ackerman, face the problem of balancing the desires and expertise of conflicting interest groups, such as those that concern themselves with environmental protection. Under German law, however, environmental associations with policy agendas have no enforceable legal right to participate in federal policymaking, and regulation writing is much less open and accountable than in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court is moving in the direction of the German system - away from review of the rulemaking process and toward a focus on individual rights. Those who support this trend should look critically at the German solution.
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