The subject of U.S. grand strategy has been getting increasing attention from the policy and academic communities. But too often the debate suffers from being too reductionist, limiting America's choices to worldwide hegemony or narrow isolation. There is a wide spectrum of choices before Washington that lie "somewhere in the middle." Too often not enough thought is given to how such alternative strategies should be designed and implemented. The future cannot be known, and earlier predictions of American decline have proven to be premature. However, there is a shift in wealth and power to the extent that America may not be able to hold on to its position as an unrivalled unipolar superpower. Therefore, it is worth thinking about how the United States could shape and adjust to the changing landscape around it. What is more, there are a number of interlocking factors that mean such a shift would make sense: transnational problems needing collaborative efforts...
The following three papers comprise one of the panels form a conference on U.S.-Russia relations that SSI co-sponsored with the Carnegie Council at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011, Carnegie Council's Program on "U.S. Global Engagement: A Two-Year Retrospective." The papers offer three contrasting looks at one of the major issues in today's arms control agenda, namely the future of the Conventional forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The three papers are by leading experts in the field from the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia and provide a revealing glimpse into the very different assessments that are being made by those three governments and the difficult issues involved in attempting to regenerate the process that led to the original treaty in 1990. They also implicitly contribute to a better understanding of the intractabilities facing the major players in any effort to advance not only arms control but also European stability.
Prevention is the key to effective policies in Africa, whether the issue is equitable resource exploitation, ethnic conflict, infectious diseases, or famine. African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have moved beyond their initial purpose of a loose confederation of trading partners to become increasingly effective supranational bodies promoting financial, political, and security stabilization in each of their regions. Looking at each of the RECs, their power centers, and areas of weakness, policymakers can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the sometimes symbiotic and often destructive dynamics within and among African states to seek more effective strategic and regional, not national, approaches. This monograph suggests USAFRICOM is uniquely positioned to help design a path to spearhead a pan-African strategy highly likely to have the net long-term effect of attaining considerable competitive advantage for the U.S. economically, militarily, and politically...
What is "grand strategy," and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy--the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s--and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.
The relationship between energy and security has been receiving increasing attention over the last few years. Energy literally drives the global economy. Societies rely on it for everything from advanced medical equipment to heating, cooling, and irrigation. Whether it derives from advanced nuclear reactors in developed nations or simple woodstoves in the developing world, energy is recognized as vital to human welfare. It influences our economic, political, and social policies. Possessing or not possessing sufficient energy determines a state's political and economic power. Competition for energy has been, is, and will be a source of conflict. The choices nation-states make when it comes to energy will have a profound bearing on a wide range of security concerns, from nuclear proliferation to climate change.
Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is a declared policy of the U.S. Government. Three key strategic objectives have been identified for accomplishing this: attacking al-Qaeda's terror network, undermining radicalization and recruitment, and hardening homeland defense. The present monograph proposes a distinct "jihad realist" approach for undermining radicalization and recruitment to al Qaeda. First, a brief discussion of six means for ending terrorist organizations is provided. Second, the premises of a jihad realist approach are described. Third, a jihad realist shari'a case against al Qaeda's terrorism is presented. In conclusion, key assertions are summarized, and several specific policy recommendations offered for national security personnel charged with formulating and executing counterterrorist messaging strategy.
North Korea is a country of paradoxes and contradictions. Although it remains an economic basket case that cannot feed and clothe its own people, it nevertheless possesses one of the world's largest armed forces. Whether measured in terms of the total number of personnel in uniform, numbers of special operations soldiers, the size of its submarine fleet, quantity of ballistic missiles in its arsenal, or its substantial weapons of mass destruction programs, Pyongyang is a major military power. Content: North Korea's Military Threat Conventional Forces Unconventional Forces Overall Conclusions The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program DPRK National Strategy and Motivations Historical Background of DPRK Missile Development Institutional Setting Conclusion U.S. Government Policy Toward North Korea Countering the North Korean Threat (New Steps in U.S. Policy) Pressuring North Korea (Evaluating Options) President Donald Trump on Current Crisis on the Korean Peninsula A Message to the Congress of the United States on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea Statement from the President on North Korea's Second ICBM Launch Statement by President Donald J. Trump on North Korea About the Authors
The essays gathered here represent a panel at SSI's annual Russia conference in 2011. They focus on the analysis of Russian foreign policy both on its material side or actual conduct as well as on the cognitive bases of Russian thinking about international affairs and Russian national security. They span much of the gamut of that foreign policy and also show its strong linkages to the Russian historical tradition and to the imperatives of Russian domestic development.
The United States is not the only global center as it was in the first years of post-Cold War era. Nor are there just two superpowers-the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-that define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power that will provide the opportunity for small states such as Belorussia to move from one center of power to the other and/or engage in sort of geopolitical "ménage de troix." During the last 10 years or so, Belorussia moved from Russia to the European Union and back, while at the same time engaging in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the European Union have not been stable, the story is different with China and Iran. Belorussia has always maintained a good relationship with both countries, especially with China. This demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in geopolitical arrangements now and in the future.
Developing a U.S. national security strategy for Latin America is a daunting task in an era of scarce resources. Yet, it is important at this historical juncture that the effort be undertaken. The demise of the Cold War has produced not an "End of History" but a "New World Disorder," which may well become more tumultuous in the decades ahead. Thus, it is crucial at this turn of the millennium to reconsider the prospects for regional security, the challenges that both new and old dangers may pose to U.S. interests, and the kind of strategy and policies that might enable the United States to both better cope with current problems and head off those that are just over the horizon. In this report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz first analyzes U.S. security interests in Latin America. He then surveys the primary challenges to those interests, and how well U.S. strategy and policy are equipped to cope with them. But he does not stop there. He suggests how the security environment is likely to change over the next quarter century, both in terms of the new dangers that may arise and the evolution of problems that already exist. His conclusion that we are not strategically equipped to face the future is a disturbing one, for Latin America's importance to the United States is growing fast even as our attention is flagging. Will we have the insight to recognize our own interests, the will to commit sufficient resources to attain them, and the intellectual wherewithal to relate our means to our ends?
As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions-will it manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to vocation and its service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through just it means for the Army to be a profession...
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war--whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement--as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war.
Today, America faces security challenges that are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing America's whole-of-government (WOG) capabilities. Although the need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental, national and international capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for its attempts at creating WOG responses to international crises and conflicts for overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, ..
The utility of U.S. forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions-and in particular the arguments against forward presence-in the context of a decades' long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others, mistakenly tie forward basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, the author bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. This monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American landpower, particular in this age of austerity.
This monograph examines the strategic importance of Egypt for the United States by exploring Egypt's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its geographical role (providing air and naval access) for U.S. military assets heading to the Persian Gulf, and joint training programs. With so much at stake in the Middle East, the idea of "losing" Egypt as a strategic ally would be a significant setback for the United States. The Egyptian revolution of early 2011 was welcomed by U.S. officials because the protestors wanted democratic government which conformed to U.S. ideals, and the institution that would shepherd the transition, the Egyptian military, had close ties with the United States. To bolster the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and help keep Egypt on the democratic path, the monograph recommends that U.S. military aid should not be cut, economic aid should be increased, and U.S. administration officials should not oppose congressional conditions tying aid...
With the last departure of U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011 and a drawdown in Afghanistan already underway, the current era of American counterinsurgency may be coming to a close. At the same time, irregular threats to U.S. national interests remain, and the future may hold yet more encounters with insurgents for the U.S. military. Accordingly, the latest Defense strategic guidance has called on the Department of Defense (DoD) to "retain and continue to reine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities" from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This monograph is a contribution to this ongoing effort to institutionalize the military's understanding of counterinsurgency, building on its hard-won recent experience. Michael Fitzsimmons examines two case studies drawn from some of the darkest months of conlict in Iraq...
The Middle East and North Africa might not be the first region that comes to mind when one contemplates the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To many, the Alliance was founded largely to unite Europe and North America, and to counter threats emerging from the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War changed these assumptions-not least to be proven by NATO's Operation in Libya in 2011, sanctioned by the League of Arab States. In this monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub describes how the region has moved from the rim of the Alliance's security perspective toward a more nuanced vision that recognizes the region's role in an ever-changing and more-complex world. NATO has understood the security implications emerging from the changes taking place among its southern neighbors and the need for dialogue and cooperation. Dr. Gaub gives not only an overview of the different frameworks of cooperation that NATO has with the Middle East and North Africa, but also explains their evolution and potential.
As if combating vicious narco-syndicates were not a sufficiently formidable challenge, the Mexican government has assigned such additional roles to the Army and Navy as overseeing customs agents, serving as state and municipal security chiefs, taking charge of prisons, protecting airports, safeguarding migrants, functioning as firefighters, preventing drug trafficking around schools, establishing recreational programs for children, and standing guard 24-hours a day over boxes of ballots cast in recent elections. This expansion of duties has sparked the accusation that Mexico is being "militarized." A creative outreach program includes parades and other ceremonial extravaganzas, pilots encourage adults and children to hop into the seat of a helicopter; other wide-eyed youngsters grasp the controls of anti-aircraft weapons; admiring onlookers are invited to shake hands and have photos taken with nationally prominent military athletes; in Veracruz and other ports, residents are given tours of ships...
Any significant homeland response event requires Americans to work together. This is a complex challenge. The authors assert that the principal obstacle to effective homeland response is a recurring failure to achieve unity of effort across a diverse and often chaotic mix of participating federal, state, and local government and nongovernmental organizations. Despite a decade of planning since the terror attacks of September 2001, unity of effort still eludes us-particularly in the largest and most dangerous of crises. The authors examine how the military's joint doctrine system affected joint military operational capabilities, concluding that a similar national homeland response doctrinal system is needed to create and sustain unity of effort. Doctrine performs a vital unifying function in complex operations, standardizing ways and means.
This monograph examines the potential utility of history as a source of education and possible guidance for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in the claim that since history (more accurately termed the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for today as we try to look forward. This point of view did not find much favor here. The monograph argues that although history does not repeat itself in detail, it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances. Of course, much detail differs from one historical case to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn from virtually every period of history, concerning most circumstances. Contents: Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Understanding the Past: A Foreign Country? Persisting Concerns and Enduring Hazards A Familiar Past? Parallels and Analogies What Changes and What Does Not? What Can the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recommendations for the U.S. Army
Cyber is now recognized as an operational domain, but the theory that should explain it strategically is, for the most part, missing. It is one thing to know how to digitize; it is quite another to understand what digitization means strategically. The author maintains that, although the technical and tactical literature on cyber is abundant, strategic theoretical treatment is poor. He offers four conclusions: (1) cyber power will prove useful as an enabler of joint military operationsl; (2) cyber offense is likely to achieve some success, and the harm we suffer is most unlikely to be close to lethally damaging; (3) cyber power is only information and only one way in which we collect, store, and transmit information; and (4) it is clear enough today that the sky is not falling because of cyber peril. As a constructed environment, cyberspace is very much what we choose to make it.
Because of rising popular expectations regarding currently nonexistent rights in Latin America, it appears to be a revolutionary, insurgent, criminal, and populist dream. Thus, the Americas appear to be particularly susceptible to state (and their proxies) and nonstate actors that promise the security, stability, and prosperity national governments have generally failed to provide. Accordingly, Venezuela and President Hugo Chavez have become exporters of asymmetric, unconventional, and undeclared war. If left ignored and unchecked, these wars compel radical, unwanted, and epochal political-economic-social system change. Even though prudent governments must prepare for high-risk, low probability conventional interstate war, there is a high probability that the U.S. President and Congress and leaders of other powers around the world will continue to require civil-military participation in unconventional conflicts.
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