Planning Armageddon provides the first detailed account of Britain's Command, Control, Intelligence and Communications infrastructure. A central theme of the book is the British-American atomic relationship and its implications for NATO strategy. Based on the recollections of officials and military officers in both Britain and the United States and
This volume is comprised of a collection of diplomatic documents covering British reactions to, and policy towards, the collapse of the German Democratic Republic and the unification of Germany in 1989-90. The peaceful unification of Germany in 1989-90 brought a dramatic end to the Cold War. This volume documents official British reactions to the collapse of East Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the evolution of British policy during the ‘Two plus Four’ negotiations that provided the international framework for the merger of the two German states. All of the documents fall within the UK’s 30-year rule and have therefore not previously been in the public domain. Most are drawn from the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but there are also a large number of Prime Ministerial files from the Cabinet Office archives. These are of particular interest for the light they throw on the views of Margaret Thatcher. Taken together, the documents show that despite Mrs Thatcher’s well-known reservations about German unity, the United Kingdom played a vital and constructive role in the negotiations that helped to bring it about. This volume will be of great interest to students of International History, British Political History, and European Politics and International Relations in general. Patrick Salmonis Chief Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Keith Hamiltonis a Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Senior Editor of Documents on British Policy Overseas. Stephen Twiggeis a Senior Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Planning Armageddon provides the first detailed account of Britain's Command, Control, Intelligence and Communications infrastructure. A central theme of the book is the British-American atomic relationship and its implications for NATO strategy. Based on the recollections of officials and military officers in both Britain and the United States and
Winner of the Emme Award for Astronautical Literature from the American Astronautical Society How does one go about organizing something as complicated as a strategic-missile or space-exploration program? Stephen B. Johnson here explores the answer—systems management—in a groundbreaking study that involves Air Force planners, scientists, technical specialists, and, eventually, bureaucrats. Taking a comparative approach, Johnson focuses on the theory, or intellectual history, of "systems engineering" as such, its origins in the Air Force's Cold War ICBM efforts, and its migration to not only NASA but the European Space Agency. Exploring the history and politics of aerospace development and weapons procurement, Johnson examines how scientists and engineers created the systems management process to coordinate large-scale technology development, and how managers and military officers gained control of that process. "Those funding the race demanded results," Johnson explains. "In response, development organizations created what few expected and what even fewer wanted—a bureaucracy for innovation. To begin to understand this apparent contradiction in terms, we must first understand the exacting nature of space technologies and the concerns of those who create them.
Drawing upon previously unpublished records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence, this book focuses upon Britain's role in the early stages of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna, and British policy towards the Soviet Union and its European satellites during an era of detente in East-West relations. The documents reveal both the suspicions of senior Whitehall officials regarding Soviet designs in Europe, and their doubts about the negotiating tactics and strategy of their American allies. With Washington still reeling from the Vietnam debacle, British diplomats initially saw the MBFR talks as a mechanism for helping the Nixon administration to stave off Congressional demands for cuts in US forces in Europe. They dismissed as a 'pipe dream' the notion that reductions in Western manpower numbers could be compatible with undiminished security for all, but hoped through participation in the talks to forestall any unnecessary weakening of NATO." --Book Jacket.
While other books have speculated on the history and nature of Britain's intelligence services, this is the first to tell the story through the documents themselves. Only ten years ago access to these original sources would have been impossible, but now experts Twigge, Hampshire and Macklin draw on the spies' and spymasters' own words from the National Archives' unique intelligence files - including the very latest remarkable releases from MI5. Historical narrative is interwoven with colourful tales from the past that highlight some of the greatest successes - and failures - along the way, as well as the motives and machinations of those responsible for them. And readers who want to explore sources for themselves are given all the guidance they need. As the Iraq War and its aftermath bring the intelligence profession back into the spotlight, "British Intelligence" is compelling reading for anyone interested in the shadowy world of 20th-century espionage.
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