The military coup that toppled Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973 led to one of the most repressive military dictatorships in Latin American history. Although the coup's full origin remains one of the great mysteries of the Cold War, most assume that powers in Washington were largely to blame, given the long history of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. These assumptions were only strengthened by ongoing suspicions about the Nixon administration's role in a failed campaign to prevent Allende's inauguration in 1970. Providing a comprehensive account of the Nixon administration's efforts to undermine and unseat Allende, the book relies heavily on newly declassified records, addressing several crucial questions regarding U.S. involvement. The author explores several counterfactual scenarios to highlight important turning points and crucial decisions which contributed to the failure of Chilean democracy.
The military coup that toppled Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973 led to one of the most repressive military dictatorships in Latin American history. Although the coup's full origin remains one of the great mysteries of the Cold War, most assume that powers in Washington were largely to blame, given the long history of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. These assumptions were only strengthened by ongoing suspicions about the Nixon administration's role in a failed campaign to prevent Allende's inauguration in 1970. Providing a comprehensive account of the Nixon administration's efforts to undermine and unseat Allende, the book relies heavily on newly declassified records, addressing several crucial questions regarding U.S. involvement. The author explores several counterfactual scenarios to highlight important turning points and crucial decisions which contributed to the failure of Chilean democracy.
The Eisenhower administration's intervention in Guatemala is one of the most closely studied covert operations in the history of the Cold War. Yet we know far more about the 1954 coup itself than its aftermath. This book uses the concept of "counterrevolution" to trace the Eisenhower administration's efforts to restore U.S. hegemony in a nation whose reform governments had antagonized U.S. economic interests and the local elite. Comparing the Guatemalan case to U.S.-sponsored counterrevolutions in Iran, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Chile reveals that Washington's efforts to roll back "communism" in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War represented in reality a short-term strategy to protect core American interests from the rising tide of Third World nationalism.
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