This book shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Aristotle, and Nietzsche all did ethical philosophy? It introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions.
Philosophers don't often write about the heart. At least, analytical philosophers don't. Why is this? Philosophers are said to live life ?in their heads? rather than ?from their hearts.? But even if that is so, why don't they think and write about the heart? Moreover, it can hardly have escaped philosophers' attention that matters of the heart are central to what we human beings value most about our lives, including our lives with animals. Philosophers write a lot about friendship and love, but they tend to do so in terms that leave out heartfelt connection. They speak rather of commitment to one another and each other's well-being, or taking each other as ends, or sharing deliberative standpoints or living life together, or a whole host of other topics, and much less about mutual emotional vulnerability and sharing and being in one another's hearts. Surely one explanation of philosophers' reticence is that talk of ?the heart? seems unavoidably metaphorical. It turns out to be easy enough, however, to cash the metaphor in if we simply take ?heart? refers to a cluster of emotional susceptibilities that have an essentially reciprocating structure. The heart aims at heartfelt connection-at shared experience of joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, and other personal emotions. We seek naturally to share these feelings with others and must suppress our natural tendencies if we wish to avoid doing so. Our heart's wish is to be open to other hearts in the hope that they will be open to ours, and thereby us, in return. This book is a systematic treatment-perhaps the first-of ?attitudes of the heart?-remorse (versus guilt), love, trust, gratitude, personal anger (versus righteous anger), jealousy, and others-and their role in mediating personal relationship, attachment, and connection. This is obviously interesting in its own right, but it also shows how heartfelt attitudes mirror more extensively studied ?reactive attitudes? of guilt, resentment, and blame (?attitudes of the will?). Whereas the latter mediate moral relations of mutual respect and accountability, attitudes of the heart are the currency of heartfelt connection and personal relationship.
Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as ?What has value?? and ?What are our moral obligations?? with fundamental philosophical issues such as ?What is value?? and ?What can a moral
What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.
In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in which we are committed to morality by presuppositions that are inescapable when we relate to others (person to person). He expands on the argument set forth in The Second-Person Standpoint to explore the second-personal framework in three further settings. The first concerns a fundamental difference between the form that respect and the concept of person take in honor cultures, on the one hand, and the shape these assume in morality conceived as equal accountability, on the other. One essay explores this difference directly while others investigate related themes of justice versus retaliation and vengeance for insult and injury to honor, including in the writings of Adam Smith and Nietzsche on ressentiment. A second setting concerns the role of second-personal ideas in the development of a distinctively "modern" moral philosophy, beginning in seventeenth-century Europe. Two essays here discuss the centrality of second-personal notions in two formative modern natural law theorists: Grotius and Pufendorf. And two others concentrate on the role of reciprocal recognition in Kant and Fichte, respectively. A third group of essays treat the second-personal structure of interpersonal relations. There are three essays in this group: one on promising as a second-personal transaction between promiser and promisee, a second on what it is to be with another person, and a third on the role of second-personal standing in personal relationships.
Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.
In contemporary culture, accountability is usually understood in terms of holding people who have done something wrong accountable for their actions. As such, it is virtually synonymous with punishing someone. Living Accountably argues that accountability should also be understood as a significant, forward-looking virtue, an excellence possessed by those who willingly embrace being accountable to those who have proper standing, when that standing is exercised appropriately. Those who have this virtue are people who strive to live accountably. The book gives a fine-grained description of the virtue and how it is exercised, including an account of the motivational profile of the one who has the virtue. It examines the relation of accountability to other virtues, such as honesty and humility, as well as opposing vices, such as self-deception, arrogance, and servility. Though the virtue of accountability is compatible with individual autonomy, recognizing the importance of the virtue does justice to the social character of human persons. C. Stephen Evans also explores the history of this virtue in other cultures and historical eras, providing evidence that the virtue is widely recognized, even if it is somewhat eclipsed in modern western societies. Accountability is also a virtue that connects ethical life with religious life for many people, since it is common for people to have a sense that they are accountable in a global way for how they live their lives. Living Accountably explores the question as to whether global accountability can be understood in a purely secular way, as accountability to other humans, or whether it must be understood as accountability to God, or some other transcendent reality.
Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to fall back on non-moral values or first-person considerations, Stephen Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community.
Stephen L. Dyson has spent a lifetime studying and teaching the history of ancient Rome. That unparalleled knowledge is reflected in his magisterial overview of the Eternal City. Rather than look only at the physical development of the city—its buildings, monuments, and urban spaces—Dyson also explores its social, economic, and cultural histories. This unique approach situates Rome against a background of comparative urban history and theory, allowing Dyson to examine the dynamic society that once thrived there. In his personal effort to reconstruct the city, Dyson populates its streets with the hurried politicians, hawking vendors, and animated students that once lived, worked, and studied there, bringing the ancient city to life for a new generation of students and tourists. Dyson follows Rome as it developed between the third century BC and the fourth century AD, dividing the great megalopolis into distinct neighborhoods and locales. He shows how these communities, each with its own unique customs and colorful inhabitants, eventually grew into the great imperial capital of the Italian Empire. Dyson integrates the full range of sources available—literary, artistic, epigraphic, and archaeological—to create a comprehensive history of the monumental city. In doing so, he offers a dramatic picture of a complex and changing urban center that, despite its flaws, flourished for centuries.
Uncertainty is critical to economic theory, mainly because it either supports, or undermines, many significant debates within economic theory. Despite the significance of uncertainty, this book represents the first attempt to comprehensively trace the genealogy of uncertainty, which is a procedure that Nietzsche used in relation to morality; one of the subjects that become logically redundant in the absence of uncertainty. On the one hand, this logical redundancy is problematic when considered in isolation, given the practical importance of morality. On the other hand, this logical redundancy becomes even more problematic, given that, at one time, uncertainty was widely accepted as an important part of the philosophical system. Here uncertainty played a pivotal role, in terms of explaining practical decision-making. Such an appreciation of uncertainty has recently been set aside by modern philosophy, which argues quantities of human labour provide virtually all economic value. Such an explanation of economic value excludes uncertainty, the many qualitative contributions of nature, and morality, even when one acknowledged the contribution to the understanding of uncertainty, as proposed by Frank Knight, in 1921. However, in contrast to Knight, who looked toward recent philosophy so as to support the existence of uncertainty, this genealogy looks to support the significance of uncertainty by understanding the philosophy that supported the idea of uncertainty for thousands of years, before the philosophy of John Locke. Specifically, Locke excludes uncertainty from the analysis of practical decision-making in general, and from economic decision-making in particular. Accordingly, it can be anticipated that the enclosed genealogy will assist economists to more adequately develop the idea of uncertainty within economic theory.
Fossil fuel energy is the lifeblood of the modern world. Before the Industrial Revolution, humanity depended on burning wood and candle wax. But with the ability to harness the energy in oil and other fossil fuels, quality of life and capacity for progress increased exponentially. Thanks to incredible innovations in the energy industry, fossil fuels are as promising, safe, and clean an energy resource as has ever existed in history. Yet, highly politicized climate policies are pushing a grand-scale shift to unreliable, impractical, incredibly expensive, and far less efficient energy sources. Today, "fossil fuel" has become such a dirty word that even fossil fuel companies feel compelled to apologize for their products. In Fueling Freedom, energy experts Stephen Moore and Kathleen Hartnett White make an unapologetic case for fossil fuels, turning around progressives' protestations to prove that if fossil fuel energy is supplanted by "green" alternatives for political reasons, humanity will take a giant step backwards and the planet will be less safe, less clean, and less free.
This volume collects the best and most influential essays on knowledge, rationality and morality that Stephen Stich has published in the last 40 years. The volume includes a new introductory essay that offers an overview of the papers and traces the history of how they emerged.
Drawing on Protestant scholasticism, Puritan "precisionism," and virtue ethics, "Virtue Reformed" offers a comprehensive rereading of the ethical position of American philosopher-theologian Jonathan Edwards and his fascinating struggle to be both forwarder of the Reformation and participant in the Enlightenment.
When people encounter an argument for or against God's existence, it often raises more questions than it answers. In Letters to Doubting Thomas, C. Stephen Layman offers a fresh, insightful approach to the issue of God's existence--a way to organize what can seem like a blizzard of claims and concepts--bringing clarity to a debate often mired in confusion. Layman explores the evidence for the existence of God in a series of fictionalized letters between two characters--Zachary, a philosopher, and Thomas, an old college friend who appeals to Zach for help in sorting out his thoughts about God. As their correspondence grows, Zachary leads Thomas through an informal and highly readable comparison of Naturalism (the belief that there is no God and that ultimate reality is physical reality), and Theism (the idea that there is an almighty, perfectly good God). In engaging letters that break down complex philosophical arguments into easily digestible bits, the two friends delve into such weighty topics as the reliability of religious experience, various arguments for God's existence (such as the cosmological, design, and moral arguments), the question of free will, and the problem of evil. A piece at a time, they build an argument that shows that Theism, on balance, provides a better explanation of the world and human life than does Naturalism. Here then is a highly accessible account of the major arguments for and against the existence of God, capturing some of the best new insights of modern philosophy in a marvelously clear and engaging format.
Originally published in 1986, this book explores the animating qualities of human character and moral thought and discusses how they place constraints on the adequacy of moral theories. It evaluates some of the major theories in the history of ethics, notably the moral thoughts of Sidgwick, Kant, Aristotle and Hume. The book examines questions of fundamental importance to all of us and broadens the scope and wisdom of analytical philosophy by conveying the excitement of original philosophical research.
Can normative words like 'good', 'ought', and 'reason' be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
Ronald Dworkin is widely accepted as the most important and most controversial Anglo-American jurist of the past forty years. And this same-named volume on his work has become a minor classic in the field, offering the most complete analysis and integration of Dworkin's work to date. This third edition offers a substantial revision of earlier texts and, most importantly, incorporates discussion of Dworkin's recent masterwork Justice for Hedgehogs. Accessibly written for a wide readership, this book captures the complexity and depth of thought of Ronald Dworkin. Displaying a long-standing commitment to Dworkin's work, Stephen Guest clearly highlights the scholar's key theories to illustrate a guiding principle over the course of Dworkin's work: that there are right answers to questions of moral value. In assessing this principle, Guest also expands his analysis of contemporary critiques of Dworkin. The third edition includes an updated and complete bibliography of Dworkin's work.
Does objectivity exist in the news media? In The Invention of Journalism Ethics, Stephen Ward argues that given the current emphasis on interpretation, analysis, and perspective, journalists and the public need a new theory of objectivity. He explores the varied ethical assertions of journalists over the past few centuries, focusing on the changing relationship between journalist and audience. This historical analysis leads to an innovative theory of pragmatic objectivity that enables journalists and the public to recognize and avoid biased and unbalanced reporting. Ward convincingly demonstrates that journalistic objectivity is not a set of absolute standards but the same fallible but reasonable objectivity used for making decisions in other professions and public institutions. Considered a classic in the field since its first publication in 2004, this second edition includes new chapters that bring the book up to speed with journalism ethics in the twenty-first century by focusing on the growing dominance of online journalism and calling for a radical approach to journalism ethics reform. Ward also addresses important developments that have occurred in the last decade, including the emergence of digital journalism ethics and global journalism ethics.
This book argues that human dignity and law stand in a privileged relationship with one another. Law must be understood as limited by the demands made by human dignity. Conversely, human dignity cannot be properly understood without clarifying its interaction with legal institutions and legal practices. This is not, then, a survey of the uses of human dignity in law; it is a rethinking of human dignity in relation to our principles of social governance. The result is a revisionist account of human dignity and law, one focused less on the use of human dignity in our regulations and more on its constitutive implications for the governance of the public realm. The first part conducts a wide-ranging moral, legal and political analysis of the nature and functions of human dignity. The second part applies that analysis to three fields of legal regulation: international law, transnational law, and domestic public law. The book will appeal to scholars in both philosophy and law. It will also be of interest to political theorists, particularly those working within the liberal tradition or those concerned with institutional design.
This book develops a contemporary model of spiritual struggle aimed at perpetual ascent to and in God. Spiritual struggle in this project, which ultimately shifts the emphasis from virtue's acquisition to its pursuit, is defined as the exertion of effort in all conceivable dimensions-physical, emotional, psychological, intellectual, and spiritual-with intent to attain a semblance of, knowledge of, and intimacy with Jesus Christ in community, for God and for others. Gregory of Nyssa's theory of epektasis assumes a basic three-tiered conception of perpetual ascent, beginning with purification and detachment from fleshly passions, strengthening the soul by increasing in similitude to God, and ending with unity with God, that is, with inexpressible and transformative experience of God. God-the infinite, the Good, and the Paragon of virtue-functions as the orienting principle of this perpetual ascent, mitigating the issues of the unity of the virtues and the self-centeredness and self-effacement of virtue. This book goes on to provide two of many potential concrete instantiations of this suggested model. The first is the application of this model to the body, which in turn will have implications for contemporary sexual ethics. The second is a reintegration of ethics and Scripture through the contemporary application of an ancient Patristic lectio divina"--
Stephen Daniel presents a study of the philosophy of George Berkeley in the intellectual context of his times, with a particular focus on how, for Berkeley, mind is related to its ideas. Daniel does not assume that thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche, or Locke define for Berkeley the context in which he develops his own thought. Instead, he indicates how Berkeley draws on a tradition that informed his early training and that challenges much of the early modern thought with which he is often associated. Specifically, this book indicates how Berkeley's distinctive treatment of mind (as the activity whereby objects are differentiated and related to one another) highlights how mind neither precedes the existence of objects nor exists independently of them. This distinctive way of understanding the relation of mind and objects allows Berkeley to appropriate ideas from his contemporaries in ways that transform the issues with which he is engaged. The resulting insights--for example, about how God creates the minds that perceive objects--are only now starting to be fully appreciated.
Rights, Wrongs, and Injustices is the first comprehensive account of the scope, foundations, and structure of remedial law in common law jurisdictions. The rules governing the kinds of complaints that common law courts will accept are generally well understood. However, the rules governing when and how they respond to such complaints are not. This book provides that understanding. It argues that remedies are judicial rulings, and that remedial law is the law governing their availability and content. Focusing on rulings that resolve private law disputes (for example, damages, injunctions, and restitutionary orders), this book explains why remedial law is distinctive, how it relates to substantive law, and what its foundational principles are. The book advances four main arguments. First, the question of what courts should do when individuals seek their assistance (the focus of remedial law) is different from the question of how individuals should treat one another in their day-to-day lives (the focus of substantive law). Second, remedies provide distinctive reasons to perform the actions they command; in particular, they provide reasons different from those provided by either rules or sanctions. Third, remedial law has a complex relationship to substantive law. Some remedies are responses to rights-threats, others to wrongs, and yet others to injustices. Further, remedies respond to these events in different ways: while many remedies (merely) replicate substantive duties, others modify substantive duties and some create entirely new duties. Finally, remedial law is underpinned by general principles-principles that cut across the traditional distinctions between so-called “legal” and “equitable” remedies. Together, these arguments provide an understanding of remedial law that takes the concept of a remedy seriously, classifies remedies according to their grounds and content, illuminates the relationship between remedies and substantive law, and presents remedial law as a body of principles rather than a historical category.
Does objectivity in the news media exist? In The Invention of Journalism Ethics Stephen Ward argues that, given the current emphasis on interpretation, analysis, and perspective, journalists and the public need a new theory of objectivity. He explores the varied ethical assertions of journalists over the past few centuries, focusing on the changing relationship between journalist and audience. This historical analysis leads to an innovative theory of pragmatic objectivity that enables journalists and the public to recognize and avoid biased and unbalanced reporting. Ward convincingly demonstrates that journalistic objectivity is not a set of absolute standards but the same fallible but reasonable objectivity used for making decisions in other professions and public institutions.
Anthropological Realism is a new theory of ethics that transforms static moral principles into global normative ideals. Two prominent weaknesses in the field provide the rationale for this book. First, as a discipline, ethics lacks a strong theoretical basis. A second concern is moral parochialism. Technologies are global, but international perspectives rarely reflect an ethics anchored in humanity as a whole. Progress in developing a moral globalism as the basis for ethics has been prevented by unproductive dualisms that lead to stalemates. Ethics is typically divided into opposites such as individual and society, consequentialism and deontology, and local and global. To deal constructively with this history of unproductive disputes, the book focuses on a fundamental rivalry in philosophical ethics—the opposition between realism and anti-realism. To move the field forward, the authors create a next-generation moral theory of hybrid moral realism that promotes a sustainable global ethics of humaneness and human flourishing.
A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts Includes listings of suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy
This book outlines a new account of the tacit, meaning tacit knowledge, presuppositions, practices, traditions, and so forth. It includes essays on topics such as underdetermination and mutual understanding, and critical discussions of the major alternative approaches to the tacit, including Bourdieu’s habitus and various practice theories, Oakeshott’s account of tradition, Quentin Skinner’s theory of historical meaning, Harry Collins’s idea of collective tacit knowledge, as well as discussions of relevant cognitive science concepts, such as non-conceptual content, connectionism, and mirror neurons. The new account of tacit knowledge focuses on the fact that in making the tacit explicit, a person is not, as many past accounts have supposed, reading off the content of some sort of shared and fixed tacit scheme of presuppositions, but rather responding to the needs of the Other for understanding.
Disrupting Journalism Ethics sets out to disrupt and change how we think about journalism and its ethics. The book contends that long-established ways of thinking, which have come down to us from the history of journalism, need radical conceptual reform, with alternate conceptions of the role of journalism and fresh principles to evaluate practice. Through a series of disruptions, the book undermines the traditional principles of journalistic neutrality and "just the facts" reporting. It proposes an alternate philosophy of journalism as engagement for democracy. The aim is a journalism ethic better suited to an age of digital and global media. As a philosophical pragmatist, Stephen J. A. Ward critiques traditional conceptions of accuracy, neutrality, detachment and patriotism, evaluating their capacity to respond to ethical dilemmas for journalists in the 21st century. The book proposes a holistic mindset for doing journalism ethics, a theory of journalism as advocacy for egalitarian democracy, and a global redefinition of basic journalistic norms. The book concludes by outlining the shape of a future journalism ethics, employing these alternative notions. Disrupting Journalism Ethics is an important intervention into the role of journalism today. It asks: what new role journalists should play in today’s digital media world? And what new mind-set, new aims, and new standards ought jounalists to embrace? The book aims to persuade—and provoke—ethicists, journalists, students, and members of the public to disrupt and invent.
William James (1842–1910) argued for a philosophy of democracy and pluralism that advocates individual and collective responsibility for our social arrangements, our morality, and our religion. In James' view, democracy resides first and foremost not in governmental institutions or in procedures such as voting, but rather in the characteristics of individuals, and in qualities of mind and conduct. It is a philosophy for social change, counselling action and hope despite the manifold challenges facing democratic politics, and these issues still resonate strongly today. In this book, Stephen Bush explores how these themes connect to James' philosophy of religion, his moral thought, his epistemology, his psychology, and his metaphysics. His fresh and original study highlights the relevance of James' thought to modern debates, and will appeal to scholars and students of moral and political philosophy.
Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that, in order to capture the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choice, we must commit to the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts. Specifically, he identifies five ways in which a metaethical theory might fail to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. The first involves claims about the bruteness of moral attitudes or facts. The second involves claims about the privileging of some attitudes over others. The third involves the claim that some metaethical theories leave a normative deficit. The fourth involves a claim about our ownership over moral reality. And the fifth involves the claim that certain metaethical theories introduce a destabilising contingency into the moral domain. Ingram argues that robust realism is the theory that is best placed to avoid all five of these arbitrariness charges. He then goes on to show that, by exploring the nature of interpersonal moral dialogue, robust realists can defend epistemological and meta-semantic theories that are friendly to their view. Specifically, he defends a dualistic form of moral intuitionism on which some moral beliefs are justified on the basis of a priori intuitions, whilst others are justified on the basis of a posteriori moral experiences, and provides a theory of 'moral mental files' to explain how moral terms and concepts are able to refer to robust moral facts.
By developing an account of practical knowledge that situates Kant's ethics within his broader epistemology and rethinks numerous topics in his moral psychology and in his account of practical reason, this book promises to deepen and to reshape our understanding of Kantian ethics.
Angle's book is both an exposition of Neo-Confucian philosophy and a sustained dialogue with many leading Western thinkers, especially with those philosophers leading the current renewal of interest in virtue ethics. He argues for a new stage in the development of contemporary Confucian philosophy.
This book is a major work in the history of ethics, and provides the first study of early modern British philosophy in several decades. Professor Darwall discerns two distinct traditions feeding into the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, there is the empirical, naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume, which argues that obligation is the practical force that empirical discoveries acquire in the process of deliberation. On the other hand, there is a group including Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Butler, and in some moments Locke, which views obligation as inconceivable without autonomy and which seeks to develop a theory of the will as self-determining.
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