Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer, and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of sellers and the bidders, providing useful insight into actual behavior. The theoretic results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations expose shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer, and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of sellers and the bidders, providing useful insight into actual behavior. The theoretic results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations expose shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
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