This publication, “Deployment and Redeployment Operations (Joint Publication 3-35),” provides doctrine and principles for planning and executing deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It explains the deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment processes, and planning and execution considerations that may impact United States force projection operations. It discusses the responsibilities and command relationships for supported and supporting combatant commands and Services, and the interaction with other Department of Defense and federal agencies, foreign nations, allies, multinational organizations, and other groups.The deployment, reception, and integration of US air, land, maritime, and special operations forces in support of combatant commander (CCDR) requirements is a series of operational events enabled by logistics. The deployment process begins with planning for force projection under contingency planning or in a crisis. The operation plan (OPLAN) contains a deployment concept and may contain time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that identifies force requirements and flows the forces into the theater as required by the concept of operations (CONOPS). Deployment operations enable joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and to respond to other contingencies by securing positional advantages that contribute to the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. At any given time there could be multiple requirements to employ military forces. Each operation could have a different strategic priority, and could be of a different size and scope. To effectively support multiple requirements, and apply the right level of priority and resources to each, requires effective global force management. The joint deployment process is divided into four iterative and often simultaneous phases: planning, predeployment activities, movement, and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). Deployment planning occurs during both Joint Operation Planning and Execution System contingency planning and crisis action planning. It is conducted at all command levels and by both the supported and supporting commanders. Deployment planning activities include all action required to plan for the deployment and employment of forces. Predeployment activities are all actions taken by the joint planning and execution community, before actual movement, to prepare to execute a deployment operation. It includes continued refinement of OPLANs, from the strategic to the tactical level at the supported and supporting commands. It includes sourcing forces, completion of operation specific training, and mission rehearsals. Movement includes the movement of self-deploying units and those that require lift support. It includes movements within the continental US, deployments within an area of responsibility (AOR), and end-to-end origin to destination strategic moves. JRSOI, is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces in the operation area. It integrates the deploying forces into the joint operation and is the responsibility of the supported CCDR.
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agencies regardless of service delivery model have sought guidance on how to better integrate their emergency preparedness and response activities into similar processes occurring at the local, regional, State, tribal and Federal levels. The primary purpose of this project is to begin the process of providing that guidance as it relates to mass care incident deployment. The World Bank reported in 2005 that on aggregate, the reported number of natural disasters worldwide has been rapidly increasing, from fewer than 100 in 1975 to more than 400 in 2005. Terrorism, pandemic surge, and natural disasters have had a major impact on the science of planning for and responding to mass care incidents and remain a significant threat to the homeland. From the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the subsequent use of anthrax as a biological weapon, to the more recent surge concerns following the outbreak of H1N1 influenza, EMS have a real and immediate need for integration with the emergency management process, and to coordinate efforts with partners across the spectrum of the response community. The barriers identified from the literature review and interviews with national EMS leadership include: lack of access to emergency preparedness grant funding; underrepresentation on local, regional, and State level planning committees; and lack of systematic mandatory inclusion of all EMS provider types in State, regional, and local emergency plans. In December 2004, New York University's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response held a national roundtable that included experts from major organizations representing the EMS system as a whole. The report from that meeting concluded that: “EMS providers, such as fire departments and hospital-based, commercial, and air ambulance services, ensure that patients receive the medical care they need during a terrorist attack. While EMS personnel, including Emergency Medical Technicians and paramedics, represent roughly one-third of traditional first responders (which also include law enforcement and fire service personnel), the EMS system receives only four percent of first responder funding. If EMS personnel are not prepared for a terrorist attack, their ability to provide medical care and transport to victims of an attack will be compromised. There will be an inadequate medical first response.” In 2007, the Institute of Medicine in its landmark report Emergency Medical Services at the Crossroads issued a recommendation that stated: “The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Homeland Security and the States should elevate emergency and trauma care to a position of parity with other public safety entities in disaster planning and operations.” Since the time of these reports Federal progress to address these issues has included the creation of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the creation of the Emergency Care Coordination Center (ECCC) within HHS, and the creation of the Federal Interagency Committee on EMS (FICEMS) Preparedness Committee. In an effort to increase the level of preparedness among EMS agencies, the National Emergency Medical Services Management Association (NEMSMA) approached the DHS and OHA to engage them in a partnership that would provide a greater understanding of the shortfalls in EMS emergency preparedness and provide resources to fill those gaps. The primary objective of this project is to understand model policies and practices across a spectrum of disciplines and provider types that will lead to a better prepared EMS deployment to mass care incidents. This project should serve as a foundation for further development of EMS specific policies and templates that improve EMS readiness to manage the full spectrum of hazards that face their communities.
This monograph examines building large unit staffs to include divisions, corps, and field armies during mass mobilization. Unlike generating company grade officers, creating leaders capable of operational art is more challenging under tight time constraints. To discover trends on how the Army has generated large unit staffs before, the monograph uses three historical periods, each beginning with a force size contraction and ending with the conclusion of a wartime mobilization. The findings include three key deductions that helped generate or expand large unit staffs including doctrine, officer education, and officer selection. First, doctrine allowed a common point of reference for staff officers to learn and bridge gaps in experience. Next, officer education was critical prior to and during war because an educated officer corps served as the primary trainers to new units preparing for deployment. Finally, successful units had commanders take an active role in identification and selection of personnel capable of adaptive and creative learning. Officers in large unit staffs required many intangible attributes that are difficult to screen based on paper qualifications alone.
In the wake of 9/11, the Secretary of Defense assigned to USNORTHCOM the mission of providing military forces in support of civilian authorities in case of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack anywhere in the U.S. or its territories. With this directive, USNORTHCOM planners formed Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) with the mission of providing support to civilian authorities. This Task Force contains multiple units across the United States to fulfill mission requirements to support myriad potential scenarios. In the structure of JTF-CS, there are representatives from the Army, Air Force, and Navy ready within 24-48 hours' notice to assist civilian authorities based on identified gaps in states' capabilities. Distributed across the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, these military forces must deploy following a strict timeline set by USNORTHCOM. In order to support deployment of military forces, base support installations synchronize and coordinate deployment support efforts to ensure military forces abide to USNORTHCOM timelines. Factors that this research will consider are USNORTHCOM's ability to deploy military forces in relation to the incident area, capabilities required to support civil authorities, and requirements necessary to transport military forces to support domestic catastrophes. Successful synchronization will safeguard a unified effort among all stakeholders to include military forces and civilian authorities specifically at the state level. An increased emphasis on responsibilities by local state response forces is driving the thesis of this monograph to capture if USNORTHCOM's current employment and array of capabilities are relevant. Additionally, based on the recent changes to Army Doctrine Publication ADP 3-0, Defense Support of Civil Authorities is part of the unified land operations concept. This capstone doctrine places increased emphasis on the systems available to deploying military forces in support of civilian authorities.
This Annual Report covers the following main topics: 1) Updated Reference Mission. The reference ProSEDS (Propulsive Small Expendable Deployer System) mission is evaluated for an updated launch date in the Summer of 2002 and for the new 80-s current operating cycle. Simulations are run for nominal solar activity condition at the time of launch and for extreme conditions of dynamic forcing. Simulations include the dynamics of the system, the electrodynamics of the bare tether, the neutral atmosphere and the thermal response of the tether. 2) Evaluation of power delivered by the tether system. The power delivered by the tethered system during the battery charging mode is computed under the assumption of minimum solar activity for the new launch date. 3) Updated Deployment Control Profiles and Simulations. A number of new deployment profiles were derived based on the latest results of the deployment ground tests. The flight profile is then derived based on the friction characteristics obtained from the deployment tests of the F-1 tether. 4) Analysis/estimation of deployment flight data. A process was developed to estimate the deployment trajectory of the endmass with respect to the Delta and the final libration amplitude from the data of the deployer turn counters. This software was tested successfully during the ProSEDS mission simulation at MSFC (Marshall Space Flight Center) EDAC (Environments Data Analysis Center).Lorenzini, Enrico C.Marshall Space Flight CenterTETHERLINES; SPACECRAFT PROPULSION; SIMULATION; CATHODES; TETHERING; PROPULSION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS; LIBRATION; SOLAR ACTIVITY; SPACE PLASMAS; ORBIT DECAY; ELECTRODYNAMICS; BATTERY CHARGERS; ELECTROSTATIC DRAG
A preliminary effort in characterizing the types of stationary lunar power systems which may be considered for emplacement on the lunar surface from the proposed initial 100-kW unit in 2003 to later units ranging in power from 25 to 825 kW is presented. Associated with these power systems are their related infrastructure hardware including: (1) electrical cable, wiring, switchgear, and converters; (2) deployable radiator panels; (3) deployable photovoltaic (PV) panels; (4) heat transfer fluid piping and connection joints; (5) power system instrumentation and control equipment; and (6) interface hardware between lunar surface construction/maintenance equipment and power system. This report: (1) presents estimates of the mass and volumes associated with these power systems and their related infrastructure hardware; (2) provides task breakdown description for emplacing this equipment; (3) gives estimated heat, forces, torques, and alignment tolerances for equipment assembly; and (4) provides other important equipment/machinery requirements where applicable. Packaging options for this equipment will be discussed along with necessary site preparation requirements. Design and analysis issues associated with the final emplacement of this power system hardware are also described. Sprouse, Kenneth M. Unspecified Center...
The NOAA N' Search and Rescue Antenna (SRA) inadvertently deployed during a spacecraft rotation on April 14,2007. This rotation was part of a normal operation to configure the spacecraft for additional antenna and the solar array boom deployments. This procedure (red flag written) had been modified to look for a lost metal washer and a thermal blanket button. The modification to the procedure was reviewed and approved by the Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space (LMMS) Material Review Board (MRB) per standard procedures. The flag to the procedure introduced a counter clockwise rotation before the normal clockwise rotation. The antenna was temporally stowed and held in place via lacing cord. The lacing cord broke and allowed the SRA to inadvertently deploy during the clockwise rotation. The SRA broke through a hard stop bracket and damaged an instrument optical sensor radiator panel. The satellite damage appears to be minimal and there were no injuries to personnel. The damage to the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU)-A1 instrument has not been fully assessed. Based on mishap site visits, interviews and data analysis, the Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) identified the underlying causes of the mishap. Event and causal factor tree diagrams were developed, resulting in the identification of the proximate (or direct) cause and root causes of the mishap. Sabelhaus, Phil and Clemons, Eric and Haqopian, Mike Goddard Space Flight Center
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