Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th European Public Key Infrastructure Workshop: Theory and Practice, EuroPKI 2008, held in Trondheim, Norway, in June 2008. The 15 revised full papers presented together with 1 invited paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. Ranging from theoretical and foundational topics to applications and regulatory issues in various contexts, the papers focus on all research and practice aspects of PKI and show ways how to construct effective, practical, secure and low cost means for assuring authenticity and validity of public keys used in large-scale networked services.
Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th European Public Key Infrastructure Workshop: Theory and Practice, EuroPKI 2008, held in Trondheim, Norway, in June 2008. The 15 revised full papers presented together with 1 invited paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. Ranging from theoretical and foundational topics to applications and regulatory issues in various contexts, the papers focus on all research and practice aspects of PKI and show ways how to construct effective, practical, secure and low cost means for assuring authenticity and validity of public keys used in large-scale networked services.
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR'99, held in Eindhoven, The Netherlands in August 1999. The 32 revised full papers presented together with four invited contributions were selected from a total of 91 submissions. The papers address all areas of semantics, logics, and verification techniques for concurrent systems, in particular process algebras, Petri nets, event-structures, real-time systems, hybrid systems, stochastic systems, decidability, model-checking, verification, refinement, term and graph rewriting, distributed programming, logic constraint programming, typing systems, etc.
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