After more than a decade of deliberations, ASEAN leaders agreed on 11 November 2022 in principle to admit Timor-Leste as the eleventh member of the regional organization and to grant Timor-Leste observer status to attend all ASEAN meetings. Timor-Leste has demonstrated positive developmental progress, and fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars have returned generally optimistic results. However, an assessment of Timor-Leste’s ability to fulfil its commitments and obligations reveals that the country will need to close the gap with the ten existing members on matters such as the ratification and implementation of legally binding agreements and derivative work plans. Creating enforcement mechanisms and finding ways to implement commitments at the local level will be important. Timor-Leste has put in place institutional structures and implementing agencies for advancing cooperation with ASEAN. It is also moving towards harmonizing its laws with ASEAN instruments. However, its capacity remains in question due to a lack of substantive knowledge and technical expertise among government officials, as well as inadequate infrastructure, logistics and facilities for hosting ASEAN meetings. Strengthening human capital will be a top priority for Timor-Leste. This includes not only enhancing its personnel’s knowledge and technical expertise on ASEAN processes and procedures but also skills such as English language proficiency and negotiation. Coordinated capacity-building assistance from ASEAN and dialogue partners will be important. These efforts must also be met with economic diversification and growth of its nascent private sector. Apart from bridging gaps, ASEAN needs to grapple with its reservations that Timor-Leste’s economic limitations may slow down the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community. There are also concerns that Timor-Leste’s membership may entrench differences within the bloc, particularly with regard to geopolitical issues, and dilute the organization’s effectiveness or further complicate the consensus-based decision-making process.
The ASEAN+6 Single Window (ASW+6) in this study refers to the geographic expansion of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) to enable cross-border electronic exchange of trade-related data and documents among ASEAN member states and six FTA partners, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The ASW is part of ASEAN’s trade facilitation reform to reduce intraregional trade costs and time. This study considers cross-border paperless trade measures to represent the implementation of ASW+6, using data from the UN Global Survey on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in 2019. The simulation analyses reveal that the ASW+6 has significant potential to reduce times required to export and import, and to boost trade in ASEAN and its FTA partners. Partial implementation of cross-border paperless trade measures would imply an increase in ASEAN’s exports of US$102 billion annually. Under a more ambitious scenario of full implementation of cross-border paperless trade, the export gain for ASEAN would be US$199 billion annually. At the same time, the time required to export would fall by anything between 19 to 98 per cent, depending on the reform scenario considered. Trade gains from a full-fledged ASW+6 have not yet been reaped: even strong performers such as Singapore, Australia and New Zealand have areas for improvements, and weaker performers such as Cambodia and Laos need to make significant progress to catch up with the rest of the region, and deepen their mutual trade integration. The sequence of expanding the ASW to FTA partners may begin with countries that are major sources of ASEAN’s export gains identified in this study and those that have expressed their political will to move in that direction. These are Japan and South Korea. The ASW should then be enlarged to remaining FTA partners, especially China and India. While trade gains from ASW+6 are substantial, the implementation costs can also be significant due to different regulatory requirements across ASEAN+6 countries. Aid for trade and capacity-building to support the reform process have to be an integral part for the design of ASW+6.
After more than a decade of deliberations, ASEAN leaders agreed on 11 November 2022 in principle to admit Timor-Leste as the eleventh member of the regional organization and to grant Timor-Leste observer status to attend all ASEAN meetings. Timor-Leste has demonstrated positive developmental progress, and fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars have returned generally optimistic results. However, an assessment of Timor-Leste’s ability to fulfil its commitments and obligations reveals that the country will need to close the gap with the ten existing members on matters such as the ratification and implementation of legally binding agreements and derivative work plans. Creating enforcement mechanisms and finding ways to implement commitments at the local level will be important. Timor-Leste has put in place institutional structures and implementing agencies for advancing cooperation with ASEAN. It is also moving towards harmonizing its laws with ASEAN instruments. However, its capacity remains in question due to a lack of substantive knowledge and technical expertise among government officials, as well as inadequate infrastructure, logistics and facilities for hosting ASEAN meetings. Strengthening human capital will be a top priority for Timor-Leste. This includes not only enhancing its personnel’s knowledge and technical expertise on ASEAN processes and procedures but also skills such as English language proficiency and negotiation. Coordinated capacity-building assistance from ASEAN and dialogue partners will be important. These efforts must also be met with economic diversification and growth of its nascent private sector. Apart from bridging gaps, ASEAN needs to grapple with its reservations that Timor-Leste’s economic limitations may slow down the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community. There are also concerns that Timor-Leste’s membership may entrench differences within the bloc, particularly with regard to geopolitical issues, and dilute the organization’s effectiveness or further complicate the consensus-based decision-making process.
The COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and US-China trade disputes, and the Russia-Ukraine war have increased the risk of global value chain (GVC) disruptions and forced firms to strengthen resilience in their supply chains and operations. MNCs have diversified suppliers, established new production sites, and shifted production closer to consumers. ASEAN countries are becoming increasingly attractive destinations for foreign investors. This paper gauges the position of ASEAN in GVCs and assesses the risks and opportunities of GVC reconfiguration for ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries are increasing their participation in GVCs and raising domestic value-added. The relocation of production sites from China to ASEAN countries could enhance their participation in GVCs. Should MNCs increase the concentration of supplier and buyer markets, ASEAN countries could become more vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, this paper assesses the risk of thirty-five sectors of GVCs in ASEAN countries using value-added trade data from ADB’s multi-region input-output tables (MRIO). Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Thailand face significant risks of both supplier and buyer market concentrations. The remaining ASEAN countries face the risk of either supplier market concentration or buyer market concentration. Any restrictions on the use of intermediate inputs from the US or China to manufacture goods in ASEAN can cause substantial disruption to ASEAN GVCs. The upstream and downstream GVCs in ASEAN countries are dominated by the US, China and Japan. Extraregional trade integration could be enhanced by linking keysuppliers and buyers in China, the US, and Japan to producers inASEAN countries. Trade policy measures to strengthen ASEAN GVCs should focus on a faster release of perishable goods and intermediate inputs at border checkpoints, accelerating the cross-border paperless trade reforms, promoting the utilization of rules of origins under RCEP, streamlining non-tariff measures, and digitalizing ASEAN GVCs.
The ASEAN+6 Single Window (ASW+6) in this study refers to the geographic expansion of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) to enable cross-border electronic exchange of trade-related data and documents among ASEAN member states and six FTA partners, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The ASW is part of ASEAN’s trade facilitation reform to reduce intraregional trade costs and time. This study considers cross-border paperless trade measures to represent the implementation of ASW+6, using data from the UN Global Survey on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in 2019. The simulation analyses reveal that the ASW+6 has significant potential to reduce times required to export and import, and to boost trade in ASEAN and its FTA partners. Partial implementation of cross-border paperless trade measures would imply an increase in ASEAN’s exports of US$102 billion annually. Under a more ambitious scenario of full implementation of cross-border paperless trade, the export gain for ASEAN would be US$199 billion annually. At the same time, the time required to export would fall by anything between 19 to 98 per cent, depending on the reform scenario considered. Trade gains from a full-fledged ASW+6 have not yet been reaped: even strong performers such as Singapore, Australia and New Zealand have areas for improvements, and weaker performers such as Cambodia and Laos need to make significant progress to catch up with the rest of the region, and deepen their mutual trade integration. The sequence of expanding the ASW to FTA partners may begin with countries that are major sources of ASEAN’s export gains identified in this study and those that have expressed their political will to move in that direction. These are Japan and South Korea. The ASW should then be enlarged to remaining FTA partners, especially China and India. While trade gains from ASW+6 are substantial, the implementation costs can also be significant due to different regulatory requirements across ASEAN+6 countries. Aid for trade and capacity-building to support the reform process have to be an integral part for the design of ASW+6.
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