Why do courts hold political power-holders accountable in some democratic and democratizing countries, but not in others? And, why do some courts remain very timid while others - under seemingly similar circumstances - become 'hyper-active'? This is valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the issue of democratic accountability.
Creating a viable judiciary and strengthening its democratic functions has been a main concern of both governments and donors over the last two decades. This report charts the efforts to improve the functioning of a country's legal system in terms of both fairness and efficiency. Norwegian assistance to judicial reform, which is of relatively new date but of increasing importance, is placed in the broader context of how other donors - multilateral, governmental, and non-governmental - have sought to support judicial reform. The report analyses which sectors of the judiciary have been targeted for reform and why; what channels have been used; and what the lessons have been so far. Experiences from Latin America and Africa are highlighted, and case studies of Norwegian aid to Guatemala and Ethiopia provide reflections on what works and what does not work when donors set out to help governments reform their judiciaries.
Taking its cue from the poverty-reduction thrust of the Millennium Development Goals, this paper proposes an analytical framework for answering the fundamental question: How can we increase the responsiveness of decision-makers to the concerns of the poor and hold them accountable for their commitment to reducing poverty? The paper develops an approach to poverty reduction based on three interlinked concepts -- voice, responsiveness, and accountability. Voice refers to the articulation of the concerns of the poor and their conversion into political demands. Responsiveness addresses the sensitivity of decision-makers to the voice of the poor and its expression in action or inaction. Accountability pertains to the relationship between bearers of rights and legitimate claims and the agents responsible for fulfilling those rights and claims. The authors distinguish between an array of agents with povertyreducing mandates or obligations. Furthermore they suggest schema for assessing the means whereby the voice of the poor can be heard better, for reviewing the mechanisms for enhancing the responsiveness of decision-makers to the plight of the poor, and for increasing accountability to the commitment to poverty reduction. The paper raises a number of questions for discussion and interspersed in the text are boxes with examples pointing to ways forward. The paper was first developed as the issues paper of the conference: 'Responsiveness and accountability for poverty reduction: Democratic governance and the Millennium Development Goals', jointly organised by UNDP, Oslo Governance Centre and the Chr. Michelsen Institute at Solstrand Fjord Hotel, Os, Norway, 18-19 November 2002.
Originally published in 1997, South Africa: The Battle over the Constitution analyses rivaling positions in the South African constitutional debate from the early 1990s, via the 1993 interim constitution to the adoption and certification of the new, 'Final' Constitution in December 1996. A theoretical framework is developed to analyze the constitutional structure of the contesting constitutional models and the book looks into their potential for addressing the problems of violence, social inequality and ethnic tension and for achieving legitimacy and constitutionalism. It argues that the constitutional 'solutions' are premised on incomparable conceptions of South African reality, and that the Final Constitution includes elements based on incompatible world-views. The compromises required by the 'constitutional moment' could pose problems for the ’constitutional function’. The book also discusses other factors influencing the consolidation of a constitutional democracy in South Africa, such as the role of the Constitutional Court and the attempts to create legitimacy for the constitution by broad public participation in the constitution-making process.
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