The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—a senior group of officers who lead the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—is perhaps the most influential military figure in the United States. The chairman is the primary military advisor to the president and is often the public face of the armed forces. As advocates for the military’s priorities, some chairmen have used this role to help shape policy, but others have embraced the position as an opportunity to chart new policy directions or challenge presidential preferences. Managing the Military is a pioneering analysis of the power of the chairman of the JCS that sheds new light on civil-military relations in the United States. Using detailed case studies of debates over defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, Sharon K. Weiner examines when and how the JCS chairman opposes civilian defense policy preferences. She shows that, under the right conditions, the chairman can be a policy entrepreneur, challenging the goals of the White House and lobbying for the military’s interests. However, the extent of the chairman’s political clout is constrained by the preferences of the service chiefs who head the branches of the military. Weiner also explores the evolution of the institution of the JCS and illuminates the chairman’s interaction with the president and secretary of defense. Blending empirical detail and theoretical contributions, Managing the Military offers a compelling account of the circumstances under which the power of the JCS chairman is maximized.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—a senior group of officers who lead the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—is perhaps the most influential military figure in the United States. The chairman is the primary military advisor to the president and is often the public face of the armed forces. As advocates for the military’s priorities, some chairmen have used this role to help shape policy, but others have embraced the position as an opportunity to chart new policy directions or challenge presidential preferences. Managing the Military is a pioneering analysis of the power of the chairman of the JCS that sheds new light on civil-military relations in the United States. Using detailed case studies of debates over defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, Sharon K. Weiner examines when and how the JCS chairman opposes civilian defense policy preferences. She shows that, under the right conditions, the chairman can be a policy entrepreneur, challenging the goals of the White House and lobbying for the military’s interests. However, the extent of the chairman’s political clout is constrained by the preferences of the service chiefs who head the branches of the military. Weiner also explores the evolution of the institution of the JCS and illuminates the chairman’s interaction with the president and secretary of defense. Blending empirical detail and theoretical contributions, Managing the Military offers a compelling account of the circumstances under which the power of the JCS chairman is maximized.
An examination of the effectiveness of knowledge nonproliferation programs implemented by the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many observers feared that terrorists and rogue states would obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or knowledge about how to build them from the vast Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons complex. The United States launched a major effort to prevent former Soviet WMD experts, suddenly without salaries, from peddling their secrets. In Our Own Worst Enemy, Sharon Weiner chronicles the design, implementation, and evolution of four U.S. programs that were central to this nonproliferation policy and assesses their successes and failures. Weiner examines the parlous state of the former Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons complex, the contentious domestic political debate within the United States, and most critically, the institutional interests and dynamics of the Defense, State, and Energy departments, which were charged with preventing the spread of WMD expertise. She explains why--despite unprecedented cooperation between the former Cold War adversaries--U.S. nonproliferation programs did not succeed at redirecting or converting to civilian uses significant parts of the former Soviet weapons complex. She shows how each of the U.S. government bureaucracies responsible for managing vital nonproliferation policies let its own organizational interests trump U.S. national security needs. Our Own Worst Enemy? raises important and troubling questions for anyone interested in understanding and improving policymaking and implementation processes in the area of nonproliferation and in U.S. national security policy more generally.
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