The Russian-Israeli intersections in the Middle East sway sometime from being distinctly pragmatic to peculiar arenas when it comes to the ongoing Syrian conflict. Through adopting the lens of Neoclassical Realism as a theory of international relations, this paper demonstrates how the Syrian conflict - due to its importance to both Israel and Russia - leads both countries to participate in positional competition in the region, engage in limited but effective cooperation, and try to stem the erosion of state-centric governance. The unique ties between the two countries in terms of their religious and ethnic composition further underpin these activities, and how they translate into a particular decision-making process down to the domestic level. The controversial, yet pragmatic approaches of the two countries, often associated with the “iron fist” policies of both Netanyahu’s and Putin’s statecraft, are reflective of a distinct mixture of domestic homogeneity and vertical leadership-centered power aggregation, blended with military boldness in the constant quest for security.
This analysis strives to factually present the evolution of Germany’s foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Iraq. It assesses the question of whether German foreign policy is guided by a new doctrine, insofar as it envisages to assume more security policy responsibility on the global stage, as stated in the recently published “2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.”
While the Lebanese Hezbollah’s raison d’être ever since its inception in the early ’80s has been the mantra of unwavering resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanese soil, in April 2013 the Shi’ite militia’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly stated that his fighters were openly fighting alongside the Shi’ite-sect Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad on Syrian ground. Since then, Hezbollah has steadily deepened its commitment there both in size and in scope. It has scored tactical victories and territorial gains on the Syrian battlefield in bolstering the foothold of al-Assad, just as it has suffered considerable losses among some of its most experienced military ranks. Therefore, Hezbollah’s deepening interference on Syrian turf testifies to a paradigm shift in its strategic realignment in the context of the Levant’s unprecedented volatility. Feeling the repercussions from internal political divisions in Lebanon and the increasingly intricate frontlines across the neighboring country of Syria, Hezbollah has embarked on a dangerous path that is likely to have grave consequences. As it carries the dual burden of being expected to maintain the opposition against Israel as well as shoring up regime loyalists in Syria, it risks stalemate on its southern front and overexpansion in the protracted Syrian quagmire.
US President Donald Trump came to office having inherited a pair of seemingly intractable problems in regard to Iran and North Korea. The two countries’ peculiar historic relationship only adds to the complexity of the situation. Events over the past several years are forcing the Trump administration to simultaneously confront these two major political problems with nuclear weapons issues at their core. Iran maintains nuclear weapons options resulting from the flawed 2015 multilateral nuclear deal, and on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced he was ending US support for the deal and imposing new sanctions on Iran, setting in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe and the Middle East. In Asia, the unexpected and rapid progress of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities, as well as the challenge of navigating Kim Jong-un’s latest diplomatic moves, demand equally momentous decisions from the administration. Its approach has been to pursue negotiations aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. A bilateral summit is scheduled to begin on June 12 in Singapore. There are unique elements and capabilities in Iran and North Korea’s respective programs—the DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability is more advanced than Iran’s, for example—but at the same time, it is certain that both nations will be watching how President Trump and his new national security team deal with the other to identify signs of weakness and areas of possible exploitation. Trump’s decision on May 8, is a potential new beginning, not the last word, on this most complex of policy questions. All this will be followed shortly thereafter by US talks with the DPRK. No timetable has been established for the talks beyond the initial round on 12 June, and North Korean officials have said little about its proposed timelines or objectives beyond the most obvious points. If they occur at all, it is almost certain the talks now definitely will follow Trump’s decision on Iran. For this reason, it is certain the North Koreans will be tracking closely US actions and decisions. What is much less certain is what lessons the North Korean leadership will draw from Trump’s choices on Iran. This paper addresses the issues and choices available to the Trump administration in responding to the nuclear ambitions of Iran and further contextualizes the recent developments surrounding American nuclear diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea.
This research paper explores the topical implications of the new realities and calculations surrounding Iran’s rapidly-evolving cyber ecosystem. The study traces a variety of cases where attribution is overwhelmingly linked to cyber interference emerging from the Islamic Republic, in which perpetrators act at arm’s length in an effort to insulate definitive accountability. First, the findings include an in-depth account describing the strategic and technical ramifications of the infamous Stuxnet worm, a Western cyber attack that crippled nuclear centrifuges at the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz in 2009. Second, the paper outlines the lessons learned from Natanz, from an Iranian perspective, by shedding light on the country’s increasing domestic efforts to centralize and professionalize its cyber clout. This is done in an attempt to streamline limited capacities, effectively making Iran a competitive top-tier player in the global cyber realm to date. Lastly, the paper describes Iran’s strategic departure in the aftermath of Stuxnet, moving away from mere defacement campaigns towards extensive cyber sabotage operations. Such a move resulted in repeated intrusive operations, either directly or through regional proxies, which hit the broader Middle East, the US and European nations from 2009 up until the present.
Russia has developed one of the world’s most extensive cyberwarfare capabilities and views those capabilities as a means to advance its strategic objectives in both war and peacetime. This paper examines Russia’s approach to the use of its cyber capabilities and how they are integrated into Russia’s broader objectives for dealing with its adversaries. Particular focus is placed on Russia’s unprecedented use of cyber to influence political elections in the West, including in the United States, France, and Germany. To further its objectives, Russia also has used relations with outsiders such as at WikiLeaks to disseminate information considered damaging to Russian foes such as the US political campaign of Hillary Clinton. The paper concludes that there are very limited means to either deter or hold accountable Russian uses of cyber, implying Russian cyber attacks will continue and could easily expand to Middle East nations.
The Russian-Israeli intersections in the Middle East sway sometime from being distinctly pragmatic to peculiar arenas when it comes to the ongoing Syrian conflict. Through adopting the lens of Neoclassical Realism as a theory of international relations, this paper demonstrates how the Syrian conflict - due to its importance to both Israel and Russia - leads both countries to participate in positional competition in the region, engage in limited but effective cooperation, and try to stem the erosion of state-centric governance. The unique ties between the two countries in terms of their religious and ethnic composition further underpin these activities, and how they translate into a particular decision-making process down to the domestic level. The controversial, yet pragmatic approaches of the two countries, often associated with the “iron fist” policies of both Netanyahu’s and Putin’s statecraft, are reflective of a distinct mixture of domestic homogeneity and vertical leadership-centered power aggregation, blended with military boldness in the constant quest for security.
King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)
Published Date
ISBN 10
6038032975
ISBN 13
9786038032978
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