U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. The findings of this research help U.S. decisionmakers more closely refine how and in what circumstances strategic influence campaigns can best be applied.
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
Deception is a powerful yet understudied instrument of war. Using the extensive literature on deception in the animal kingdom, where ruses of near-infinite variety are applied to offense, defense, and intelligence gathering, the authors delve into the theory of deception to reveal new avenues of experimentation. These pathways may lead to new technologies or training techniques and provoke a new look at deception doctrine applicable at every level of war. ISBN: 0-8330-3159-7 Price: $24.00 Page count: 98
Combat stress casualties are not necessarily higher in city operations than operations on other types of terrain. Commanders and NCOs need to have the skills to treat and prevent stress casualties and understand their implications for urban operations. The authors review the known precipitants of combat stress reaction, its battlefield treatment, and the preventive steps commanders can take to limit its extent and severity.
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
Operations in urban areas pose specific challenges for U.S. Army combat service support (CSS)--which is responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations. This report gives an overview of these tasks and ways in which the CSS community can prepare itself to meet them. The authors conducted literature reviews and interviews, and they drew on extensive prior research. Findings fall into two broad categories: (1) functional-area specific, applying exclusively to arming, manning, sustaining, moving, fixing, force protection, and selected other areas; and (2) those with broader application. Under the latter, the limited availability of many CSS assets will encourage their central management. Commanders will therefore have to consider weighting front-line assets with such low-density assets or keeping them centralized for dispatch as needed. CSS resources will require the same command, control, and communications assets as do other units. Additionally, CSS drivers and others throughout the area of operations are a potentially vital and traditionally underused source of intelligence. Attrition and consumption rates tend to be much higher than is elsewhere experienced. Demands on CSS units will be exceptional even during operations in which combat plays no role.
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. The findings of this research help U.S. decisionmakers more closely refine how and in what circumstances strategic influence campaigns can best be applied.
Deception is a powerful yet understudied instrument of war. Using the extensive literature on deception in the animal kingdom, where ruses of near-infinite variety are applied to offense, defense, and intelligence gathering, the authors delve into the theory of deception to reveal new avenues of experimentation. These pathways may lead to new technologies or training techniques and provoke a new look at deception doctrine applicable at every level of war. ISBN: 0-8330-3159-7 Price: $24.00 Page count: 98
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