Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
This volume collects twelve essays by Sanford C. Goldberg on the topic of social epistemology. The collection falls into two halves: the first half develops a proposal for a programme for social epistemology, its animating vision, foundational questions, and core concepts; the other half focuses on applications of this programme to particular topics. Goldberg characterizes the research programme as the exploration of the epistemic significance of other minds. This programme is dedicated to an examination of the various ways in which we depend epistemically on others, and to describe the proper way to evaluate beliefs according to the sort of dependence they exhibit. It thus provides the basis for identifying and characterizing various dysfunctions of our epistemic communities. The programme is put into practice by exploring such topics as the epistemic agency exhibited in inquiry, the practices that constitute news coverage, the basis for allegations of what we or others should have known, how reliance on another's testimony contrasts with reliance on an instrument, our reliance on others as consumers of testimony, and the epistemic significance of non-epistemic social norms--moral, political, professional, or relationship-based.
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He defends the view that this type of speech act is answerable to a constitutive norm--the norm of assertion. The hypothesis that assertion is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm is uniquely suited to explain assertion's philosophical significance--its connections to other philosophically interesting topics. These include topics in epistemology (testimony and testimonial knowledge; epistemic authority; disagreement), the philosophy of mind (belief; the theory of mental content), the philosophy of language (norms of language; the method of interpretation; the theory of linguistic content), ethics (the ethics of belief; what we owe to each other as information-seeking creatures), and other matters which transcend any subcategory (anonymity; trust; the division of epistemic labor; Moorean paradoxicality). Goldberg aims to bring out these connections without assuming anything about the precise content of assertion's norm, beyond regarding it as robustly epistemic. In the last section of the book, however, he proposes that we do best to see the norm's epistemic standard as set in a context-sensitive fashion. After motivating this proposal by appeal to Grice's Cooperative Principle and spelling it out in terms of what is mutually believed in the speech context, Goldberg concludes by noting how this sort of context-sensitivity can be made to square with assertion's philosophical significance.
Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving "coverage", where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. Goldberg argues that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. Goldberg uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non-orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social-reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief-fixation involves epistemic reliance on others. Sanford Goldberg presents an important contribution both to the reliability literature in general epistemology and to the social epistemology of testimony and related topics.
In the course of conversation, we exert implicit pressures on both ourselves and others. These forms of conversational pressure are many and far from uniform, so much so that it is unclear whether they constitute a single cohesive class. In this book Sanford C. Goldberg explores the source, nature, and scope of the normative expectations we have of one another as we engage in conversation that are generated by the performance of speech acts themselves. In doing so he examines two fundamental types of expectation -- epistemic and interpersonal. It is through normative expectations of these types that we aim to hold one another to standards of proper conversational conduct. This line of argument is pursued in connection with such topics as the normative significance of acts of address, the epistemic costs of politeness, the bearing of epistemic injustice on the epistemology of testimony, the normative pressure friendship exerts on belief, the nature of epistemic trust, the significance of conversational silence, and the various evils of silencing. By approaching these matters in terms of the normative expectations to which conversational participants are entitled, Goldberg aims to offer a unified account of the various pressures that are exerted in the course of a speech exchange.
Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving "coverage", where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. Goldberg argues that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. Goldberg uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non-orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social-reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief-fixation involves epistemic reliance on others. Sanford Goldberg presents an important contribution both to the reliability literature in general epistemology and to the social epistemology of testimony and related topics.
In the course of conversation, we exert implicit pressures on both ourselves and others. These forms of conversational pressure are many and far from uniform, so much so that it is unclear whether they constitute a single cohesive class. In this book Sanford C. Goldberg explores the source, nature, and scope of the normative expectations we have of one another as we engage in conversation that are generated by the performance of speech acts themselves. In doing so he examines two fundamental types of expectation — epistemic and interpersonal. It is through normative expectations of these types that we aim to hold one another to standards of proper conversational conduct. This line of argument is pursued in connection with such topics as the normative significance of acts of address, the epistemic costs of politeness, the bearing of epistemic injustice on the epistemology of testimony, the normative pressure friendship exerts on belief, the nature of epistemic trust, the significance of conversational silence, and the various evils of silencing. By approaching these matters in terms of the normative expectations to which conversational participants are entitled, Goldberg aims to offer a unified account of the various pressures that are exerted in the course of a speech exchange.
This volume collects twelve essays by Sanford C. Goldberg on the topic of social epistemology. The collection falls into two halves: the first half develops a proposal for a programme for social epistemology, its animating vision, foundational questions, and core concepts; the other half focuses on applications of this programme to particular topics. Goldberg characterizes the research programme as the exploration of the epistemic significance of other minds. This programme is dedicated to an examination of the various ways in which we depend epistemically on others, and to describe the proper way to evaluate beliefs according to the sort of dependence they exhibit. It thus provides the basis for identifying and characterizing various dysfunctions of our epistemic communities. The programme is put into practice by exploring such topics as the epistemic agency exhibited in inquiry, the practices that constitute news coverage, the basis for allegations of what we or others should have known, how reliance on another's testimony contrasts with reliance on an instrument, our reliance on others as consumers of testimony, and the epistemic significance of non-epistemic social norms--moral, political, professional, or relationship-based.
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics.
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He defends the view that this type of speech act is answerable to a constitutive norm—the norm of assertion. The hypothesis that assertion is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm is uniquely suited to explain assertion's philosophical significance—its connections to other philosophically interesting topics. These include topics in epistemology (testimony and testimonial knowledge; epistemic authority; disagreement), the philosophy of mind (belief; the theory of mental content), the philosophy of language (norms of language; the method of interpretation; the theory of linguistic content), ethics (the ethics of belief; what we owe to each other as information-seeking creatures), and other matters which transcend any subcategory (anonymity; trust; the division of epistemic labor; Moorean paradoxicality). Goldberg aims to bring out these connections without assuming anything about the precise content of assertion's norm, beyond regarding it as robustly epistemic. In the last section of the book, however, he proposes that we do best to see the norm's epistemic standard as set in a context-sensitive fashion. After motivating this proposal by appeal to Grice's Cooperative Principle and spelling it out in terms of what is mutually believed in the speech context, Goldberg concludes by noting how this sort of context-sensitivity can be made to square with assertion's philosophical significance.
Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is epistemology, on the other.
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