Traditional theories of property rights change have posited an evolutionary progression of property rights towards private property in response to changes in the relative price ratio of land compared to the other factors of production. Using case studies from two areas of Ethiopia and one area of Eritrea the dissertation demonstrates the role of political factors such as interest group preference and state intervention in directing property rights development away from a linear path. The case studies trace the development of three separate systems of property rights throughout the twentieth century up to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Analysis of history and litigation in the three areas demonstrates that in none did property rights evolve spontaneously towards privatization. In one area of the study relative price changes did not lead to changes in the system of property rights as the theory predicts. In the other two areas, changes in property rights followed a change in the relative price of land, but these changes were brought about exogenously, by the intervention of the government or interest groups in guiding property rights in a particular direction. There are two theoretical conclusions to the study 1) property rights development does not always occur when we expect it to, other factors such as vested interests and government reluctance can intervene with their development and 2) even if property rights do change in response to relative price changes, they may not always move towards privatization or greater specification. In addition, one interesting empirical result of the research was that in communal systems of land tenure the transaction costs of land transfer are higher, leading to a drag on economic efficiency in the overall economy of the region. Generally, the incorporation of political factors into the model of changing property rights leads to a less parsimonious, but more accurate description of the progression of land rights in developing countries in particular.
It is safe to say that a sizeable majority of the world's population would agree with the proposition that that property rights are important for political and social stability as well as economic growth. But what happens when the state fails to enforce such rights? Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, this is in fact an endemic problem. In Where There is No Government, Sandra Joireman explains how weak state enforcement regimes have allowed private institutions in sub-Saharan Africa to define and enforce property rights. After delineating the types of actors who step in when the state is absent--traditional tribal leaders, entrepreneurial bureaucrats, NGOs, and violent groups--she argues that the institutions they develop can be helpful or predatory depending on their incentives and context. Because such institutions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad, Joireman develops a set of measurement criteria to assess which types of property regimes and enforcement mechanisms are helpful and which are harmful to social welfare. By focusing on the varieties of property rights enforcement in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, Joireman moves beyond simply evaluating the effectiveness of official property rights laws. Provocatively, she also challenges the premise that changes in property law will lead to changes in property rights on the ground. Indeed, states that change their property laws face challenges in implementation when they do not control the authority structures in local communities. Utilizing original research on the competitors to state power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges of providing secure and defensible property rights, Where There is No Government is a sharp analysis of one of the most daunting challenges facing the African subcontinent today.
Growing numbers of people are displaced by war and violent conflict. In Ukraine, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria, and elsewhere violence pushes civilian populations from their homes and sometimes from their countries, making them refugees. In previous decades, millions of refugees and displaced people returned to their place of origin after conflict or were resettled in countries in the Global North. Now displacements last longer, the number of people returning home is lower, and opportunities for resettlement are shrinking. More and more people spend decades in refugee camps or displaced within their own countries, raising their children away from their home communities and cultures. In this context, international policies encourage return to place of origin. Using case studies and first-person accounts from interviews and fieldwork in post-conflict settings such as Uganda, Liberia, and Kosovo, Sandra F. Joireman highlights the divergence between these policies and the preferences of conflict-displaced people. Rather than looking from the top down, at the rights that people have in international and domestic law, the perspective of this text is from the ground up—examining individual and household choices after conflict. Some refugees want to go home, some do not want to return, some want to return to their countries of origin but live in a different place, and others are repatriated against their will when they have no other options. Peace, Preference, and Property suggests alternative policies that would provide greater choice for displaced people in terms of property restitution and solutions to displacement.
This is a lively and well-written textbook, which will prove a valuable addition to the IR textbook series - mainly because the ideas it covers have changed so fundamentally in the last ten years. Nationalism and ethnicity are uniquely considered within the context of both traditional IR theory and 'new' IR (ie Cold War perspectives). Joireman explains the conflict between primordialism (the view that ethnicity is inborn and ethnic division natural), instrumentalism (ethnicity is a tool to gain some larger, typically material end) and social constructivism (the emerging consensus that ethnicity is flexible and people can make choices about how they define themselves). Case studies are included on Quebec, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Eritrea.
It is safe to say that a sizeable majority of the world's population would agree with the proposition that that property rights are important for political and social stability as well as economic growth. But what happens when the state fails to enforce such rights? Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, this is in fact an endemic problem. In Where There is No Government, Sandra Joireman explains how weak state enforcement regimes have allowed private institutions in sub-Saharan Africa to define and enforce property rights. After delineating the types of actors who step in when the state is absent--traditional tribal leaders, entrepreneurial bureaucrats, NGOs, and violent groups--she argues that the institutions they develop can be helpful or predatory depending on their incentives and context. Because such institutions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad, Joireman develops a set of measurement criteria to assess which types of property regimes and enforcement mechanisms are helpful and which are harmful to social welfare. By focusing on the varieties of property rights enforcement in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, Joireman moves beyond simply evaluating the effectiveness of official property rights laws. Provocatively, she also challenges the premise that changes in property law will lead to changes in property rights on the ground. Indeed, states that change their property laws face challenges in implementation when they do not control the authority structures in local communities. Utilizing original research on the competitors to state power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges of providing secure and defensible property rights, Where There is No Government is a sharp analysis of one of the most daunting challenges facing the African subcontinent today.
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