While moral philosophy has traditionally been understood as an examination of the good life, this book argues that ethical inquiry should, rather, begin from an examination of evil and other 'negative' moral concepts, such as guilt and suffering.
The essays collected in this volume and authored by Sami Pihlström emphasize that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know better through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is irreducibly valuational. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely “factual” projects of inquiry we engage in. This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chapter 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, both pragmatic (practice-embedded and practice-involving) and transcendental (operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). The author claims we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. This book does so by offering case-studies of various important neopragmatists and philosophers close to the pragmatist tradition, including Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Joseph Margolis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It appeals to scholars and advanced graduate students focusing on pragmatism and analytic philosophy.
It is commonly believed that populist politics and social media pose a serious threat to our concept of truth. Philosophical pragmatists, who are typically thought to regard truth as merely that which is 'helpful' for us to believe, are sometimes blamed for providing the theoretical basis for the phenomenon of 'post-truth'. In this book, Sami Pihlström develops a pragmatist account of truth and truth-seeking based on the ideas of William James, and defends a thoroughly pragmatist view of humanism which gives space for a sincere search for truth. By elaborating on James's pragmatism and the 'will to believe' strategy in the philosophy of religion, Pihlström argues for a Kantian-inspired transcendental articulation of pragmatism that recognizes irreducible normativity as a constitutive feature of our practices of pursuing the truth. James himself thereby emerges as a deeply Kantian thinker.
What we find 'unthinkable' is not seriously considered as an ethical option in our thought and deliberation; it is ruled out from the outset. Combining a broadly pragmatist approach with a Kantian-inspired transcendental strategy, Sami Pihlström distinguishes between what is considered 'unthinkable' and what is merely ethically wrong. Pihlström demonstrates how different issues concerning the unthinkable vs the thinkable, ranging from the proper ethical response to the Holocaust to philosophical considerations of monstrous characters familiar in gothic fiction, may challenge the categories we use to structure the world. In particular, he makes the case that it is unthinkable for us to reject the kind of 'human exceptionalism' that attributes an ineliminable dignity or preciousness to human beings. Chapters also explore the complex relationship between our responses to human suffering and the suffering of non-human animals, together with questions concerning the philosophy of war and pacifism. 'The Unthinkable' in Ethics, History and Philosophical Anthropology turns our attention to the ethically and ontologically constitutive character of the boundaries we draw between the thinkable and the unthinkable, while utilizing conceptual and argumentative resources from the Wittgensteinian tradition in moral philosophy, particularly from the work of Raimond Gaita. An original and timely study, it will be welcomed by students and scholars interested in the fundamental ethical issues of human life.
As a traditional theological issue and in its broader secular varieties, theodicy remains a problem in the philosophy of religion. In this remarkable book, Sami Pihlström provides a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering. He develops and defends an antitheodicist view, arguing that theodicies seeking to render apparently meaningless suffering meaningful or justified from a ‘God’s-Eye-View’ ultimately rely on metaphysical realism failing to recognize the individual perspective of the sufferer. Pihlström thus shows that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a re-evaluation of the problem of theodicy. With its strong positions and precise arguments, the volume provides a new approach which is likely to stimulate discussion in the wider academic world of philosophy of religion.
Pragmatist Metaphysics proposes a pragmatist re-articulation of the nature, aims and methods of metaphysics. Rather than regarding metaphysics as a 'first philosophy', an inquiry into the world independent of human perspectives, the pragmatist views metaphysics as an inquiry into categorizations of reality laden with human practices. Insofar as our categorizations of reality are practice-laden, they are also, inevitably, value-laden. Sami Pihlström argues that metaphysics does not, then, study the world's 'own' categorial structure, but a structure we, through our conceptual and practical activities, impose on the reality we experience and interact with. Engaging with the classical American pragmatists, in particular William James, and neopragmatists, including Hilary Putnam, the author seeks to correct long-held misconceptions regarding the nature of the relationship between metaphysics and pragmatism. He argues that a coherent metaphysical alternative to the currently fashionable realist metaphysics emerges from pragmatism and that pragmatism itself should be reinterpreted in a metaphysically serious manner. Moreover, the book argues that, from a pragmatist perspective, metaphysics must be inextricably linked with ethics.
It is commonly believed that populist politics and social media pose a serious threat to our concept of truth. Philosophical pragmatists, who are typically thought to regard truth as merely that which is 'helpful' for us to believe, are sometimes blamed for providing the theoretical basis for the phenomenon of 'post-truth'. In this book, Sami Pihlström develops a pragmatist account of truth and truth-seeking based on the ideas of William James, and defends a thoroughly pragmatist view of humanism which gives space for a sincere search for truth. By elaborating on James's pragmatism and the 'will to believe' strategy in the philosophy of religion, Pihlström argues for a Kantian-inspired transcendental articulation of pragmatism that recognizes irreducible normativity as a constitutive feature of our practices of pursuing the truth. James himself thereby emerges as a deeply Kantian thinker.
Solipsism is one of the philosophical thesis or ideas that has generally been regarded as highly implausible, or even crazy. The view that the world is “my world” in the sense that nothing exists independently of my mind, thought, and/or experience is, understandably, frowned up as a genuine philosophical position. For this reason, solipsism might be regarded as an example of a philosophical position that does not “matter” at all. It does not seem to play any role in our serious attempts to understand the world and ourselves. However, by arguing that solipsism does matter, after all, Why Solipsism Matters more generally demonstrates that philosophy, even when dealing with highly counterintuitive and “crazy” ideas, may matter in surprising, unexpected ways. It will be shown that the challenge of solipsism should make us rethink fundamental assumptions concerning subjectivity, objectivity, realism vs. idealism, relativism, as well as key topics such as ethical responsibility – that is, our ethical relations to other human beings – and death and mortality. Why Solipsism Matters is not only an historical review of the origins and development of the concept of solipsism and a exploration of some of its key philosophers (Kant and Wittgenstein to name but a few) but it develops an entirely new account of the idea. One which takes seriously the global, socially networked world in which we live in which the very real ramifications of solipsism - including narcissism - can be felt.
As a traditional theological issue and in its broader secular varieties, theodicy remains a problem in the philosophy of religion. In this remarkable book, Sami Pihlström provides a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering. He develops and defends an antitheodicist view, arguing that theodicies seeking to render apparently meaningless suffering meaningful or justified from a ‘God’s-Eye-View’ ultimately rely on metaphysical realism failing to recognize the individual perspective of the sufferer. Pihlström thus shows that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a re-evaluation of the problem of theodicy. With its strong positions and precise arguments, the volume provides a new approach which is likely to stimulate discussion in the wider academic world of philosophy of religion.
Humanist scholars often feel the need to defend the humanities. The value of humanistic research is sometimes challenged, as the cultural "reality" investigated by disciplines such as history, literary studies, and theology may seem unclearIn particular, the ontology of the humanities might be considered obscure in comparison to the ontology of the natural sciences. Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of the Humanities proposes to develop a comprehensive philosophical account of the humanities, focusing on the ontology and epistemology of humanistic inquiry from the standpoint of pragmatism. Sami Pihlström argues that humanistic cognitive pursuits can be interpreted along the lines of a pragmatist theory of inquiry, defending pragmatic realism about the humanities. However, far from leading to any reductive naturalization of the human world, the pragmatist philosophy of the humanities defended by Pihlström takes a distinctively Kantian critical turn in emphasizing the need for transcendental argumentation in the philosophy of the humanities, insisting on the irreducibly ethical dimensions of humanistic scholarship.
The book is a study of pragmatism and pragmatic pluralism in the philosophy of religion. Through critical examinations of James's, Dewey's, and recent neopragmatists' ideas, it argues that key issues in the field--including the debate between evidentialism and fideism, and the problem of evil--need rearticulation from a pragmatic pluralistic perspective.
Arguing, humanistically, that we live in a "human world" inescapably colored by meaning, this book shows why the pursuit of meaningfulness is not ethically innocent but must be subjected to critique. Pragmatist critique of meaning both embraces critical humanism and rejects theodicies postulating ultimate meaning in suffering.
This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant’s 1791 “Theodicy Essay” and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including “Jewish” post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka’s The Trial, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism.
The essays collected in this volume and authored by Sami Pihlström emphasize that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know better through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is irreducibly valuational. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely “factual” projects of inquiry we engage in. This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chapter 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, both pragmatic (practice-embedded and practice-involving) and transcendental (operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). The author claims we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. This book does so by offering case-studies of various important neopragmatists and philosophers close to the pragmatist tradition, including Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Joseph Margolis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It appeals to scholars and advanced graduate students focusing on pragmatism and analytic philosophy.
Arguing, humanistically, that we live in a "human world" inescapably colored by meaning, this book shows why the pursuit of meaningfulness is not ethically innocent but must be subjected to critique. Pragmatist critique of meaning both embraces critical humanism and rejects theodicies postulating ultimate meaning in suffering.
This book argues that no ethically appropriate relation to other human beings is possible unless we treat them as genuinely other. The authors provide reasons to be critical of various attempts, many of them popular in our contemporary (Western) culture, to encourage deeper attachment to and immersion into others’ lives and experiences. They defend the significance of the distance between human beings, criticizing exaggerated uses of, e.g., the concept of empathy and related concepts in academic as well as more popular ethical contexts, across a range of issues from the nature of ethical duty to the philosophy of love. The chapters offer non-technical philosophical and cultural criticism through selected perspectives on the continuum between closeness and distance, exploring various aspects of ethically significant relations between human beings. This book thus appeals to a wide audience, especially researchers and students in different fields of the humanities, including philosophy, literary studies, and cultural studies, by combining philosophical and literary methodologies in a humanistic examination of the value of distance. The book also argues that we have to be able to abstract from the concrete other in ethical relations, living in the normative and rational sphere of duty instead of emotional immersion.
This book examines the issue of moral realism from a pragmatist point of view, drawing attention to our human practices of ethical evaluation and deliberation. It defends the essentially ungrounded and humanly fundamental place of ethics in our thought and action. Ethics must remain beyond justification and ubiquitous in our human form(s) of life.
This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant’s 1791 “Theodicy Essay” and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including “Jewish” post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka’s The Trial, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism.
Death and Finitude offers an examination and defense of a pragmatic transcendental anthropology applicable to the concepts of limit, finitude, and mortality that are constitutive of human life as we know it. Sami Pihlström develops a special kind of philosophical anthropology —a pragmatic yet transcendental examination of the human condition—that interprets what is worth preserving in the tradition of transcendental philosophy in such a manner that this unusual combination will crucially enrich our understanding of a human problem we all share: mortality. In some sense, all serious philosophy inevitably reflects on the human condition and is thus philosophical anthropology, broadly conceived. There can hardly be any more serious problem concerning the human condition than the problem of death. Yet, mainstream analytic contributions to the philosophy of death usually addresses death in general, and it is far from obvious that such contributions are philosophically relevant in the sense of addressing the agony of an individual human being trying to understand their own mortal condition. “Continental” philosophy of death may be frustrating in a different sense, as it often fails to be conceptually as clear and argumentatively as rigorous as the analytic literature. Claiming to address my “being-toward-death”, such contributions may also fail to speak to the mortal individual if they end up in endless pseudo-philosophical jargon. It is against this background of frustration that Death and Finitude contributes to humanity’s on-going reflections on death, dying, and mortality—from a pragmatist yet transcendental perspective, seeking to accommodate these topics within a broader philosophical anthropology. The book is primarily intended for academic philosophers, but the potential readership includes not only scholars but also both graduate students and advanced undergraduates, as well as general educated readers. It is relevant to the concerns of philosophers specializing in transcendental philosophy, philosophical anthropology, pragmatism, Wittgenstein, and the philosophy of religion. As the book may be said to be an attempt to “philosophize historically,” it is in principle of interest to both systematically and historically oriented philosophers and students.
Death and Finitude offers an examination and defense of a pragmatic transcendental anthropology applicable to the concepts of limit, finitude, and mortality that are constitutive of human life as we know it. Sami Pihlström develops a special kind of philosophical anthropology —a pragmatic yet transcendental examination of the human condition—that interprets what is worth preserving in the tradition of transcendental philosophy in such a manner that this unusual combination will crucially enrich our understanding of a human problem we all share: mortality. In some sense, all serious philosophy inevitably reflects on the human condition and is thus philosophical anthropology, broadly conceived. There can hardly be any more serious problem concerning the human condition than the problem of death. Yet, mainstream analytic contributions to the philosophy of death usually addresses death in general, and it is far from obvious that such contributions are philosophically relevant in the sense of addressing the agony of an individual human being trying to understand their own mortal condition. “Continental” philosophy of death may be frustrating in a different sense, as it often fails to be conceptually as clear and argumentatively as rigorous as the analytic literature. Claiming to address my “being-toward-death”, such contributions may also fail to speak to the mortal individual if they end up in endless pseudo-philosophical jargon. It is against this background of frustration that Death and Finitude contributes to humanity’s on-going reflections on death, dying, and mortality—from a pragmatist yet transcendental perspective, seeking to accommodate these topics within a broader philosophical anthropology. The book is primarily intended for academic philosophers, but the potential readership includes not only scholars but also both graduate students and advanced undergraduates, as well as general educated readers. It is relevant to the concerns of philosophers specializing in transcendental philosophy, philosophical anthropology, pragmatism, Wittgenstein, and the philosophy of religion. As the book may be said to be an attempt to “philosophize historically,” it is in principle of interest to both systematically and historically oriented philosophers and students.
Transcendental Guilt challenges traditional ways of understanding moral philosophy by proposing, instead of mainstream ethical theorizing, a serious moral reflection on our ethical finitude, focusing on the concept of guilt. It argues that guilt plays a 'transcendental' role in our ethical lives by being constitutive of the seriousness characteristic of the moral point of view.
Both as a traditional theological issue and in its broader secular varieties, theodicy remains a problem in the philosophy of religion. In this book, Professor Sami Pihlström provides a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering. He develops an antitheodicist view, arguing that theodicies seeking to render apparently meaningless suffering meaningful or justified from a “God's-Eye-View” ultimately rely on metaphysical realism failing to recognize the individual perspective of the sufferer. Pihlström thus shows that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a re-evaluation of the problem of theodicy.
Solipsism is one of the philosophical thesis or ideas that has generally been regarded as highly implausible, or even crazy. The view that the world is “my world” in the sense that nothing exists independently of my mind, thought, and/or experience is, understandably, frowned up as a genuine philosophical position. For this reason, solipsism might be regarded as an example of a philosophical position that does not “matter” at all. It does not seem to play any role in our serious attempts to understand the world and ourselves. However, by arguing that solipsism does matter, after all, Why Solipsism Matters more generally demonstrates that philosophy, even when dealing with highly counterintuitive and “crazy” ideas, may matter in surprising, unexpected ways. It will be shown that the challenge of solipsism should make us rethink fundamental assumptions concerning subjectivity, objectivity, realism vs. idealism, relativism, as well as key topics such as ethical responsibility – that is, our ethical relations to other human beings – and death and mortality. Why Solipsism Matters is not only an historical review of the origins and development of the concept of solipsism and a exploration of some of its key philosophers (Kant and Wittgenstein to name but a few) but it develops an entirely new account of the idea. One which takes seriously the global, socially networked world in which we live in which the very real ramifications of solipsism - including narcissism - can be felt.
Transcendental Guilt challenges traditional ways of understanding moral philosophy by proposing, instead of mainstream ethical theorizing, a serious moral reflection on our ethical finitude, focusing on the concept of guilt. It argues that guilt plays a 'transcendental' role in our ethical lives by being constitutive of the seriousness characteristic of the moral point of view.
The book is a study of pragmatism and pragmatic pluralism in the philosophy of religion. Through critical examinations of James's, Dewey's, and recent neopragmatists' ideas, it argues that key issues in the field--including the debate between evidentialism and fideism, and the problem of evil--need rearticulation from a pragmatic pluralistic perspective.
This book examines the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering, arguing that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy problem. The book develops a new antitheodicist view on what it means to respond to suffering.
This book responds to the currently unclear situation in the philosophy of religion by developing a version of pragmatic pluralism. This position is developed through a critical articulation and defense of pragmatist philosophy of religion, largely based on William James's and John Dewey's ideas. The historical background of pragmatism in Kantian transcendental philosophy as well as more recent neopragmatist developments in the philosophy of religion (e.g., Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam) are also taken into account.
This book argues that no ethically appropriate relation to other human beings is possible unless we treat them as genuinely other. The authors provide reasons to be critical of various attempts, many of them popular in our contemporary (Western) culture, to encourage deeper attachment to and immersion into others’ lives and experiences. They defend the significance of the distance between human beings, criticizing exaggerated uses of, e.g., the concept of empathy and related concepts in academic as well as more popular ethical contexts, across a range of issues from the nature of ethical duty to the philosophy of love. The chapters offer non-technical philosophical and cultural criticism through selected perspectives on the continuum between closeness and distance, exploring various aspects of ethically significant relations between human beings. This book thus appeals to a wide audience, especially researchers and students in different fields of the humanities, including philosophy, literary studies, and cultural studies, by combining philosophical and literary methodologies in a humanistic examination of the value of distance. The book also argues that we have to be able to abstract from the concrete other in ethical relations, living in the normative and rational sphere of duty instead of emotional immersion.
This volume is based on papers presented at the XV Internordic Philosophical Symposium in Helsinki in May, 2004. It covers a number of important and timely philosophical issues: naturalism - its strengths, weaknesses, and limits - in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science; the relation between philosophical and scientific methodology; the ethics of science and, more generally, the place of science in society; the relation between the natural sciences and the humanities; as well as the ways in which scientific progress may challenge traditional philosophical concepts and problems and, on the other hand, the ways in which philosophical arguments and/or artistic innovations - or philosophical interpretations of them - may challenge some claims made in the name of science. In addition to several Scandinavian authors, a number of leading philosophers from outside the Nordic countries are among the contributors to this volume. This collection of original articles thus contributes to the current lively philosophical debates on the relations between science, philosophy, and society.
Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften
Published Date
ISBN 10
3631542607
ISBN 13
9783631542606
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