This is the first book to examine the concept of anti-access and area denial warfare, providing a definitive introduction to both conceptual theories and historical examples of this strategy. Also referred to by the acronym "A2/AD," anti-access warfare has been identified in American strategic planning as the most likely strategy to be employed by the People's Republic of China or by the Islamic Republic of Iran in any future conflict with the United States. While previous studies of the subject have emphasized the effects on the joint force and, air forces in particular, this important new study advances the understanding of sea power by identifying the naval roots of the development of the anti-access concept. The study of anti-access or area denial strategies for use against American power projection capabilities has strong naval roots-which have been largely ignored by the most influential commentators. Sustained long-range power projection is both a unique strength of U.S. military forces and a requirement for an activist foreign policy and forward defense. In more recent years, the logic of the anti-access approach has been identified by the Department of Defense as a threat to this U.S. capability and the joint force. The conclusions in Anti-Access Warfare differ from most commentary on anti-access strategy. Rather than a technology-driven post-Cold War phenomenon, the anti-access approach has been a routine element of grand strategy used by strategically weaker powers to confront stronger powers throughout history. But they have been largely unsuccessful when confronting a stronger maritime power. Although high technology weapons capabilities enhance the threat, they also can be used to mitigate the threat. Rather than arguing against reliance on maritime forces-presumably because they are no longer survivable-the historical analysis argues that maritime capabilities are key in "breaking the great walls" of countries like Iran and China.
It is unclear if U.S. policy makers and military leaders fully realize that we have already been thrust into an artificial intelligence (AI) race with authoritarian powers. Today, the United States’ peer adversaries—China and Russia—have made clear their intentions to make major investments in AI and insert this technology into their military systems, sensors and weapons. Their goal is to gain an asymmetric advantage over the U.S. military. The implications for our national security are many and complex. Algorithms of Armageddon examines this most pressing security issue in a clear, insightful delivery by two experts. Authors George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi are national security professionals who deal with AI on a day-to-day basis in their work in both the technical and policy arenas. Opening chapters explain the fundamentals of what constitutes big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. They investigate the convergence of AI with other technologies and how these systems will interact with humans. Critical to the issue is the manner by which AI is being developed and utilized by Russia and China. The central chapters of the work address the weaponizing of AI through interaction with other technologies, man-machine teaming, and autonomous weapons systems. The authors cover in depth debates surrounding the AI “genie out of the bottle” controversy, AI arms races, and the resulting impact on policy and the laws of war. Given that global powers are leading large-scale development of AI, it is likely that use of this technology will be global in extent. Will AI-enabled military weapons systems lead to full-scale global war? Can such a conflict be avoided? The later chapters of the work explore these questions, point to the possibility of humans failing to control military AI applications, and conclude that the dangers for the United States are real. Neither a protest against AI, nor a speculative work on how AI could replace humans, Algorithms of Armageddon provides a time-critical understanding of why AI is being implemented through state weaponization, the realities for the global power balance, and more importantly, U.S. national security. Galdorisi and Tangredi propose a national dialogue that focuses on the need for U.S. military to have access to the latest AI-enabled technology in order to provide security and prosperity to the American people.
This survey is a product of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working Group, a project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the working group is an independent, honest-broker effort intended to build intellectual capital for the upcoming QDR. More specifically, it aims to frame issues, develop options, and provide insights for the Chairman, the services, and the next administration in three areas: defense strategy, criteria for sizing conventional forces, and force structure for 2005--2010. One of the group's initial tasks was to assess the future security environment to the year 2025. This was pursued by surveying the available literature to identify areas of consensus and debate. The goal was to conduct an assessment that would be far more comprehensive than any single research project or group effort could possibly produce. This survey documents major areas of agreement and disagreement across a range of studies completed since the last QDR in 1997. Because it distills a variety of sources and organizes and compares divergent views, this volume makes a unique contribution to the literature. It also provides a particularly strong set of insights and assumptions on which both strategists and force planners can draw in the next Quadrennial Defense Review. Michele A. Flournoy Project Director
This is the first book to examine the concept of anti-access and area denial warfare, providing a definitive introduction to both conceptual theories and historical examples of this strategy. Also referred to by the acronym "A2/AD," anti-access warfare has been identified in American strategic planning as the most likely strategy to be employed by the People's Republic of China or by the Islamic Republic of Iran in any future conflict with the United States. While previous studies of the subject have emphasized the effects on the joint force and, air forces in particular, this important new study advances the understanding of sea power by identifying the naval roots of the development of the anti-access concept. The study of anti-access or area denial strategies for use against American power projection capabilities has strong naval roots-which have been largely ignored by the most influential commentators. Sustained long-range power projection is both a unique strength of U.S. military forces and a requirement for an activist foreign policy and forward defense. In more recent years, the logic of the anti-access approach has been identified by the Department of Defense as a threat to this U.S. capability and the joint force. The conclusions in Anti-Access Warfare differ from most commentary on anti-access strategy. Rather than a technology-driven post-Cold War phenomenon, the anti-access approach has been a routine element of grand strategy used by strategically weaker powers to confront stronger powers throughout history. But they have been largely unsuccessful when confronting a stronger maritime power. Although high technology weapons capabilities enhance the threat, they also can be used to mitigate the threat. Rather than arguing against reliance on maritime forces-presumably because they are no longer survivable-the historical analysis argues that maritime capabilities are key in "breaking the great walls" of countries like Iran and China.
It is unclear if U.S. policy makers and military leaders fully realize that we have already been thrust into an artificial intelligence (AI) race with authoritarian powers. Today, the United States’ peer adversaries—China and Russia—have made clear their intentions to make major investments in AI and insert this technology into their military systems, sensors and weapons. Their goal is to gain an asymmetric advantage over the U.S. military. The implications for our national security are many and complex. Algorithms of Armageddon examines this most pressing security issue in a clear, insightful delivery by two experts. Authors George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi are national security professionals who deal with AI on a day-to-day basis in their work in both the technical and policy arenas. Opening chapters explain the fundamentals of what constitutes big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. They investigate the convergence of AI with other technologies and how these systems will interact with humans. Critical to the issue is the manner by which AI is being developed and utilized by Russia and China. The central chapters of the work address the weaponizing of AI through interaction with other technologies, man-machine teaming, and autonomous weapons systems. The authors cover in depth debates surrounding the AI “genie out of the bottle” controversy, AI arms races, and the resulting impact on policy and the laws of war. Given that global powers are leading large-scale development of AI, it is likely that use of this technology will be global in extent. Will AI-enabled military weapons systems lead to full-scale global war? Can such a conflict be avoided? The later chapters of the work explore these questions, point to the possibility of humans failing to control military AI applications, and conclude that the dangers for the United States are real. Neither a protest against AI, nor a speculative work on how AI could replace humans, Algorithms of Armageddon provides a time-critical understanding of why AI is being implemented through state weaponization, the realities for the global power balance, and more importantly, U.S. national security. Galdorisi and Tangredi propose a national dialogue that focuses on the need for U.S. military to have access to the latest AI-enabled technology in order to provide security and prosperity to the American people.
Every new Presidential administration seeks to implement its policy objectives rapidly, but in the vast organization of the U.S. Government, such changes take time. The Quadrennial defense Review (QDR) of 2001 offers the new Bush administration an important opportunity, as well as a great responsibility, to reexamine America's defense priorities in a comprehensive, top-to-bottom, strategy-to-program approach and provide early guidance for change. This is a gargantuan task. Current legislation requires the final report of QDR 2001 to be provided to Congress in September 2001. Even with early Senate confirmation of top defense officials, completing such a thorough review in just eight months is a daunting charge. One of the lessons learned during QDR 1997 was the advance efforts to identify key issues for the review process can be critical to success. Fortunately for the incoming administration, an independent effort to develop intellectual capital for QDR 2001 was started in the autumn of 1999. This effort consisted of a small working group which was chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and established in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Leading the group was Michele A. Flournoy, a veteran of the QDR 1997 effort and the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. This volume is a product of the group's work as well as contributions from outside experts associated with the project. A major conference on the project was held at NDU in November 2000, at which a final report was issued. This book provides the intellectual underpinnings of that report. To some extent this book is very much like the results of screening at an archeological dig. The issues in the book are not new; they are already part of the defense policy debate of our great democracy. But the authors carefully unearthed insights and options in a systematic manner, placing the issues in context. No defense issue lives in isolation; all are part of the process of priority-setting that is required to craft a successful strategy in the context of a finite budget. To help the new administration set its priorities, the working group and outside contributors have outlined a series of integrated paths that lead from strategy alternatives to force-sizing criteria to force structure and other programmatic issues, and they identify the forks in each path and the signposts along the way. This valuable book provides a unique service to the Department of Defense and the Nation, whether the new administration uses the QDR or some other review process as its primary vehicle for setting defense priorities. It represents an effort to transcend both the tyranny of the urgent and the bureaucratic rivalries that tend to dominate the analyses conducted within the Pentagon. It does so in a practical, logical, and supportive manner. It does not provide solutions but instead offers options form which the Bush administration can craft a new defense policy. In a sense this book represents a consummate menu of choices: an outside view that only knowledgeable insiders can provide. There are options identified in this book that some might support enthusiastically, and others might oppose. But no one can fail to be impressed by the fairness of this effort and the professional skill with which it was completed. This book represents a service to the Department of Defense and the new administration with few parallels. It provides an excellent starting point for a review of defense strategy, policies and programs.
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