A big challenge for the economic development of small island countries is dealing with external shocks. The Pacific Islands are vulnerable to natural disasters, climate change, commodity price changes, and uncertain donor grants. The question that arises is how should small developing countries formulate a fiscal policy to achieve economic stability and fiscal sustainability when prone to various shocks? We study how natural disasters affect long-term debt dynamics and propose fiscal policy rules that could help insulate the economy from such unexpected shocks. We propose fiscal rules to address these shocks and uncertainties using the example of Papua New Guinea. Our study finds the advantages of expenditure rules, especially a recurrent expenditure rule based on non-resource and non-grant revenue, interdependently determined by government debt and budget balance targets with expected disaster shocks. This paper contributes to the literature and policy dialogue by theoretically analyzing the impact of natural disasters on debt sustainability and proposing fiscal rules against natural disasters and climate changes. Our fiscal policy framework is practically applicable for many developing countries facing increasing frequency and impact of natural disasters and climate change. Our rules-based fiscal framework is crucial for sustainable and countercyclical macroeconomic policies to build resilience against devastating natural hazards.
How should resource-rich economies handle the balance of payments adjustment required after commodity price declines? This paper addresses the question theoretically by developing a simple two-period multi-sector model based on Nakatani (2016) to compare different exchange rate policies, and empirically by estimating elasticities of imports and commodity exports with respect to exchange rates using Papua New Guinean data. In the empirical part, using various econometric methods, I find the statistically significant elasticities of commodity exports to real exchange rates. In the theoretical part, by introducing the notion of a shadow exchange rate premium, I show how the rationing of foreign exchange reduces consumer welfare. Using the estimated elasticities and theoretical outcomes, I further discuss policy implications for resource-rich countries with a focus on Papua New Guinea.
Many studies predict massive job losses and real wage decline as a result of the ongoing widespread automation of production, a trend that may be further aggravated by the COVID-19 crisis. Yet automation is also expected to raise productivity and output. How can we share the gains from automation more widely, for the benefit of all? And what are the attendant equity-efficiency trade-offs? We analyze this issue by considering the effects of fiscal policies that seek to redistribute the gains from automation and address income inequality. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition, including a novel specification linking corporate power to automation. While fiscal policy cannot eliminate the classic equity-efficiency trade-offs, it can help improve them, reducing inequality at small or no loss of output. This is particularly so when policy takes advantage of novel, less distortive transmission channels of fiscal policy created by the empirically observed link between corporate market power and automation.
Does fiscal decentralization improve health and educational outcomes? Does this improvement depend on the quality of governance? How do fiscal decentralization and governance interact? We answer these questions through an instrumental variable Tobit analysis of cross-country panel data. We find negative effects of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes, which however are more than offset by better governance. Education expenditure decentralization to subnational governments enhances educational outcomes. We conclude that countries can only reap the benefits from decentralization when the quality of their governance arrangements exceeds a certain threshold. We also find that sequencing and staging of decentralization matter. Countries should improve government effectiveness and control of corruption first to maximize benefits of fiscal decentralization.
A big challenge for the economic development of small island countries is dealing with external shocks. The Pacific Islands are vulnerable to natural disasters, climate change, commodity price changes, and uncertain donor grants. The question that arises is how should small developing countries formulate a fiscal policy to achieve economic stability and fiscal sustainability when prone to various shocks? We study how natural disasters affect long-term debt dynamics and propose fiscal policy rules that could help insulate the economy from such unexpected shocks. We propose fiscal rules to address these shocks and uncertainties using the example of Papua New Guinea. Our study finds the advantages of expenditure rules, especially a recurrent expenditure rule based on non-resource and non-grant revenue, interdependently determined by government debt and budget balance targets with expected disaster shocks. This paper contributes to the literature and policy dialogue by theoretically analyzing the impact of natural disasters on debt sustainability and proposing fiscal rules against natural disasters and climate changes. Our fiscal policy framework is practically applicable for many developing countries facing increasing frequency and impact of natural disasters and climate change. Our rules-based fiscal framework is crucial for sustainable and countercyclical macroeconomic policies to build resilience against devastating natural hazards.
Does fiscal decentralization improve health and educational outcomes? Does this improvement depend on the quality of governance? How do fiscal decentralization and governance interact? We answer these questions through an instrumental variable Tobit analysis of cross-country panel data. We find negative effects of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes, which however are more than offset by better governance. Education expenditure decentralization to subnational governments enhances educational outcomes. We conclude that countries can only reap the benefits from decentralization when the quality of their governance arrangements exceeds a certain threshold. We also find that sequencing and staging of decentralization matter. Countries should improve government effectiveness and control of corruption first to maximize benefits of fiscal decentralization.
Many studies predict massive job losses and real wage decline as a result of the ongoing widespread automation of production, a trend that may be further aggravated by the COVID-19 crisis. Yet automation is also expected to raise productivity and output. How can we share the gains from automation more widely, for the benefit of all? And what are the attendant equity-efficiency trade-offs? We analyze this issue by considering the effects of fiscal policies that seek to redistribute the gains from automation and address income inequality. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition, including a novel specification linking corporate power to automation. While fiscal policy cannot eliminate the classic equity-efficiency trade-offs, it can help improve them, reducing inequality at small or no loss of output. This is particularly so when policy takes advantage of novel, less distortive transmission channels of fiscal policy created by the empirically observed link between corporate market power and automation.
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