Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action offers the consensus findings and recommendations of a joint committee established by the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences to identify methods of improving the ongoing cooperation between the two nations in this area. The report finds that the best way to realize the enormous potential of the U.S.-Russian relationship on nuclear nonproliferation is to reinvigorate the relationship between the two governments as a true partnership. It recommends that the U.S. and Russia establish a Joint High-Level Commission of government and non-government experts to assess their cooperation and devise a strategic plan for moving forward. It suggests that the Senior Interagency Group that was recently established by the two presidents be empowered to carry out this strategic plan. The report then examines three issue areas, making specific recommendations in each: law and taxation, program organization and management, and scientific and technical cooperation.
Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action offers the consensus findings and recommendations of a joint committee established by the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences to identify methods of improving the ongoing cooperation between the two nations in this area. The report finds that the best way to realize the enormous potential of the U.S.-Russian relationship on nuclear nonproliferation is to reinvigorate the relationship between the two governments as a true partnership. It recommends that the U.S. and Russia establish a Joint High-Level Commission of government and non-government experts to assess their cooperation and devise a strategic plan for moving forward. It suggests that the Senior Interagency Group that was recently established by the two presidents be empowered to carry out this strategic plan. The report then examines three issue areas, making specific recommendations in each: law and taxation, program organization and management, and scientific and technical cooperation.
The U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences convened a joint workshop to identify methods of overcoming impediments to cooperation between the United States and Russia on nonproliferation. The workshop emphasized approaches and techniques that have already been shown to work in U.S.-Russian programs and that might be applied in other areas. The workshop was intended to facilitate frank discussion between individuals in the United States and Russia who have some responsibility for cooperative nonproliferation programs in the hope of identifying both the impediments to cooperation and potential methods of addressing them. This report summarizes the discussions at the workshop.
The U.S. National Academies (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), building on a foundation of years of interacademy cooperation, conducted a joint project to identify U.S. and Russian views on what the international nuclear security environment will be in 2015, what challenges may arise from that environment, and what options the U.S. and Russia have in partnering to address those challenges. The project's discussions were developed and expanded upon during a two-day public workshop held at the International Atomic Energy Agency in November 2007. A key aspect of that partnership may be cooperation in third countries where both the U.S. and Russia can draw on their experiences over the last decade of non-proliferation cooperation. More broadly, the following issues analyzed over the course of this RAS-NAS project included: safety and security culture, materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) best practices, sustainability, nuclear forensics, public-private partnerships, and the expansion of nuclear energy.
The U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences convened a joint workshop to identify methods of overcoming impediments to cooperation between the United States and Russia on nonproliferation. The workshop emphasized approaches and techniques that have already been shown to work in U.S.-Russian programs and that might be applied in other areas. The workshop was intended to facilitate frank discussion between individuals in the United States and Russia who have some responsibility for cooperative nonproliferation programs in the hope of identifying both the impediments to cooperation and potential methods of addressing them. This report summarizes the discussions at the workshop.
In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.
The so-called nuclear renaissance has increased worldwide interest in nuclear power. This potential growth also has increased, in some quarters, concern that nonproliferation considerations are not being given sufficient attention. In particular, since introduction of many new power reactors will lead to requiring increased uranium enrichment services to provide the reactor fuel, the proliferation risk of adding enrichment facilities in countries that do not have them now led to proposals to provide the needed fuel without requiring indigenous enrichment facilities. Similar concerns exist for reprocessing facilities. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle summarizes key issues and analyses of the topic, offers some criteria for evaluating options, and makes findings and recommendations to help the United States, the Russian Federation, and the international community reduce proliferation and other risks, as nuclear power is used more widely. This book is intended for all those who are concerned about the need for assuring fuel for new reactors and at the same time limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This audience includes the United States and Russia, other nations that currently supply nuclear material and technology, many other countries contemplating starting or growing nuclear power programs, and the international organizations that support the safe, secure functioning of the international nuclear fuel cycle, most prominently the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This book presents the proceedings of the fourth U.S.-Russian interacademy workshop on the general theme of countering terrorism, which was held in Moscow in March 2007. The fourth in a series, this volume continues to explore topics related to urban terrorism, but with a new emphasis on potential attacks involving biological agents, transportation networks, and energy systems. The other books in the series include: High Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (2002) Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S.-Russian Workshop Proceedings (2004) Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the United States: Proceedings of a Workshop (2006)
The International Atomic Energy Agency reports numerous incidents of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, including ionizing radiation sources (IRSs) used in medical, agricultural, and industrial applications. This report assesses the threats posed by inadequately protected IRSs in Russia and recommends steps to enhance the effectiveness of DOE's current cooperative program with Russia. These continuing DOE's current program of quick security fixes and developing a comprehensive plan to work with Russian counterparts to reduce overall risk, within the context of a comprehensive Russian program for ensuring adequate life-cycle management of IRSs.
In January-February 2005, the National Academies Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States and the Russian Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on Counterterrorism held a workshop on urban terrorism in Washington, D.C. Prior to the workshop, three working groups convened to focus on the topics of energy systems vulnerabilities, transportation systems vulnerabilities, and cyberterrorism issues. The working groups met with local experts and first responders, prepared reports, and presented their findings at the workshop. Other workshop papers focused on various organizations' integrated response to acts of urban terrorism, recent acts of terrorism, radiological terrorism, biological terrorism, cyberterrorism, and the roots of terrorism.
This book is devoted primarily to papers prepared by American and Russian specialists on cyber terrorism and urban terrorism. It also includes papers on biological and radiological terrorism from the American and Russian perspectives. Of particular interest are the discussions of the hostage situation at Dubrovko in Moscow, the damge inflicted in New York during the attacks on 9/11, and Russian priorities in addressing cyber terrorism.
In the fall of 2010, the U.S. National Academies (consisting of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences) initiated a joint study of U.S.-Russian bilateral engagement in the biological sciences and biotechnology (hereinafter collectively referred to as bioengagement). The U.S. Department of State and the Russian Academy of Sciences provided support for the study. The academies established a joint committee of 12 leading scientists from the two countries to assess bioengagement activities since 1996 and to provide recommendations as to collaborative efforts in the near future. The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions summarizes the principal conclusions and recommendations of the study.
In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.
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