‘Nations appear and fall, but cities endure and rediscover how to succeed. In this meticulously defined and researched book, Glenn presents ideas for minimising suffering during urban catastrophes. His urgency identifies risks held in urban areas by 3.5 billion people. These people are many of us: as urban populations occupying 3 per cent of our planet’s land area, drawing water from 41 per cent of the world’s ground surface, consuming 60 to 80 per cent of global energy and achieving 80 per cent of the world’s economic productivity. For Glenn, our resilience—through diversity in preparation, survival and recovery—includes comprehensive approaches that are sustained in duration, orchestrated in bringing all necessary capabilities to bear, layered in approach and early in application.’ —Major General Chris Field, Australian Army ‘The time to prepare for the inevitable is now. Dr Glenn has written a book that should be read by all leaders, planners and responders who may be called upon in an urban disaster, whether natural or man-made. Military leaders should give it particular attention, as the human race is increasingly concentrated in its cities. Understanding how to wage war in dense urban terrain is essential, especially if a nation also seeks to hold the moral high ground. The fruits of any victory won among people that fails to consider the lessons in Come Hell or High Fever are likely to be very bitter.’ —Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, United States Army (retired)
Focusing on the embedded press system deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, this book attempts to answer the following questions: How effective was the embedded press system in meeting the needs of the three main constituencies-the press, the military, and the citizens of the United States? What policy history led to the innovation of an embedded press system? Where are press-military relations likely to go in the future?
Combat stress casualties are not necessarily higher in city operations than operations on other types of terrain. Commanders and NCOs need to have the skills to treat and prevent stress casualties and understand their implications for urban operations. The authors review the known precipitants of combat stress reaction, its battlefield treatment, and the preventive steps commanders can take to limit its extent and severity.
Operations in urban areas pose specific challenges for U.S. Army combat service support (CSS)--which is responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations. This report gives an overview of these tasks and ways in which the CSS community can prepare itself to meet them. The authors conducted literature reviews and interviews, and they drew on extensive prior research. Findings fall into two broad categories: (1) functional-area specific, applying exclusively to arming, manning, sustaining, moving, fixing, force protection, and selected other areas; and (2) those with broader application. Under the latter, the limited availability of many CSS assets will encourage their central management. Commanders will therefore have to consider weighting front-line assets with such low-density assets or keeping them centralized for dispatch as needed. CSS resources will require the same command, control, and communications assets as do other units. Additionally, CSS drivers and others throughout the area of operations are a potentially vital and traditionally underused source of intelligence. Attrition and consumption rates tend to be much higher than is elsewhere experienced. Demands on CSS units will be exceptional even during operations in which combat plays no role.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
Restructure the LAPD Training Group to allow the centralization of planning; instructor qualification, evaluation, and retention; and more efficient use of resources.
This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.
Virtually every action, message, and decision of a military force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: strategic communication, treatment of civilians at vehicle checkpoints, and the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment. Themes of U.S. goodwill mean little if its actions convey otherwise. Consequently, a unified message in both word and deed is fundamental to success. Business marketing practices provide a useful framework for improving U.S. military efforts to shape the attitudes and behaviors of local populations in a theater of operations as well as those of a broader, international audience. Enlisting Madison Avenue extracts lessons from these business practices and adapts them to U.S. military efforts, developing a unique approach to shaping that has the potential to improve military-civilian relations, the accuracy of media coverage of operations, communication of U.S. and coalition objectives, and the reputation of U.S. forces in theater and internationally. Foremost among these lessons are the concepts of branding, customer satisfaction, and segmentation of the target audience, all of which serve to maximize the impact and improve the outcome of U.S. shaping efforts.
This study proposes a new way of viewing urban operations, among the most complex challenges facing America's armed forces. Viewing urban operations in light of relevant densities, regardless of whether combat, stability, or support missions predominate, offers a viable means of approaching an otherwise most imposing puzzle. Doing so provides a vehicle to better understand how to conceptualize issues of pertinence,the tasks and missions that will address those issues, and the specific ways of employing elements of national power in the service of strategic objectives. Following an overview of density's potential influence on military operations, the author proposes and discusses five approaches to dealing with its challenges: Matching density with density, effectively reducing densities, maintaining selected densities, addressing density asymmetrically, and capitalizing on urban densities. He concludes with an analysis of density and its implications for information operations conducted in builtup areas.
In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.
Draws on a review of relevant literature, service doctrine, training, and emerging technologies to assess U.S. military preparedness to undertake military operations on urbanized terrain.
Deception is a powerful yet understudied instrument of war. Using the extensive literature on deception in the animal kingdom, where ruses of near-infinite variety are applied to offense, defense, and intelligence gathering, the authors delve into the theory of deception to reveal new avenues of experimentation. These pathways may lead to new technologies or training techniques and provoke a new look at deception doctrine applicable at every level of war. ISBN: 0-8330-3159-7 Price: $24.00 Page count: 98
On July 24, 2003, a joint, multinational, interagency force landed in the Solomon Islands at the request of that nation's prime minister. Its intent was to "reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in the Solomon Islands, and to ensure respect for the country's constitution and implementation of its laws." The call for help came after years of turmoil during which the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Solomon Islands government had been undermined by social strife, corruption, intimidation, and armed groups acting with no regard for the law. Within weeks, the worst of the problems had been suppressed and national rebuilding began. This analysis considers why the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) succeeded in its first weeks, months, and years, and what lessons of value its operations might offer to counterinsurgency (COIN) and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
During stability operations, coalitions must incorporate participation by government agencies other than the military, the indigenous government, and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. This book investigates challenges confronting coalitions today and considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world.
This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.
Virtually every action, message, and decision of a military force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: strategic communication, treatment of civilians at vehicle checkpoints, and the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment. These of U.S. goodwill mean little if its actions convey otherwise. Consequently, a unified message in both word and deed is fundamental to success. Business marketing practices provide a useful framework for improving U.S. military efforts to shape the attitudes and behaviors of local populations in a theater of operations as well as those of a broader, international audience. Enlisting Madison Avenue extracts lessons from these business practices and adapts them to U.S. military efforts, developing a unique approach to shaping that has the potential improve military-civilian relations, the accuracy of media coverage of operations, communication of U.S. and coalition objectives, and the reputation of U.S. forces in theater and internationally. Foremost among these lessons are the concepts of branding, customer satisfaction, and segmentation of the target audience, all of which serve to maximize the impact and improve the outcome of U.S. shaping efforts.
‘Nations appear and fall, but cities endure and rediscover how to succeed. In this meticulously defined and researched book, Glenn presents ideas for minimising suffering during urban catastrophes. His urgency identifies risks held in urban areas by 3.5 billion people. These people are many of us: as urban populations occupying 3 per cent of our planet’s land area, drawing water from 41 per cent of the world’s ground surface, consuming 60 to 80 per cent of global energy and achieving 80 per cent of the world’s economic productivity. For Glenn, our resilience—through diversity in preparation, survival and recovery—includes comprehensive approaches that are sustained in duration, orchestrated in bringing all necessary capabilities to bear, layered in approach and early in application.’ —Major General Chris Field, Australian Army ‘The time to prepare for the inevitable is now. Dr Glenn has written a book that should be read by all leaders, planners and responders who may be called upon in an urban disaster, whether natural or man-made. Military leaders should give it particular attention, as the human race is increasingly concentrated in its cities. Understanding how to wage war in dense urban terrain is essential, especially if a nation also seeks to hold the moral high ground. The fruits of any victory won among people that fails to consider the lessons in Come Hell or High Fever are likely to be very bitter.’ —Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, United States Army (retired)
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began on July 24, 2003, has been a remarkable success, in part because of the consistency of its message, the strength of its leadership, and its uncommon support for, rather than overt control of, the Solomon Islands government and policing capability. This study reviews RAMSI operations through the lens of a broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
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