The essays that comprise this volume clearly demonstrate that coalitions have dramatically altered the shape of war. Paul Kennedy's overview of coalitions over the past century shows that, with coalitions firmly established as viable in the minds of strategists, wars have become markedly lengthier, bloodier, and much more expensive. Three of the essays focus on explicitly military aspects of the two world wars: Norman Stone's on the Austro-German Alliance, 1914-18; Ulrich Trumpener's on the German-Ottoman Coalition, 1914-18; and Ian Nish's on the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. J. L. Granatstein pursues a contrasting, though equally enlightening, course, focussing on Hume Wrong, the "functional principle," and the difficulties inherent in Canada's role in the diplomacy of the post-World War II era. In keeping with the immediacy of Granatstein's concerns is John Erickson's lucid presentation of Soviet military philosophy, a matter of crucial and immediate concern. This book will be of interest to military historians, political scientists, and the more general reader intrigued by military history and philosophy. These essays, edited and compiled by Keith Neilson and Roy Prete, who teach in the Department of History at the Royal Military College, Kingston, were presented at the Eighth Royal Military College Military History Symposium.
Falling between the “War of Movement” in 1914 and the major attrition battles of 1916, 1915 was a critical year in the First World War. As France failed in ever-larger offensives to break through the German trenches, Britain shifted its strategy from defence of empire to total commitment to the continental war. In the second of three planned volumes, Roy Prete analyzes the political and military policies and strategies of Britain and France and their joint command relationship on the Western Front in 1915. The opposing strategies of the two governments proved to be the main determinant in the sometimes ragged relations between the French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, and his British counterpart, Sir John French, as they sought to drive the German army out of France and to aid their hard-pressed Russian ally. With an impressive marshalling of evidence, Strategy and Command demonstrates that the increased British commitment to the continental war, manifested in sending Kitchener’s New Armies to France in 1915, was largely due to the disastrous situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front and the perceived weakness of the French government. Based on extensive research in French and British political and military archives, this new in-depth study of Anglo-French military relations on the Western Front in 1915 fills a major gap in the unfolding drama of the First World War.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.