The Beginnings of Behavioral Economics: Katona, Simon, and Leibenstein's X-Efficiency Theory explores the mid-20th century roots of behavioral economics, placing the origin of this now-dominant approach to economic theory many years before the groundbreaking 1979 work on prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. It discusses the work of Harvey Leibenstein, Herbert Simon, George Katona, and Frederick Hayek, reintroducing their contributions as founding pillars of the behavioral approach. It concentrates on the work of Leibenstein, reviewing his nuanced introduction of X-efficiency theory. Building from these foundations, the work explores the body of empirical research on market power and firm behavior – XE relationship. This book is a tremendous resource for graduate students and early career researchers in behavioral economics, experimental economics, organizational economics, social and organizational psychology, labor market economics and public policy. Reviews the powerful, but neglected contributions of mid-20th century scholars, like Leibenstein and Katona in building the roots of behavioral economic theory Amalgamates and reviews 50 years of empirical research and over 200 empirical papers on X-efficiency theory Establishes how X-efficiency can aid modern behavioral economics in further developing firm theory and understanding efficiency wages
As everyone knows, intuition is warm and fuzzy, qualitative, not measurable. Economics, on the other hand, is quantitative, and if it is not a hard science, at least it is the "queen of the social sciences." It is, therefore, intuitively obvious, that intuition and economics are as if oil and water. The problem is, what is intuitively obvious is not always correct. And, there are two major reasons why intuition and economics are not like oil and water. First, economics concerns itself with decision making, and decisions are made in the brain. The human brain is the size of a grapefruit, weighing three pounds with approximately 180 billion neurons, each physically independent but interacting with the other neurons. What we call intuition is, like decision making, a natural information processing function of the brain. Second, despite the current emphasis on quantitative analysis and deductive logic there is a rich history of economists speaking about intuition. First, the human brain, specifically the neocortex, has a left and right hemisphere. The specialized analytical style of the left hemisphere and the specialized intuitive style of the right hemispheres complement each other.
My interest in X-Efficiency (XE) dates back to 1978. At the time, I was writing the dissertation for my Ph. D. at Washington State University. My dissertation was concerned with the role of attitudes in the school-to-work transition among young men. I was advised by Professor Millard Hastay (a member of my committee) to look at Leibenstein's "new" book, Beyond Economic Man. One of the things that caught my attention was his behavioral description of (selective) rationality. It seemed that Leibenstein' s behavioral description of a (selectively) rational individ ual was very similar to what psychologists such as Abraham Maslow were reporting as being the product of a particular motivational system. In other words, I was impressed with the idea that what Leibenstein was referring to as X-inefficiency was being discussed by psychologists as "the way it (often) is. " So from the beginning I always considered the concept ofX-(in)efficiency to be a valuable one for understanding human behavior. I have since come to believe that this is particularly true when considering behavior in non-market environments, i. e. , within the firm. Work on this book, however, can most realistically said to have started with work which I began in 1982 while I was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University. Professor Leibenstein suggested that I consider how some empirical evidence which was being cited as evidence for the role of property rights might also be consistent with XE theory. (The consistency, in both directions, is considerable.
Professor Sir Roger Penrose is one of the truly original thinkers of our time. He has made several remarkable contributions to science, from quantum physics and theories of human consciousness to relativity theory and observations on the structure of the universe. Unusually for a scientist, some of his ideas have crossed over into the public arena. Now his work, spanning fifty years of science, with over five thousand pages and more than three hundred papers, has been collected together for the first time and arranged chronologically over six volumes, each with an introduction from the author. Where relevant, individual papers also come with specific introductions or notes.
Philosopher Roger Scruton was the leading conservative thinker of the post-war years. His public pronouncements were prophetic and provocative. Dooley, Scruton's literary executor, has assembled the best of Scruton's essays and commentaries, arranged thematically. Writing with passion and conviction, Scruton takes aim at those who defy conservative common sense in favor of liberal falsehoods.
William Harvey's natural philosophy was a view of the world that he had put together during his education in Cambridge and Padua. It contained ways of structuring knowledge, formulating questions and arriving at answers that directed the programme of work in which he discovered the circulation of the blood. Harvey addressed himself to people with related philosophies, and it is necessary to be aware of seventeenth-century modes of exposition and evaluation of knowledge if we are to understand how Harvey's contemporaries reacted to his work. This book, the most extensive discussion of Harvey to be published for over twenty-five years, reports extensively on the views of those who wrote for and against him. It is a study of a major change in natural philosophy and of the forces which acted for and, equally important, against change. In a period traditionally central to historians of science, it is argued here that natural philosophy, and particularly Harvey's specialty within it - anatomy - was theocentric. Harvey's contribution was experiment; and the revolution which occurred in the seventeenth century was concerned not with science but with experiment and the status of natural knowledge.
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