Solving Social Dilemmas demonstrates that social, political, and economic progress occur when ethical dispositions evolve in a manner that solves or ameliorate social dilemmas. That same process can account for the emergence of prosperous societies in the West during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was substantially a consequence of increased moral support for commerce and careers in commerce that had emerged during the previous two centuries. To support these claims, two analytical histories are developed. The first uses elementary game theory to illustrate how critical social dilemmas can be solved by internalized ethical ideas about "proper" or "moral" conduct. That analytical history implies that in the absence of solutions to critical social dilemmas-of which there are many thousands-social, political, and economic development tends to be curtailed. The second analytical history surveys three centuries of ethical assessments concerning the proper role of commerce in a good life and good society. The authors reviewed all used economic illustrations to illustrate moral principles or how they may be applied. Because the illustrating examples are ones that their readers would have found "obvious," they shed light on the ethical dispositions in the communities to whom those works were addressed. Together, they reveal that concerns about the effects of market son ethical dispositions were diminishing during the centuries before the great acceleration of commerce in the nineteenth century. In fact, many of the authors reviewed argued that there was a complete harmony between ethical dispositions and commerce. Together the two narratives imply that shifts in norms directly and indirectly account for the relative prosperity of the West compared to other parts of the World during the twentieth century. It turns out that flourishing commercial societies have moral foundations"--
This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and pre-existing institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of (1) governance, (2) the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, (3) constitutional exchange, and (4) suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries. The third part provides additional evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.
Do constitutions matter? Are constitutions simply symbols of the political times at which they were adopted, or do they systematically affect the course of public policy? Are the policy crises of failing democracies the result of bad luck or of fundamental problems associated with the major and minor constitutional reforms adopted during their recent histories? The purpose of the present study is to address these questions using a blend of theory, history, and statistical analysis. The Swedish experience provides a nearly perfect laboratory in which to study the effects of constitutional reform. During the past 200 years, Swedish governance has shifted from a king-dominated system with an unelected four-chamber parliament to a bicameral legislature elected with wealth-weighted voting in 1866, and then to a new electoral system based on proportional representation and universal suffrage in 1920, and finally to a unicameral parliamentary system in 1970. All these radical reorganizations of Swedish governance were accomplished peacefully using formal amendment procedures established by previous constitutions. By focusing on constitutional issues rather than Sweden's political history, this book extends our understanding of constitutional reform and parliamentary democracy in general.
Solving Social Dilemmas demonstrates that social, political, and economic progress occur when ethical dispositions evolve in a manner that solves or ameliorate social dilemmas. That same process can account for the emergence of prosperous societies in the West during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was substantially a consequence of increased moral support for commerce and careers in commerce that had emerged during the previous two centuries. To support these claims, two analytical histories are developed. The first uses elementary game theory to illustrate how critical social dilemmas can be solved by internalized ethical ideas about "proper" or "moral" conduct. That analytical history implies that in the absence of solutions to critical social dilemmas-of which there are many thousands-social, political, and economic development tends to be curtailed. The second analytical history surveys three centuries of ethical assessments concerning the proper role of commerce in a good life and good society. The authors reviewed all used economic illustrations to illustrate moral principles or how they may be applied. Because the illustrating examples are ones that their readers would have found "obvious," they shed light on the ethical dispositions in the communities to whom those works were addressed. Together, they reveal that concerns about the effects of market son ethical dispositions were diminishing during the centuries before the great acceleration of commerce in the nineteenth century. In fact, many of the authors reviewed argued that there was a complete harmony between ethical dispositions and commerce. Together the two narratives imply that shifts in norms directly and indirectly account for the relative prosperity of the West compared to other parts of the World during the twentieth century. It turns out that flourishing commercial societies have moral foundations"--
This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and pre-existing institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of (1) governance, (2) the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, (3) constitutional exchange, and (4) suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries. The third part provides additional evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.
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