Listed in Bloomberg’s TOP 50 BUSINESS BOOKS OF 2010 and shortlisted for Spear’s FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE YEAR AWARD “Robert Sloan works in the hedge-fund industry. As he shows in this readable polemic, dislike of shorting has a long history. . . . Someone has to point out when the emperor has no clothes. The shorts were among the biggest skeptics of the subprime-mortgage boom and of the banks that financed it. And when they were proved right, their activities were banned. Gratitude, huh?” The Economist “If Robert Sloan manages to go the distance in Don’t Blame the Shorts, it is because his book is as much about historical tensions between Washington and Wall Street as the practice of short selling. He puts it all in the context of the opposing views of the federalist Alexander Hamilton, who was pro-speculation, and Jeffersonian republicans, who were pro-agriculture and convinced that making money from money was nonsense. . . . His book is a useful corrective to the view of short selling as ‘unpatriotic’ or uniquely antisocial . . . it is a brave act to take on anti-finance populists at this time.” Financial Times “In this knowing book about the business of short-selling stocks, financier Robert Sloan gives a modern day lesson on why we shouldn’t shoot the messenger. . . Rather than blast short sellers, we should praise them for exposing management methane. . . .The story may be old, but Sloan’s easy and informative writing makes for a thoroughly worthwhile update.” Barron’s ”Bob Sloan, a Wall Street veteran, cites the confrontation in his new book, Don’t Blame the Shorts, as evidence that blind fury from politicians and unrepentant shrugs from bankers are far from new. As the title suggests, Sloan’s main thrust is to defend the practice of short-selling. . . . Today, Sloan says, the very same battle of ideas is being played out in America . . . this is just the latest bitter expression of the constant tension between a moneyed east coast financial elite, and the manufacturers, mom-and-pop shops and the scrappy entrepreneurs who bitterly resent the power of Wall Street—but don’t want the cash taps to be turned off.” The Observer “Timely, concise, accessible to the lay reader and with a decorously polemical edge, it is both revealing and entertaining. No matter what the politicians do, the markets will find a way to challenge the finaglers and the optimists who sustain them. Like the poor, the shorts will always be with us.” Spear’s “Post-crisis reading . . . best books on the financial crisis and its aftermath. . . . While other authors point accusing fingers, in his book, Don’t Blame the Shorts, Robert Sloan leaps to the defense of short sellers who, as he describes, have been long scapegoated for market crashes and are once again in the wake of the recent crisis. The Dutch East India Company was blaming its troubles on them as far back as 1609.” Economist.com “This book is a rare treat. Unlike most books about Wall Street, it is written from a perspective sympathetic to the banking and securities industries. Better still, Bob Sloan is not only a practitioner and market participant himself, but one with a fine sense of history. Sloan rightly describes prime brokerage as ‘the largest, most unnoticed banking system in the word.’” Global Custodian “Short and to the point and very well researched. As we are living in an era of history repeating itself, Mr. Sloan depicts the negative market psychology that has transcended Wall Street since the birth of our nation.” Instablog “Sloan’s recent book…provides an excellent survey of the shorting debate. Sloan recounts how a succession of U.S. government agencies have enacted rules over the decades to restrain short sellers—usually in the aftermath of financial crises such as the one we have just endured. Sloan believes those rules have always had counterproductive results. Sloan’s book is a smooth read, mainly because he has done his homework and has lots of entertaining scoundrels and inept politicians to write about… Sloan’s work provides a real service to market regulators and practitioners alike. With a deft quill, he exposes the futility of government regulation while offering a useful back story to the views of contemporary market regulators.” ABA Banking Journal About the Book: On the 80th anniversary of the Crash of 1929, we find ourselves peering backwards through a virtual looking-glass to a time when global markets were in free fall, and venerable financial institutions were in tatters. Yet, here in the present, these same patterns seem to repeat, causing cable newsers, Congressmen, and commoners alike to scream the same refrain, "Blame the short sellers!" Certainly, short sellers make convenient villains; for one thing, they win only when others lose. But in Don't Blame the Shorts, Bob Sloan taps into a 200-year-old American debate to convincingly and emphatically argue that short selling is not what ails our equities trading markets, but what keeps them honest. To Sloan, short sellers’ objectives are simple: find overvalued securities and bet against overconfident investors. It's an approach that uncovered widespread fraud at Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and other failed outfits long before regulators ever set foot in the door. Taking the long view of history, Sloan unearths the deep roots of the conflict over speculative investing and its role in our economy. It's a debate that oftentimes puts titans of American history and finance on opposite sides of the divide: Jefferson and Hamilton, over the fundamental nature of America's economic systems; a century later, J.P. Morgan and William Rockefeller, the brother of John D. Rockefeller, who was thought to be part of a cabal of short sellers that brought the country to its financial knees. Further, Sloan reintroduces us to the likes of Ferdinand Pecora, the federal prosecutor whose investigations in the early 1930s revealed a wide range of abusive practices of banks, and led to the creation of vital legislation, including the Glass-Steagall Act. Don't Blame the Shorts is an eye-opening account that overturns conventional wisdom about short selling, and the vital systemic (and symbolic) role it plays in making financial markets less opaque, more accountable, and, therefore, stronger.
Robert Henri (1865-1929) spearheaded the transition in American art from 19th-century academics to 20th-century self-expression. John Sloan (1871-1951) was an invaluable partner in this movement. This volume provides the first publication of the full correspondence between these two major American artists, who were kindred spirits and special friends. 160 photos. 72 illus.
The wave of data breaches raises two pressing questions: Why don’t we defend our networks better? And, what practical incentives can we create to improve our defenses? Why Don't We Defend Better?: Data Breaches, Risk Management, and Public Policy answers those questions. It distinguishes three technical sources of data breaches corresponding to three types of vulnerabilities: software, human, and network. It discusses two risk management goals: business and consumer. The authors propose mandatory anonymous reporting of information as an essential step toward better defense, as well as a general reporting requirement. They also provide a systematic overview of data breach defense, combining technological and public policy considerations. Features Explains why data breach defense is currently often ineffective Shows how to respond to the increasing frequency of data breaches Combines the issues of technology, business and risk management, and legal liability Discusses the different issues faced by large versus small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) Provides a practical framework in which public policy issues about data breaches can be effectively addressed
TV reporter Candy Sloan has eyes the color of cornflowers and legs that stretch all the way to heaven. She also has somebody threatening to rearrange her lovely face if she keeps on snooping into charges of Hollywood racketeering. Spenser's job is to keep Candy healthy until she breaks the biggest story of her career. But her star witness has just bowed out with three bullets in his chest, two tough guys have doubled up to test Spenser's skill with his fists, and Candy is about to use her own sweet body as live bait in a deadly romantic game--a game that may cost Spenser his life.
The daily work of a policeman can push an officer into the most debased side of life. Sam Sloan struggles to stay faithful to his Christian ideals while solving brutal murders and heinous crimes. The Empty Coffin finds detective Sloan and his wife, Vera, faced with the greatest challenge of their lives. In addition to solving a difficult case, this tough cop still tries to live out his faith with honesty and conviction. The problems Sam faces at work create tension at home. As the Sloans struggle to keep their marriage together, the couple evolves into a crime-fighting force, working together on difficult cases that baffle the police. Sloan's hard-nosed detective work, coupled with his faith and humility, brings an unusual solution to a murder case in which there is no corpse!
Sam Sloan is dead. But when his wife, Vera, receives the report of his plane going down, she flies to the site and finds no evidence of a crash. Unable to put the puzzle together, Vera and her daughter, Cara, struggle to accept the reality of Sam's death. But when mother and daughter find a computer disk in a hidden "stash" in Sam's office, they stumble onto the man responsible for his death-Ivan Trudoff, a money-laundering member of the Russian mafia. Armed with the promise that God's help comes in the midst of confusion, Vera is determined to go after the criminal herself. But will Vera find the justice she seeks-or will she unknowingly move toward a dangerous confrontation?
Keeping ahead of terrorists requires innovative, up-to-date training. This follow-up to Stephen Sloan's pioneering 1981 book, Simulating Terrorism, takes stock of twenty-first-century terrorism—then equips readers to effectively counter it. Quickly canvassing the evolution of terrorism—and of counterterrorism efforts—over the past thirty years, co-authors Sloan and Robert J. Bunker draw on examples from the early 2000s, following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, to emphasize the need to prevent or respond quickly to "active aggressors"—terrorists who announce their presence and seek credibility through killing. Training for such situations requires realistic simulations—whose effectiveness, the authors show, depends on incorporating red teams; that is, the groups that play the part of active aggressors. In Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training, Sloan and Bunker, developers of simulation-driven counterterrorist training, take readers through the prerequisites for and basic principles of conducting a successful simulation and preparing responders to face threats—whether from teenage shooters or from sophisticated terrorist organizations. The authors clearly explain how to create an effective red team whose members can operate from within the terrorists' mindset. An innovative chapter by theater professional Roberta Sloan demonstrates how to use dramatic techniques to teach red teams believable role-playing. Rounding out this book, a case study of the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood illustrates the cost of failures in intelligence and underscores the still-current need for serious attention to potential threats. First responders—whether civilian or military—will find Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training indispensible as they address and deter terrorism now and in the future.
While a master's student at the University of Chicago in 1951-1952, Robert Sloan attended Sewall Wright's lecture courses. He made copious notes, which provide a detailed record of Wright's teaching. This book reprints those notes.
Going beyond current books on privacy and security, this book proposes specific solutions to public policy issues pertaining to online privacy and security. Requiring no technical or legal expertise, it provides a practical framework to address ethical and legal issues. The authors explore the well-established connection between social norms, privacy, security, and technological structure. They also discuss how rapid technological developments have created novel situations that lack relevant norms and present ways to develop these norms for protecting informational privacy and ensuring sufficient information security.
While a master's student at the University of Chicago in 1951-1952, Robert Sloan attended Sewall Wright's lecture courses. He made copious notes, which provide a detailed record of Wright's teaching. This book reprints those notes.
This is the first textbook to offer a comprehensive account of ocular prosthetics and the evidence used to underpin and support this field of healthcare. It does so by bringing together information from ophthalmology, prosthetic eye and contact lens literature, and from experts actively engaged in these fields. The book describes the psychological, anatomical and physiological aspects of eye loss as well as surgical procedures for removing the eye, patient evaluation, constructing prosthetic eyes (including prosthetic and surgical techniques for dealing with socket complications), the socket’s response to prosthetic eyes, prosthetic eye maintenance and the history of prosthetic eyes. Though primarily intended for prosthetists, ophthalmologists, ophthalmic nurses, optometrists and students in the fields of ocular medicine, maxillofacial medicine and anaplastology, the book also offers a useful resource for other health workers and family members who care for prosthetic eye patients, and for those patients seeking a deeper understanding of the issues affecting them than they can find elsewhere.
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