This book offers a strategic, organizational, and logistical analysis in a historical context of the planning of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. The central question is: Why, from 1960 to 1982, did the U.S. fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force? Analysis of a series of comparative case studies reveals that the strategic concept to the "half war," or limited contingency, was never articulated adequately enough to support specific force planning. Organizations designed to oversee and command limited contingency forces, fragmented by interservice rivalries and the absence of joint doctrine, lacked multiservice composition and a unified command structure. A search for economy in limited contingency forces seemed justified by illusions about their capabilities. Low budgetary priority and Congressional perceptions that enhanced U.S. rapid deployment capabilities would encourage U.S. global intervention contributed to the lack of logistical and mobility systems dedicated to them. The wider intent of this study is to shed light on the general purpose force planning process and to suggest policy guidance as the United States once again embarks on a major conventional force planning initiative. Rather than being trapped by the past, new efforts to meet vital U.S. military interests below the nuclear threshold must identify "half war" planning contingencies, structure unified commands capable of directing tailored conventional forces in specific theaters, and provide adequate strategic mobility systems.
This sweeping recasting of American naval history is a bold departure from the conventional “sea power” approach. Volume Two of History of the U.S. Navy shows how the Navy in World War II helped to upset the traditional balance in Europe and Asia. Days after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ernest J. King took command of a navy overwhelmed by the demands of war. King devised grand strategies to defeat the Axis and promoted a cadre of fighting admirals—Halsey, Spruance, Hewitt, Kincaid, and Turner—who waged unprecedented in complexity and violence. New sources provide an entirely fresh look at the Battle of the Atlantic, the invasion of Europe, and the great naval campaigns in the Pacific. This book contains the first comprehensive interpretation of the U.S. Navy’s role in the Cold War, when the United States found itself the global bailiff. Love demonstrated that the Navy’s abiding priority was to capture and maintain a share of the strategic bombardment mission by building new ships, planes, submarines, and mission to deliver nuclear weapons. The dawn of the New World Oder found the Navy still on duty as the mailed fist of American foreign policy, standing watch in the Persian Gulf and, at the same time, off the coast of West Africa during Liberia’s violent civil war. Fresh challenges, the author argues, call for a newly balanced fleet and continued attention to America’s first line of defense.
The authors assess alternatives for a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) across a broad set of potential characteristics and situations. They use the current Minuteman III as a baseline to develop a framework to characterize alternative classes of ICBMs, assess the survivability and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and weigh those alternatives against their cost.
This book offers a strategic, organizational, and logistical analysis in a historical context of the planning of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. The central question is: Why, from 1960 to 1982, did the U.S. fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force? Analysis of a series of comparative case studies reveals that the strategic concept to the "half war," or limited contingency, was never articulated adequately enough to support specific force planning. Organizations designed to oversee and command limited contingency forces, fragmented by interservice rivalries and the absence of joint doctrine, lacked multiservice composition and a unified command structure. A search for economy in limited contingency forces seemed justified by illusions about their capabilities. Low budgetary priority and Congressional perceptions that enhanced U.S. rapid deployment capabilities would encourage U.S. global intervention contributed to the lack of logistical and mobility systems dedicated to them. The wider intent of this study is to shed light on the general purpose force planning process and to suggest policy guidance as the United States once again embarks on a major conventional force planning initiative. Rather than being trapped by the past, new efforts to meet vital U.S. military interests below the nuclear threshold must identify "half war" planning contingencies, structure unified commands capable of directing tailored conventional forces in specific theaters, and provide adequate strategic mobility systems.
Planning for US military forces goes on regardless of the political party in power, the state of the budget, or the issues of the moment. Because planners decide the size and shape of land, air, and sea forces, force planning is at the very core of our national security effort. In this primer on force planning, Colonel Robert P. Haffa reviews the process used to structure our strategic, general purpose, and rapidly deployable forces. He contends that many people both within and outside the defense community do not fully understand force planning methods. Too often, he writes, military planners themselves---caught up in the daily pressures of the bureaucracy---focus on parochial, near-term issues. At the national level, far too many public debates are cast in terms of dollars instead of national objectives, missions, and forces. Haffa calls for a return to first principles, recommending these four guidelines for force planning: emphasize coherent policy relationships; rely on empirical data; stress planning, not budgeting consider the long term. Haffa shows that rational planning methods lead to prudent choices. His analysis reminds force planners never to lose sight of fundamentals, especially while prodding national leaders to pay attention to the rational methods of force planning. This fresh study of how we plan our military forces inspires us to get back to the basics essential for informed, productive debate on defense issues. Bradley C. Hosmer Lieutenant General, US Air Force President, National Defense University
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