This book presents a comprehensive view on how the American military examined the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and used that analysis to change doctrinal policies and equipment acquisitions. Ultimately, the learning that occurred as a result of the war dramatically improved quality and competency of American forces.
Is it possible for two combatants who possess equally strong air forces to conduct limited warfare by restraining air operations? In Restraining Air Power, Robert C. Owen and contributing authors aim to answer this question by providing theoretical and empirical assessments of restrained air warfare through five historical case studies since 1945. Through an objective analysis of the past, this collection evaluates the principles of escalation and escalation management in conventional warfare scenarios to better understand when, why, and how peer opponents in past conflicts have expanded or restrained air operations. The surge in cyber warfare, the development of artificially intelligent weaponry, and the founding of the United States Space Force in 2019 mean that analysts and military planners must be prepared to think about escalation management and peer conflict in increasingly complicated and arduous ways. This comprehensive study provides readers with refined theoretical visions of the possibilities and challenges of managing escalation as a powerful mode of warfare between opponents who believe they must choose between sacrificing their own national interests or risking escalated destruction of their economies, military forces, and governing authority. The analysis within the pages of this volume updates our understanding of air warfare within a world of unprecedented military complexity and, as such, will hold immense value for specialists in advanced military studies as well as those studying international relations and history.
Global air mobility is an American invention. During the twentieth century, other nations developed capabilities to transport supplies and personnel by air to support deployed military forces. But only the United States mustered the resources and will to create a global transport force and aerial refueling aircraft capable of moving air and ground combat forces of all types to anywhere in the world and supporting them in continuous combat operations. Whether contemplating a bomber campaign or halting another surprise attack, American war planners have depended on transport and tanker aircraft.
From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe.Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.
The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 to end World War II as quickly and with as few casualties as possible. That is the compelling and elegantly simple argument Newman puts forward in his new study of World War II's end, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult. According to Newman: (1) The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conclusions that Japan was ready to surrender without "the Bomb" are fraudulent; (2) America’s "unconditional surrender" doctrine did not significantly prolong the war; and (3) President Harry S. Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons on Japanese cities was not a "racist act," nor was it a calculated political maneuver to threaten Joseph Stalin’s Eastern hegemony. Simply stated, Newman argues that Truman made a sensible military decision. As commander in chief, he was concerned with ending a devastating and costly war as quickly as possible and with saving millions of lives. Yet, Newman goes further in his discussion, seeking the reasons why so much hostility has been generated by what happened in the skies over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August, 1945. The source of discontent, he concludes, is a "cult" that has grown up in the United States since the 1960s. It was weaned on the disillusionment spawned by concerns about a military industrial complex, American duplicity and failure in the Vietnam War, and a mistrust of government following Watergate. The cult has a shrine, a holy day, a distinctive rhetoric of victimization, various items of scripture, and, in Japan, support from a powerful Marxist constituency. "As with other cults, it is ahistorical," Newman declares. "Its devotees elevate fugitive and unrepresentative events to cosmic status. And most of all, they believe." Newman’s analysis goes to the heart of the process by which scholars interpret historical events and raises disturbing issues about the way historians select and distort evidence about the past to suit special political agendas.
Napalm was invented on Valentine’s Day 1942 at a secret Harvard war research laboratory. It created an inferno that killed over 87,500 people in Tokyo—more than died in the atomic explosions at Hiroshima or Nagasaki—and went on to incinerate 64 Japanese cities. The Bomb got the press, but napalm did the work. Robert Neer offers the first history.
This sweeping recasting of American naval history is a bold departure from the conventional “sea power” approach. Volume Two of History of the U.S. Navy shows how the Navy in World War II helped to upset the traditional balance in Europe and Asia. Days after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ernest J. King took command of a navy overwhelmed by the demands of war. King devised grand strategies to defeat the Axis and promoted a cadre of fighting admirals—Halsey, Spruance, Hewitt, Kincaid, and Turner—who waged unprecedented in complexity and violence. New sources provide an entirely fresh look at the Battle of the Atlantic, the invasion of Europe, and the great naval campaigns in the Pacific. This book contains the first comprehensive interpretation of the U.S. Navy’s role in the Cold War, when the United States found itself the global bailiff. Love demonstrated that the Navy’s abiding priority was to capture and maintain a share of the strategic bombardment mission by building new ships, planes, submarines, and mission to deliver nuclear weapons. The dawn of the New World Oder found the Navy still on duty as the mailed fist of American foreign policy, standing watch in the Persian Gulf and, at the same time, off the coast of West Africa during Liberia’s violent civil war. Fresh challenges, the author argues, call for a newly balanced fleet and continued attention to America’s first line of defense.
This book is the story of a majestic bomber of the propeller era flying perilous combat missions against a sleek, nimble warplane of the jet age, the Soviet MiG-15. A very heavy bomber and a sky giant during World War 2, at that time the B-29 was the most advanced combat aircraft in the world. By the time North Korea attacked its southern neighbour in 1950, the B-29 had been reclassified a medium bomber. Many of its crew members had fought their war and settled down to raise families and begin careers only to be recalled to fight another war on a distant Asian peninsula.
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