Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.
Cooter and Schfer provide a thorough introduction to growth economics through the lens of law and economics. They do a masterful job of weaving in historical anecdotes from all over the world, detailed discussions of historical transformations, theoretical literature, empirical studies, and numerous clever hypotheticals. Scholars as well as general readers will find this book to be very useful and informative."--Henry N. Butler, George Mason University -- "This book distills and presents in a lucid and often even entertaining way the main insights and contributions of law and economics to meeting the challenges of growth for developing countries. Cooter and Schfer argue that market freedom is the key to growth, but that it needs to be sustained by the appropriate legal rules and institutions."--Robert Howse, coauthor of "The Regulation of International Trade.
Solid economic analysis and examples are included in this text. The latest microeconomic theory is used to develop economic theories concerning the core areas of the laws - property, contracts, torts and crime. These economic theories are then used to analyze topics in each of the four key areas.
This is the eBook of the printed book and may not include any media, website access codes, or print supplements that may come packaged with the bound book. With the Fifth Edition of their best-selling text, Cooter and Ulen provide a clear introduction to economic analysis and its application to legal rules and institutions.
How tort, contract, and restitution law can be reformed to better serve the social good Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good. In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.
ALERT: Before you purchase, check with your instructor or review your course syllabus to ensure that you select the correct ISBN. Several versions of Pearson's MyLab & Mastering products exist for each title, including customized versions for individual schools, and registrations are not transferable. In addition, you may need a CourseID, provided by your instructor, to register for and use Pearson's MyLab & Mastering products. Packages Access codes for Pearson's MyLab & Mastering products may not be included when purchasing or renting from companies other than Pearson; check with the seller before completing your purchase. Used or rental books If you rent or purchase a used book with an access code, the access code may have been redeemed previously and you may have to purchase a new access code. Access codes Access codes that are purchased from sellers other than Pearson carry a higher risk of being either the wrong ISBN or a previously redeemed code. Check with the seller prior to purchase. -- The new 6th edition of the highly popular, market-leading Teaching Children to Read, 6/e is a must-have resource for pre-service and new teachers alike. It presents a comprehensive, evidence-based approach to reading instruction that reinforces the centrality of the teacher's role in every aspect of teaching and learning. The authors organize each chapter into seven pillars of evidence-based, effective reading instruction: Teacher Knowledge, Assessment, Evidence-Based Instruction Practices, Response to Intervention, Family and Community Connections, and, new to this edition, Motivation and Engagement, and Technology and New Literacies. The book uses color-coding for each of the seven pillars making navigation of each chapter easy and accessible. ISBN 0133007499 / 9780133007497 Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference Plus MyEducationLab with Pearson eText Package consists of: 0132566060 / 9780132566063 Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference 0133040941 / 9780133040944 NEW MyEducationLab with Pearson eText -- Standalone Access Card -- for Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference
Cooter and Schfer provide a thorough introduction to growth economics through the lens of law and economics. They do a masterful job of weaving in historical anecdotes from all over the world, detailed discussions of historical transformations, theoretical literature, empirical studies, and numerous clever hypotheticals. Scholars as well as general readers will find this book to be very useful and informative."--Henry N. Butler, George Mason University -- "This book distills and presents in a lucid and often even entertaining way the main insights and contributions of law and economics to meeting the challenges of growth for developing countries. Cooter and Schfer argue that market freedom is the key to growth, but that it needs to be sustained by the appropriate legal rules and institutions."--Robert Howse, coauthor of "The Regulation of International Trade.
How tort, contract, and restitution law can be reformed to better serve the social good Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good. In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.
Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.
Introduction to public law and economics -- Theory of bargaining -- Bargaining applications -- Theory of voting -- Voting applications -- Theory of entrenchment -- Entrenchment applications -- Theory of delegation -- Delegation applications -- Theory of adjudication -- Adjudication applications -- Theory of enforcement -- Enforcement applications.
Thoroughly revised to reflect new advances in the field, Savage & Aronson’s Comprehensive Textbook of Perioperative and Critical Care Echocardiography, Third Edition, remains the definitive text and reference on transesophageal echocardiography (TEE). Edited by Drs. Alina Nicoara, Robert M. Savage, Nikolaos J. Skubas, Stanton K. Shernan, and Christopher A. Troianos, this authoritative reference covers material relevant for daily clinical practice in operating rooms and procedural areas, preparation for certification examinations, use of echocardiography in the critical care setting, and advanced applications relevant to current certification and practice guidelines.
Although Arly Poole seems bound to follow in his father's footsteps as a field worker in Jailtown, Florida, where his family lives in 1927 in the shadow of a cruel boss, his world suddenly seems larger when a schoolteacher comes to town.
Solid economic analysis and examples are included in this text. The latest microeconomic theory is used to develop economic theories concerning the core areas of the laws - property, contracts, torts and crime. These economic theories are then used to analyze topics in each of the four key areas.
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