From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe. Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.
Cutting the Fuse offers a wealth of new knowledge about the origins of suicide terrorism and strategies to stop it. Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman have examined every suicide terrorist attack worldwide from 1980 to 2009, and the insights they have gleaned from that data fundamentally challenge how we understand the root causes of terrorist campaigns today—and reveal why the War on Terror has been ultimately counterproductive. Through a close analysis of suicide campaigns by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka, the authors provide powerful new evidence that, contrary to popular and dangerously mistaken belief, only a tiny minority of these attacks are motivated solely by religion. Instead, the root cause is foreign military occupation, which triggers secular and religious people alike to carry out suicide attacks.Cutting the Fuse calls for new, effective solutions that America and its allies can sustain for decades, relying less on ground troops in Muslim countries and more on offshore, over-the-horizon military forces along with political and economic strategies that empower local communities to stop terrorists in their midst.
This book develops an "empirical realist" theory to enable the United States to respond effectively to rising security threats and to seize new opportunities for global governance more successfully than have past policies. A synthesis of peace research and security studies shows that a global grand strategy for human security, with U.S. national security folded into it, is likely to produce more security for the United States than a grand strategy for national security pursued as an end in itself. More security advantages are likely to result from maximizing the "causes" or correlates of peace than from maximizing U.S. military power. Peace reigns when these correlates are present: all nations' security fears are addressed; people can meet basic needs; nations enjoy reciprocal rights and duties; they are treated equitably; their lives are predictable because the international system is governed by the rule of law; and they participate in the decisions that affect their lives through fair representation in democratic global governing processes. This approach revolutionizes thinking about national security policy by transforming it into human security policy. Evidence suggests that the anarchic, militarized balance-of-power system can be gradually changed with help from enhanced international lawmaking and enforcing capacities. To promote change, concerned policymakers and citizens could withdraw their support from U.S. policies that do not serve the common good and work to implement a global grand strategy for human security that would simultaneously serve U.S. security interests and uphold the value of human dignity for all"--
Includes a new Afterword Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In Dying to Win, Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers–and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi’ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II’s Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history. Dying to Win is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11. “Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants.” –Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris “Provocative . . . Pape wants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise.” –Henry Schuster, CNN.com “Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East.” –The Washington Post Book World “Brilliant.” –Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.
In The Anatomy of Deception, Abele reconstructs the public dialogue that led to the United States collectively making the decision to invade and occupy the sovereign nation of Iraq. The book examines this public debate concerning the invasion and occupation of Iraq and focuses on thinking critically about the decision. It will be argued here that the structure of the public case made for invading Iraq showed itself at that time to be a manipulation of evidence for a predetermined conclusion. This book is intended to challenge readers to debate such important issues more deeply, more reflectively, and with more ethical commitment than prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. If we do not commit ourselves to that, and set about righting the wrongs done in the public debate regarding Iraq, we will find ourselves in many more wars to come, for no other reason than the self-interests of those who seek to enhance their own profit and/or power.
Wall Street Journal Bestseller "The pick of 2014's management books." –Andrew Hill, Financial Times "One of the top business books of the year." –Harvey Schacter, The Globe and Mail Bestselling author, Robert Sutton and Stanford colleague, Huggy Rao tackle a challenge that determines every organization’s success: how to scale up farther, faster, and more effectively as an organization grows. Sutton and Rao have devoted much of the last decade to uncovering what it takes to build and uncover pockets of exemplary performance, to help spread them, and to keep recharging organizations with ever better work practices. Drawing on inside accounts and case studies and academic research from a wealth of industries-- including start-ups, pharmaceuticals, airlines, retail, financial services, high-tech, education, non-profits, government, and healthcare-- Sutton and Rao identify the key scaling challenges that confront every organization. They tackle the difficult trade-offs that organizations must make between whether to encourage individualized approaches tailored to local needs or to replicate the same practices and customs as an organization or program expands. They reveal how the best leaders and teams develop, spread, and instill the right mindsets in their people-- rather than ruining or watering down the very things that have fueled successful growth in the past. They unpack the principles that help to cascade excellence throughout an organization, as well as show how to eliminate destructive beliefs and behaviors that will hold them back. Scaling Up Excellence is the first major business book devoted to this universal and vexing challenge and it is destined to become the standard bearer in the field.
From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe.Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.
Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but there is great confusion as to why. In this paradigm-shifting analysis, University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape has collected groundbreaking evidence to explain the strategic, social, and individual factors responsible for this growing threat. One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject, Professor Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. With striking clarity and precision, Professor Pape uses this unprecedented research to debunk widely held misconceptions about the nature of suicide terrorism and provide a new lens that makes sense of the threat we face. FACT: Suicide terrorism is not primarily a product of Islamic fundamentalism. FACT: The world’s leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka–a secular, Marxist-Leninist group drawn from Hindu families. FACT: Ninety-five percent of suicide terrorist attacks occur as part of coherent campaigns organized by large militant organizations with significant public support. FACT: Every suicide terrorist campaign has had a clear goal that is secular and political: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. FACT: Al-Qaeda fits the above pattern. Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, one major objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf region, and as a result there have been repeated attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole. FACT: Despite their rhetoric, democracies–including the United States–have routinely made concessions to suicide terrorists. Suicide terrorism is on the rise because terrorists have learned that it’s effective. In this wide-ranging analysis, Professor Pape offers the essential tools to forecast when some groups are likely to resort to suicide terrorism and when they are not. He also provides the first comprehensive demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers. With data from more than 460 such attackers–including the names of 333–we now know that these individuals are not mainly poor, desperate criminals or uneducated religious fanatics but are often well-educated, middle-class political activists. More than simply advancing new theory and facts, these pages also answer key questions about the war on terror: • Are we safer now than we were before September 11? • Was the invasion of Iraq a good counterterrorist move? • Is al-Qaeda stronger now than it was before September 11? Professor Pape answers these questions with analysis grounded in fact, not politics, and recommends concrete ways for today’s states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks. Military options may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but a lasting solution to suicide terrorism will require a comprehensive, long-term approach–one that abandons visions of empire and relies on a combined strategy of vigorous homeland security, nation building in troubled states, and greater energy independence. For both policy makers and the general public, Dying to Win transcends speculation with systematic scholarship, making it one of the most important political studies of recent time.
As one of the most innovative and influential thinkers in international relations for more than three decades, Robert O. Keohane's groundbreaking work in institutional theory has redefined our understanding of international political economy. Consisting of a selection of his most recent essays, this absorbing book address such core issues as interdependence, institutions, the development of international law, globalization and global governance. The essays are placed in historical and intellectual context by a substantial new introduction outlining the developments in Keohane's thought, and in an original afterword, the author offers a challenging interpretation of the September 11th attacks and their aftermath. Undoubtedly, this book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in international relations.
The United States today is the most powerful nation in the world, perhaps even stronger than Rome was during its heyday. It is likely to remain the world's preeminent power for at least several decades to come. What behavior is appropriate for such a powerful state? To answer this question, Robert J. Art concentrates on "grand strategy"-the deployment of military power in both peace and war to support foreign policy goals. He first defines America's contemporary national interests and the specific threats they face, then identifies seven grand strategies that the United States might contemplate, examining each in relation to America's interests. The seven are: •dominion-forcibly trying to remake the world in America's own image; • global collective security-attempting to keep the peace everywhere; •regional collective security-confining peacekeeping efforts to Europe; • cooperative security-seeking to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting other states' offensive capabilities; • isolationism-withdrawing from all military involvement beyond U.S. borders; •containment-holding the line against aggressor states; and •selective engagement-choosing to prevent or to become involved only in those conflicts that pose a threat to the country's long-term interests. Art makes a strong case for selective engagement as the most desirable strategy for contemporary America. It is the one that seeks to forestall dangers, not simply react to them; that is politically viable, at home and abroad; and that protects all U.S. interests, both essential and desirable. Art concludes that "selective engagement is not a strategy for all times, but it is the best grand strategy for these times.
This revised edition of Seeking Security in an Insecure World provides a thorough, accessible introduction to contemporary security studies. All chapters are updated and a wide range of new topics are discussed, including the Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in East Ukraine, the global refugee crisis, China’s military buildup, the impact of fracking on oil and gas markets, and rapidly evolving cyberwar capabilities. Each chapter also addresses what has been and can be done to enhance security. Overall, Seeking Security in an Insecure World offers a clear and compelling framework for understanding what security means today and how it can best be achieved.
Is it possible for two combatants who possess equally strong air forces to conduct limited warfare by restraining air operations? In Restraining Air Power, Robert C. Owen and contributing authors aim to answer this question by providing theoretical and empirical assessments of restrained air warfare through five historical case studies since 1945. Through an objective analysis of the past, this collection evaluates the principles of escalation and escalation management in conventional warfare scenarios to better understand when, why, and how peer opponents in past conflicts have expanded or restrained air operations. The surge in cyber warfare, the development of artificially intelligent weaponry, and the founding of the United States Space Force in 2019 mean that analysts and military planners must be prepared to think about escalation management and peer conflict in increasingly complicated and arduous ways. This comprehensive study provides readers with refined theoretical visions of the possibilities and challenges of managing escalation as a powerful mode of warfare between opponents who believe they must choose between sacrificing their own national interests or risking escalated destruction of their economies, military forces, and governing authority. The analysis within the pages of this volume updates our understanding of air warfare within a world of unprecedented military complexity and, as such, will hold immense value for specialists in advanced military studies as well as those studying international relations and history.
This volume provides a coherent and comprehensive understanding of Chinese security policy, comprising essays written by one of America's leading scholars. Chinese Security Policy covers such fundamental areas as the role of international structure in state behavior, the use of force in international politics (including deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and war), and the sources of great-power conflict and cooperation and balance of power politics, with a recent focus on international power transitions. The research integrates the realist literature with key issues in Chinese foreign policy, thereby placing China’s behaviour in the larger context of the international political system. Within this framework, Chinese Security Policy considers the importance of domestic politics and leadership in Chinese policy making. This book examines how Chinese strategic vulnerability since U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s has compelled Beijing to seek cooperation with the United States and to avoid U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. It also addresses the implications of the rise of China for the security of both United States and of Chinese neighbors in East Asia, and considers the implications of China’s rise for the regional balance of power and the emerging twenty-first century East Asian security order. This book will be of great interest to all students of Chinese Security and Foreign Policy, Chinese and Asian Politics, US foreign policy and International Security in general.
Linger on the mezzanines of fantastic movie palaces like the Oriental, sample the confectionary delights of Krantz Candies or recklessly splurge on dress shields or mustache wax at dime stores like Kresges or Woolworths. Allow yourself to be enchanted by the painstakingly prepared displays at Marshall Fields, but leave plenty of time to visit Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., The Fair, Montgomery Ward, Goldblatts, Wieboldts and the Boston Store. Above all, meet the people behind the glitter and glamour of State Street who poured so much heartfelt energy into making it the magical place that it was. From its first bricks to future projects, Robert P. Ledermann lovingly recounts the history of this unique thoroughfare.
The focus of this paper will be on the 1 August 1943 bombing raid on the Ploesti oil field and refineries by an American task force composed of bombardment groups of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. The Ploesti raid stood apart from the rest of the war in the air. The idea for it, and the unusual tactics employed, came from the top; it generated from General Arnold’s headquarters and was approved by President Roosevelt. Winston Churchill called Ploesti “the taproot of German might.” It was not a part of any particular campaign, but was considered vital in itself. It was painstakingly planned and executed relatively quickly by the best-prepared and most experienced force available at the time. It was also fought with unparalleled bravery, the sole action of the war for which five Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded. The purpose in examining Ploesti is to first gain a complete understanding of the events leading to the planning for the raid, the raid itself, and finally the impact on the Germans in its aftermath. With this established, the intent is to assess the raid while keeping one fascinating question in mind - after building a doctrine for twenty years based on high altitude, daylight, precision bombing, why, in its first major bombing effort, did the United States “depart from doctrine” and conduct a low level bombing mission on Ploesti, the only low-level bombing mission conducted in the war?
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