This study argues that today's international terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda, is born of neither religion nor poverty, but is merely a cloak of patchy discontent, a symptom of a society gone awry.
Osama bin Laden's demise in May 2011 marked only the symbolic end of an era. By the time of his killing, he no longer represented the Robin Hood icon that once stirred global fascination. Ten years after the 11 September 2001 attacks, jihadi terrorism has largely lost its juggernaut luster. It now mostly resembles a patchwork of self-radicalising local groups with international contacts but without any central organisational design - akin to the radical left terrorism of the 1970s and the anarchist fin-de-siècle terrorism. This volume addresses two issues that remain largely unexplored in contemporary terrorism studies. It rehabilitates the historical and comparative analysis as a way to grasp the essence of terrorism, including its jihadi strand. Crucial similarities with earlier forms of radicalisation and terrorism abound and differences appear generally not fundamental. Likewise, the very concept of radicalisation is seldom questioned anymore. Nevertheless it often lacks conceptual clarity and empirical validation. Once considered a quintessential European phenomenon, the United States too experiences how some of its own citizens radicalise into terrorist violence. This collective work compares radicalisation in both continents and the strategies aimed at de-radicalisation. But it also assesses if the concept merits its reputation as the holy grail of terrorism studies. The volume is aimed at an audience of decision makers, law enforcement officials, academia and think tanks, by its combination of novel thinking, practical experience and a theoretical approach.
Who are They, why are the (not) Coming Back and how Should We Deal with Them? : Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
Who are They, why are the (not) Coming Back and how Should We Deal with Them? : Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
Some 5000 men, women and children have travelled from Europe to Syria and Iraq since 2012. An estimated 1500 of these foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) have returned so far. This report looks into policies on returning foreign fighters in these three countries. It is the very first systematic and in-depth study into national approaches and policies vis-à-vis returnees. Its added value lies in the wealth of data, including data that has not been published before, and, of course, in the comparative angle. The authors hope to offer a reference point for future studies, for both practitioners and researchers. Each of the three country chapters in this report start with an overview of the scope of the FTF challenge, and a profile of the returnees. We also seek to compare current figures with those from previous jihadi conflicts, which is difficult given the paucity of data. Each chapter then looks at the evolution of the perception of this issue among authorities since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2012, and at the development of more coherent policies. Next comes a sequential description of the policies in place to deal with returnees: how to deal with fighters still in the conflict zone, with those that have come back, those in prison and those who have been released. Finally, the sensitive question of what to do about children in the jihadi war zone or recently returned from there is also assessed in some depth. Transcending the national perspectives, David Malet offers a historical perspective on foreign fighters in Europe, explaining that the issue is nothing new – not even in scope.
This study argues that today's international terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda, is born of neither religion nor poverty, but is merely a cloak of patchy discontent, a symptom of a society gone awry.
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