Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.
Prioritarianism holds that improvements in someone's life (gains in well-being) are morally more valuable, the worse off the person would otherwise be. The doctrine is impartial, holding that a gain in one person's life counts exactly the same as an identical gain in the life of anyone equally well off. If we have some duty of beneficence to make the world better, prioritarianism specifies the content of the duty. Unlike the utilitarian, the prioritarian holds that we should not only seek to increase human well-being, but also distribute it fairly across persons, by tilting in favor of the worse off. A variant version adds that we should also give priority to the morally deserving – to saints over scoundrels. The view is a standard for right choice of individual actions and public policies, offering a distinctive alternative to utilitarianism (maximize total well-being), sufficiency (make everyone's condition good enough) and egalitarianism (make everyone's condition the same).
How is it possible to translate egalitarian ideals into practical policy? In this second volume of the Real Utopias Project, John Roemer proposes the creation of an economy which combines a functioning market with a commitment to equality. Roemer's novel mechanism for achieving this end is the creation of two kinds of money: one used for the purchase of goods and the other, referred to as "coupons," for buying shares in companies. All citizens, on reaching the age of majority, are given an equal number of coupons from which they derive ownership rights in companies, including dividends and a vote in board elections. Firms raise finance capital through the state which converts shareholders' coupons into money. At death, all shares and unspent coupons revert to the state for redistribution. This scheme, Roomer argues, allows for a significant degree of government planning and equal distribution of property in the framework of a free market. it is, in short, a working system of market socialism. In the series of critiques which follow, a range of distinguished thinkers engage in lively polemic concerning the practicality and effectiveness of Roemer's scheme. The contributors are Richard Arneson, Fred Block, Harry Brighouse, Michael Burawoy, Joshua Cohen, Nancy Folbre, Andrew Levine, Mieke Meurs, Louis Putterman, Joel Rogers, Debra Satz, Julius Sensat, William Simon, Frank Thompson, Thomas Weisskopf, and Erik Olin Wright.
Today, multidisciplinary approaches to treatment are at the heart of cancer care. They offer improved clinical outcomes, new possibilities in patient quality of life, and enable the development of true innovation in individualized treatment. To accurately reflect this modern day approach to cancer care, the content of the 6th edition of Principles and Practice of Gynecologic Oncology was written entirely by surgeons, medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, and pathologists. New to the editorial team, Dr. Andrew Berchuck has made significant contributions to the understanding of the molecular pathogenesis of ovarian and endometrial cancer in the book’s content. Every chapter of this book has been either completely rewritten or extensively updated to ensure that everyone involved in treating women with gynecologic cancer will have the most comprehensive and up-to-date information on the subject.
The equality jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union has long drawn criticism for its almost total reliance on Aristotle’s doctrine that likes should be treated like, and unlikes unlike. As has often been shown, this is a blunt tool, entrenching assumptions and promoting difference-blindness: the symptoms of simplicity. In this book, Richard Lang proposes that the EU’s judges complement the Aristotelian test with a new one based on Michael Walzer’s theory of Complex Equality, and illustrates how analysing allegedly discriminatory acts, not in terms of comparisons of the actors involved, but rather in terms of distributions and meanings of goods, would enable them to reach decisions with new dexterity and to resolve conflicts without sacrificing diversity.
Prioritarianism holds that improvements in someone's life (gains in well-being) are morally more valuable, the worse off the person would otherwise be. The doctrine is impartial, holding that a gain in one person's life counts exactly the same as an identical gain in the life of anyone equally well off. If we have some duty of beneficence to make the world better, prioritarianism specifies the content of the duty. Unlike the utilitarian, the prioritarian holds that we should not only seek to increase human well-being, but also distribute it fairly across persons, by tilting in favor of the worse off. A variant version adds that we should also give priority to the morally deserving - to saints over scoundrels. The view is a standard for right choice of individual actions and public policies, offering a distinctive alternative to utilitarianism (maximize total well-being), sufficiency (make everyone's condition good enough) and egalitarianism (make everyone's condition the same).
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