During the twenty years before World War I, several key figures worked to improve the foreign service and to reform its appointment system. Richard Hume Werking explores both the methods and the motives of these "master architects." Unlike other scholars, Werking finds that the foundations and general structure of the United States foreign service emerged before World War I. He sees its development as prompted less by foreign crises than by economic conditions—particularly the need to stimulate export trade. Indispensable to its growth were the dedicated efforts of bureaucrats who were loyal to national interests but wished the opportunity to do interesting work and to receive recognition when they did it well.
Based upon classical and contemporary theory and empirical research, this text forms a sociological analysis of organizations, focusing on the impacts that organizations have upon individuals and society.
During the twenty years before World War I, several key figures worked to improve the foreign service and to reform its appointment system. Richard Hume Werking explores both the methods and the motives of these "master architects." Unlike other scholars, Werking finds that the foundations and general structure of the United States foreign service emerged before World War I. He sees its development as prompted less by foreign crises than by economic conditions—particularly the need to stimulate export trade. Indispensable to its growth were the dedicated efforts of bureaucrats who were loyal to national interests but wished the opportunity to do interesting work and to receive recognition when they did it well.
How does one explain America's failure to take bold action to resist the Nazi persecution and murder of European Jews? In contrast to recent writers who place the blame on anti-Semitism in American society at large and within the Roosevelt administration in particular, Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut seek the answer in a detailed analysis of American political realities and bureaucratic processes. Drawing on exhaustive archival research, the authors describe and analyze American immigration policy as well as rescue and relief efforts directed toward European Jewry between 1933 and 1945. They contend that U.S. policy was the product of preexisting restrictive immigration laws; an entrenched State Department bureaucracy committed to a narrow defense of American interests; public opposition to any increase in immigration; and the reluctance of Franklin D. Roosevelt to accept the political risks of humanitarian measures to benefit the European Jews. The authors find that the bureaucrats who made and implemented refugee policy were motivated by institutional priorities and reluctance to take risks, rather than by moral or humanitarian concerns.
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