This is the second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. It argues that the main function of corporate law is to address conflicts of interests and that, despite economic and social diversity, legal strategies employed across jurisdictions are surprisingly similar.
This is the long-awaited third edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively revised and updated to reflect the profound changes in corporate law and governance practices that have taken place since the previous edition. These include numerous regulatory changes following the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the changing landscape of governance, especially in the US, with the ever more central role of institutional investors as (active) owners of corporations. The geographic scope of the coverage has been broadened to include an important emerging economy, Brazil. In addition, the book now incorporates analysis of the burgeoning use of corporate law to protect the interests of "external constituencies" without any contractual relationship to a company, in an attempt to tackle broader social and economic problems. The authors start from the premise that corporations (or companies) in all jurisdictions share the same key legal attributes: legal personality, limited liability, delegated management, transferable shares, and investor ownership. Businesses using the corporate form give rise to three basic types of agency problems: those between managers and shareholders as a class; controlling shareholders and minority shareholders; and shareholders as a class and other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. After identifying the common set of legal strategies used to address these agency problems and discussing their interaction with enforcement institutions, The Anatomy of Corporate Law illustrates how a number of core jurisdictions around the world deploy such strategies. In so doing, the book highlights the many commonalities across jurisdictions and reflects on the reasons why they may differ on specific issues. The analysis covers the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholder meeting, both when management and when a dominant shareholder is in control. It then analyses the role of corporate law in shaping labor relationships, protection of external stakeholders, relationships with creditors, related-party transactions, fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments, takeovers, and the regulation of capital markets. The Anatomy of Corporate Law has established itself as the leading book in the field of comparative corporate law. Across the world, students and scholars at various stages in their careers, from undergraduate law students to well-established authorities in the field, routinely consult this book as a starting point for their inquiries.
Extraordinary authorship adds a unique real-world perspective to Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization. Logical and flexible organization allows for chapters to be taught in any order to accommodate alternative teaching approaches. Rich commentary in the form of explanatory notes facilitates teaching and understanding. Careful case selection and editing presents both classic and important recent cases and an economic-analysis perspective is made accessible through clear and consistent explanatory text. Examples, hypotheticals, and diagrams illustrate conceptual and theoretical models. The text can easily be used in any Business Organization course with a focus on corporate law. New to the Sixth Edition: Extensively revised Chapter on rise of alternative business entities (e.g., LLCs, LPs) and case law pertaining to them such as Dieckman and Miller). Also, we discuss implications of greater contractualization of fiduciary duties in business entities – a theme repeated in numerous places throughout the book. Extensively revised and updated Chapter on corporate voting discussing the impact of institutional investors and asset managers (alternatively hedge funds and index funds); the new SEC rules on proxy advisory firms and shareholder proposals; and the growth of ESG related proposals. Updated and revised discussion on the duty of loyalty, corporate purpose, and the rise of public benefit corporations. Updated and revised discussions in a number of Chapters including on developments related to Caremark duties and compliance programs (e.g., the Marchand decision); Creditor protection; basic finance and valuation; judicial review of executive compensation (e.g., Investors Bancorp); regulation of shareholder litigation (e.g., Trulia; Sciabacucci); insider trading (e.g., Salman, Martoma, and Dozorkho) and fraud on the market. Extensively revised and updated Chapter on Mergers & Acquisitions discussing the rise of deal litigation, appraisal actions, and fair value determinations (e.g., Dell; Aruba; Jarden) along with developments in fiduciary duty class actions related to freeze out mergers under M.F. Worldwide such as Synutra. Extensively revised and updated Chapter on Corporate Control Contests including discussion of Corwin and its progeny including Morrison and PLX. Professors and student will benefit from: Extensive commentary, particularly on Delaware corporate law but also including references to the law in other states and foreign jurisdictions. A coherent conceptual structure, which emphasizes the unique characteristics of fiduciary law as well the basic agency conflicts that underlie corporate law. Tightly edited cases, which make for brief but concentrated reading assignments, together with focused discussion questions. Teaching materials Include: Teacher’s Manual The Teacher’s Manual includes detailed guidance for structuring the course, case analyses, and answers to questions raised in the book. PowerPoint Slides
This overview starts from the premise that corporate law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems - the opportunism of: managers vis-a-vis shareholders; controlling shareholders vis-a-vis minority shareholders; and shareholdersvis-a-vis other corporate constituencies.
The extraordinary authorship of William A. Allen and Reinier Kraakman provides a unique real-world perspective to Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization. Logical and flexible organization allows for chapters to be taught in any order. Rich commentary in the form of explanatory notes facilitates understanding. Careful case selection and editing presents both classic and important recent cases. An economic-analysis perspective is made accessible through clear and consistent explanatory text. Examples, hypotheticals, and diagrams illustrate conceptual and theoretical models. The text can easily be used in a Business Organization course with a focus on corporate law. Features: New chapter on basic finance and valuation concepts that updates materials from earlier editions Extensively revised chapter on the corporate voting system which addresses the success of several governance reforms Updated discussion of the duty of loyalty including Delaware benefit corporations and the demise of Emerald Partners II Up-to-date and authoritative commentary on the Delaware case law A presentation centered on the principal-agent problem, which gives students a functional framework for understanding both statutory law and judicial decisions
This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts, framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets.
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