Raymond L. Garthoff examines the fateful final decade of U.S.-Soviet relations, from the start of the Reagan administration in 1981 through the end of the Soviet era—the collapse of the communist bloc, the end of Gorbachev's failed perestroika, and the demise of the Soviet Union itself at the end of 1991. While standing on its own, the book is a sequel to the author's earlier acclaimed, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, which covers the period 1969-1980. This volume features a detailed examination of the perspectives and actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their interaction, including the interrelationships of domestic factors with foreign and security policies in both countries and the involvement of both powers with other countries around the world, which infringed on their direct relationship. Besides analyzing the turn from confrontation to détente over the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations and Brezhnev through the Gorbachev administration, it reflects on the significance of the great transition from the cold war to a new era. It thus illuminates the very relevant recent history that underlines and informs American-Russian relations and the new situation of a post-Soviet, post-cold war world. Garthoff has obtained access to many formerly secret Soviet documents on this period in the Russian archives, as well as to a number of official American documents that have only recently been declassified. In addition, he has been able to interview and discuss the issues with many active or former Soviet and American officials. The author concludes that the key development was the advent of a Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who recognized the need to cast off a failed world view and to end the cold war—and who successfully moved with the United States, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and others, to achieve that goal; notwithstanding his failure in the parallel attempt to revitalize and transform the Soviet Union. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1994
This book, first published in 1954, is a key analysis of the guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles and methods of the Red Army, in many respects the most powerful force in the Cold War. This analysis examines the strategy and tactics, weapons systems, training, discipline and political doctrine of the Red Army, as well as focusing on the political control of the USSR and its satellite states.
Drawing on a plethora of sources, including decades of contact with senior Soviet figures, Raymond Garthoff offers the most authoritative assessment to date of how Soviet leaders and intelligence chiefs understood--and misunderstood--the United States during the Cold War.
In this memoir, Ambassador Ray Garthoff paints a dynamic diplomatic history of the cold war, tracing the life of the conflict from the vantage points of an observant insider. His intellectually formative years coincided with the earliest days of the cold war, and during his forty-year career, Garthoff participated in some of the most important policymaking of the twentieth century: • In the late 1950s he carried out pioneering research on Soviet military affairs at the Rand Corporation. • During his four-year tenure at the CIA (1957-61), in addition to drafting national intellingence estimates, Garthoff made trips to the Soviet Union with Vice President Richard Nixon and as an interpreter for a delegation from the Atomic Energy Commission. • As a special assistant in the State Department, Garthoff worked with Secretary Dean Rusk., and he was directly involved in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Later he served as executive officer and senior State Department adviser for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) delegation. • In the 1970s he served as a senior Foreign Service inspector, leading missions to a number of countries around the globe. • As U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria (1977-79), Garthoff gained first-hand knowledge of the workings of a communist state and of the Soviet bloc. • In the 1980s, Garthoff wrote two major studies of American-Soviet relations. He traveled to the Soviet Union nearly a dozen times in the final decade of the cold war, and in the early 1990s he had access to the former Soviet Communist Party archives in Moscow. Garthoff¡'s journey through the Cold War informs the views, positions, and actions of the past. His anecdotes and observations will be of great value to those anticipating the challenges of reevaluating American post-cold war security policy.
Raymond L. Garthoff examines the fateful final decade of U.S.- Soviet relations, from the start of the Reagan administration in 1981 through the end of the Soviet era-- the collapse of the communist bloc, the end of Gorbachev's failed perestroika, and the demise of the Soviet Union itself at the end of 1991. While standing on its own, the book is a sequel to the author's earlier acclaimed, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, which covers the period 1969-1980. This volume features a detailed examination of the perspectives and actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their interaction, including the interrelationships of domestic factors with foreign and security policies in both countries and the involvement of both powers with other countries around the world, which infringed on their direct relationship. Besides analyzing the turn from confrontation to détente over the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations and Brezhnev through the Gorbachev administration, it reflects on the significance of the great transition from the cold war to a new era. It thus illuminates the very relevant recent history that underlines and informs American-Russian relations and the new situation of a post-Soviet, post-cold war world. Garthoff has obtained access to many formerly secret Soviet documents on this period in the Russian archives, as well as to a number of official American documents that have only recently been declassified. In addition, he has been able to interview and discuss the issues with many active or former Soviet and American officials. The author concludes that the key development was the advent of a Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who recognized the need to cast off a failed world view and to end the cold war-- and who successfully moved with the United States, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and others, to achieve that goal; notwithstanding his failure in the parallel attempt to revitalize and transform the Soviet Union. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1994
In this book, Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the Cuban Missile Crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations.
The Soviet response to the first edition of Reflections has been a prime example of the new openness under glasnost in discussing previously taboo subjects. Using new revelations—such as the fact that Moscow had twice as many troops in Cuba as the Kennedy administration believed—from key Soviet and Cuban Sources, Garthoff has revised his earlier analysis to produce the most accurate, eye-opening story yet of the 1963 crisis. In this book Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations. He gives particular attention to the aftermath and "afterlife" of the crisis and to its bearing on current and future policy. In the first edition of the book in 1987 the Garthoff presented a number of facts for the first time. Since then, more information has become available, particularly form Soviet sources, in part from conferences in which Garthoff participated but even more from individual interviews and research. This new information, much of it presented here in this volume for the first time, helps to fill in gaps in our knowledge about events and motivations on the Soviet side. More importantly, it enlarges our understanding of the crisis interaction.
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